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Preface
Auditing Symposium VIII was made possible by the generous financial
support provided by the Touche Ross Foundation. The 1986 symposium was
the eighth of the series of biennial auditing symposia held at the University of
Kansas. The origination, development and growth of the symposia can be
directly traced to and identified with Howard Stettler who retired from the
faculty of the University of Kansas in May of 1984. Howard was the chairman
for thefirst symposium in 1972 and served as chairman or co-chairman for the
following six symposiums. Our job as co-chairmen was made substantially
easier by following the format so meticulously developed and implemented by
Howard over the past 14 years.
Topics for the symposium and individuals to serve as presenters and
discussants were selected by us after extensive consultations with members of
the faculty at the University of Kansas and professionals in the auditing area at
other universities and in practice. We are indebted to our colleagues in the
accounting area at the University of Kansas, Francis Bush, Harold Cook, Mike
Ettredge, Emeka Ofobike, Wiley Mitchell, Art Thomas and Chet Vanatta, for
their able assistance in planning the symposium and accommodating the many
guests to our campus.
Holding steadfast to tradition, thefirst paper presented at the symposium
was devoted to the historical coverage of auditing. The primary criteria used to
select topics for the other papers was current interest and relevancy to the
profession. When an academician was selected as the presenter, a practitioner
was selected as the discussant and vice versa. All papers, except for the paper
presented during the evening after dinner, were distributed in advance.
Because of the opportunity for advance preparation by all participants, the
presenter was allowed only ten minutes to make summary remarks and
observations about the paper. After the discussant's comments, which generally were limited to 20 minutes, an hour was available for open discussion. As
expected, the opportunity for leading academicians and practitioners in the
auditing area to interact in discussion and debate with respect to many of the
major issues confronted by the profession provided for lively discussion and
debate. Unfortunately, it has not been feasible to record and reproduce these
discussions for the benefit of others.
Aboutfifty invited practitioners and academicians participated in the twoday symposium, and those individuals are listed prior to the contents page.
Many observers such as doctoral graduate students, faculty members from
accounting and other disciplines, and practitioners in the area attended parts of
the symposium as observers. For those who might like an opportunity to
participate in the discussions at a future symposium, we would be pleased to
receive an indication of your interest.
The proceedings of each of the symposia except thefirst are still in print
and may be purchased from
KANSAS UNION BOOKSTORE
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045

Proceedings are shipped only on a prepaid basis. The prepaid price covers
mailing costs with the exception of orders outside of the United States and
Canada, in which case an additional $2.00 should be included for surface
transportation. The papers included in each of the available proceedings, the
authors of those papers, and the prepaid price of each volume from the Kansas
Union Bookstore are given below for the benefit of those who may wish to
refer to a paper in one of the previous volumes.
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"Under the Spreading Chestnut Tree"
Accountants' Legal Liability—
A Historical Perspective
Paul J. Ostling*
Arthur Young & Co.

I. Introduction
It is difficult these days to read a week's worth of newspaper financial
sections and business magazines withoutfinding an article, sometimes lurid,
discussing the role and liabilities of the public auditor. Those within the
profession often view this attention as an undeserved, new development.
Certainly the frequency, scope, and magnitude of civil suits against auditors
have grown. There has, however, always been a close connection between the
legal liabilities imposed upon auditors and the standards adopted by the
profession—as well as its perceived scope and responsibilities of practice.
This paper describes some present and recent legal challenges facing the
profession, their historical perspective, and predictions as to possible future
developments. Taken in perspective, current attacks on the profession may be
no more than a maturation and reevaluation of the auditor's standards and role.
As the investor community becomes more sophisticated in its appreciation of
the limitations in the auditor's role pursuant to generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS), and better understands the "gray areas" where generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) permit more than one treatment of
certainfinancial transactions, a credibility gap looms. To reduce the gap, the
courts and legislators are attempting to regulate the profession and impose
more "watchdog" responsibilities. Because of the gap, insurance companies
and bright young graduates, fearful, respectively, of large legal judgments and
less rewarding career opportunities may avoid the accounting profession.
Counter-productive activities of the professionals themselves and their
representative associations may be complicating this trend. Nearly predatory
competition drives the price of audit services downward at the very same time
that the attendant risks are skyrocketing. Legislative "overseers" lambast the
profession, often inaccurately and unjustifiably, but the associations often seem
timid by comparison in their response. Public auditors must act quickly and
affirmatively to resolve these conflicts in order to assure the future growth and
profitability of the profession.
* The views expressed herein are those of the author individually.

II. Development of Standards and Liabilities
It is now settled that the role and responsibilities of the public auditor
include the supply of accuratefinancial information to facilitate the function of
the free markets, including the securities markets. This was not always
accepted by the profession as such. Indeed, our predecessors in practice
initially viewed their audience as including only their direct, paying clients.
Auditors vociferously resisted the expansion of their role and responsibilities,
and changes were frequently the result of litigation losses and/or government
intervention.

A. Our United Kingdom Roots
While there are reports of "auditors" having counting responsibilities
during biblical times, the analysis of the evolution of accountants' legal liabilities
must commence in the United Kingdom. It comes as no great surprise to even
the less scholarly students of the profession that the modern auditing
profession as we know it evolved in England and Scotland.
— Laws permitting the formation of corporate entities (whose ownership was
represented by and transferable through stock) and the concept of "limited
liability" (that a shareholder is liable to the extent of his capital invested in
purchasing stock, but is not "personally liable") were passed there during the
1840's and 1850's. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 18441 required that a
"full and fair'' balance sheet be sent to shareholders before their meetings and
filed with the Registrar of Companies. Auditors (who were to be non-officeholding stock-holders) were required to be appointed to report on the balance
sheet. There were no meaningful legal requirements or standards as to the
form or content of the balance sheets or the manner of the conduct of the
auditors' reviews. There were no enforcement provisions relating to the
content or thefiling of the balance sheet with the Registrar of Companies. The
1844 Act should not be thought of as anything approaching our own federal or
state securities laws.
Because the balance sheets were standardless and the "audits" were a
perfunctory checking of support for disbursements there was little faith by
third parties in either the fullness or fairness of the balance sheets.2 The
balance sheet requirement was dropped in 1856,3 and the matter of accounting
and auditing was left up to the corporations themselves. It was not until 1900
that all registrants under the Companies Act were again required to have
annual audits conducted. In 1907, they were again required tofile their balance
sheets.4
In thefifty-year interim, however, certain industry-specific requirements
were enacted. During the late 1860's railroad companies were required to
publish their accounts; during the 1870's banks were required to audit their
accounts and gas companies to publish theirs; and in the early 1880's electrical
companies were to publish their accounts. These industries were regarded as
special because of the public trust in their operations, or the speculative nature
of their early operations. In the meantime, the accounting profession was
beginning to organize and establish standards. In Scotland, the Society of
Accountants in Edinburgh was granted a royal charter in 1854. In England, a
charter was granted to The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
2

Wales in 1880. Two other associations were formed in Scotland, and in England
the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors was formed in 1885. In
both Scotland and England these groups agreed upon uniform examinations for
new members (designated chartered accountant or C.A.) as well as apprenticeship programs.5
The British audit during the 1880's evolved as having the primary goal of
uncovering fraud. Detailed bookkeeping-type examinations reviewed the numbers in the books of account. Courses in study evolved in auditing, and a
textbook was prepared. Customs developed for the preparation of the auditors'
"certification". The Scots and English auditors had acquired some status and
had established some commonly accepted auditing and accounting "standards"
by 1900, when all registered companies were required to have audits
conducted. For example, the use of the term "certificate" to describe the
report, and the representation thatfinancial statements "present fairly" were
English customs. This is not to say, however, that auditors' "legal liabilities"
had been yet fully examined.
For the most part the manner of report and the procedures applied were
determined by the corporation's articles of incorporation and the engagement
contract between the auditor and the client. In most cases the company's
articles required that the balance sheet be "full and fair" and prepared to
display the "true and correct" picture of the company's "state of affairs."
This requirement was based upon the model articles of incorporation appended
to the 1856 Companies Act.6 The earliest reported losing cases involving
auditors arose in England prior to 1900, and focused upon whether the
auditor's certificate had adequately communicated the "state of affairs" of the
company.7
In the case of Leeds Estate, the auditor's certificate for seven years, 1874
through 1880, said:
I certify that I have examined the above accounts andfind them to be a
true copy of those [shown] in the books of the company.
While escaping damages because that statute of limitations had run, the
auditor was found guilty of negligence to its client for failing to actually go
behind the numbers presented by management to ascertain their accuracy.
In In re London the auditor's 1892 certificate said:
We have examined the . . . balance-sheet and compared it with the
books of the company; and we certify that it is a correct summary of the
accounts therein recorded. The value of the assets as [shown] on the
balance-sheet is dependent upon their realization.
Again the auditor was found liable for negligence in breaching its duty to its
clients—the shareholders—because the Court felt the words "subject to
realization" was not a qualification which adequately communicated the company's true state of affairs.
Thus, by 1900, some rudimentary legal reporting requirements had been
imposed upon their clients, and the court had just begun to impose a legal duty
3

upon auditors to carry out an audit in accordance with their engagement
contracts. The duty was a narrow one by today's standards, but the auditors
gave those clients some level of comfort with regard to detectingfraud which
was on the clients' books. To be sure, the primary purposes and benefits from
the audit were to assist the client's management in monitoring its financial
matters, ward off defalcations, and securefinancial supportfrom bankers.

B. Migration to America
In 1776, America was essentially an agrarian society. While the revolution
removed the yoke of British governmental rule, thefinancial connections which
had already been formed by Britishfinanciers provided much of the capital for
the American industrial revolution. American states passed laws permitting the
formation of corporations. The industrial revolution, corporate growth, and
British investment all led to the birth of the accounting profession in America—
but as a child of the United Kingdom practice.
Individuals, such as Arthur Young, came to America in growing numbers
during the 1880's and 1890's to look after the interests of English investors,
and then began their own practices here—evolving intofirms of accountants.
Englishfirms, such as Price Waterhouse & Co., sent agents of thefirm to the
United States to conduct examinations on behalf of English investors. By 1900,
Price Waterhouse's activities were significant enough here that Arthur Lowes
Dickenson came to manage them. A young English auditor on his staff at the
time, George O. May, succeeded Dickenson as senior partner in America in
1911, remained in the post until 1940, and had an incredible influence upon the
manner of practice and the development of standards in America. An American
of the day, Colonel Robert Montgomery, was also an early leader in establishing
the American practice. He was a CPA, a lawyer, a militaryfigure, a Columbia
University professor, and president of the associations which eventually
became the AICPA. In 1905, he edited thefirst American textbook on auditing
(called, simply Auditing) which was, naturally, an adaptation of the leading
English text of the day.
In 1896, New York was the first state to pass a law designating the
professional title of Certified Public Accountant. Other states quickly followed.
Likewise, uniform tests for CPAs were developed early in this century.
Through this period, however, the American practice, in terms of procedures
and process, was little more than an extension of the Scots and English
methodologies. Indeed, most of the leading U.S.firms were led by Scots and
Englishmen until the early 1960's. For at least thefirst quarter of the century,
the bulk of audit "staffmen" were importedfrom the United Kingdom. Thus,
as in England, the focus in America was initially upon auditing as a report to
management rather than as a review of management's report to investors and
lenders of its own stewardship. Much of the development of the auditor's legal
liabilities over the past 53 years has focused on this change in the audit's
emphasis to a review of the managment'sfinancial report to third-party users
of financial information.

4

C. Early Development of Standards in America
Pressure for a change in emphasis in the purpose of financial reporting and
auditing began early in this century. Before the great stock market crash of
1929, ownership of stocks and bonds became more than a game for the
wealthy. Many small, individual purchasers—relatively unsophisticated and in
large measurefinancing their purchases with borrowed money—entered the
stock market. Investors wanted more and more accuratefinancial information,
and critics wanted more standardization of accounting and reporting practices.
The new investing audience was more interested "in the income statement and
less in the balance sheet." 8 Despite this need for more standardization,
practices varied substantially on subjects such as depreciation and reporting of
income statements. Critics of the profession complained of the lack of
standardization, the inadequacy of financial information, and the manipulative
practices which abounded.9
Three developments between 1916 and 1934 went far in the United States
to formulate standards and define the duties and liabilities of auditors. In 1916
the Secretary of Commerce (William Redfield), the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) requested the American Institute
of Accountants (AIA) to prepare a memorandum on balance sheet audits. Since
many of the audits conducted had been balance sheet audits done without actual
observation of inventories and assets, they were concerned about the integrity
of financial information of the day.
The AIA committee, which included George May and Robert Montgomery,
adopted a Price Waterhouse internal memorandum entitled Memorandum on
Balance Sheet Audits. This memorandum was approved and accepted by the
FTC and the FRB and published initially in 1917 in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin. It was revised and republished several times before 1930. The AIA
itself revised the memorandum and published it in 1936 as Examination of
Financial Statements by Independent Public Accountants. While this effort
resulted in some standardization and definition of the auditor's role, it still did
not require observation or testing of inventories or the confirmation of
receivables. It would be left to a major scandal for that to occur.
The second major occurrence in the development of standards began from
a 1927 AIA initiative, when it approached, but was turned down by the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), to jointly developfinancial reporting requirements for NYSE registrants. After the 1929 crash, the NYSE reversed itself
and asked for the AIA's help in developing accounting principles. George May
was called into service yet again to chair two separate committees to cooperate
with exchanges and develop accounting principles.
May's committees did not support the adoption of a set of specific
directives of accounting treatment, but suggested in 1932 "very broad limits
[of accounting treatments within which reporting companies would make]
disclosure of the methods employed and consistency in their application from
year to year. " 1 0 In 1933 the NYSE required all new registrants to have audited
annualfinancial reports, but made no requirements for disclosure of accounting
methods. May's committees published a pamphlet in 1934 called "Audits of
Corporate Accounts" and recommended a new form of audit report which used
the words: "fairly present, in accordance with accepted principles of account5

ing consistently maintained." In 1940 the reference to "accepted principles of
accounting" became "generally accepted accounting principles." From 1934
on, the profession recommended that companies choose accounting methods
"within very broad limits" and identify them in thefinancial statements. Thus
the concept of GAAP was born—with the built-inflexibilities upon which many
of today's critics harp.
The third major occurrence in the period was the enactment of the
Securities Act of 193311 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12 Before
these enactments, no laws in the U.S. required auditedfinancial statements for
"public companies." When initially passed, the Securities Act was enforced by
the FTC, which quickly published regulations for the determination of independence of auditors and uniform accounting rules. The Securities Act requires
registration of new securities via a registration "statement" including financial
statements certified by an independent accountant. The 1933 Act imposes
significant legal liabilities upon experts identified in the registration statements
for false statements in the portions of the report as to which they are experts.
It also prohibits fraud in connection with the sale of new securities.
The 1934 Act is an overlay beyond the 1933 Act which created the SEC to
enforce both Acts. It prohibits false statements in connection with the sale of
securities, and was particularly significant in its impact upon public auditors in
the context of private securities fraud suits. The 1933 and 1934 Acts and the
regulations promulgated thereunder clearly established concrete standards,
roles, and liabilities for American auditors.

D. The Agony of Defeat
The late 1930's marked the beginning of litigation in the United States
which had direct impact upon the duties and liabilities of auditors. This paper
cannot relate all cases which have historical significance, but several have had
"landmark" results upon the profession.

1. Testing Inventories and Assets
The McKesson & Robbins case is the most significant "early" auditing case
in America. Philip Musica, alias Frank Donald Coster, was a con man. His first
scrape with American justice in 1909 resulted in conviction and a prison
sentence for bribing customs officials and preparing fraudulent invoices and
customs documents. Within three years of leaving prison, he was caught for
bilking twenty-two banks on loans obtained with collateral he did not own. He
spent three years in prison and was placed on probation.
In 1920, Musica claimed to be in the drug business but was actually a
prohibition bootlegger. In 1923, he became the sole owner of Girard &
Company, a manufacturer of drugs. Despite being sole owner, he hired Price
Waterhouse to conduct audits. He studied auditing procedures and noted that
auditors did not observe physical inventories unless requested to do so. In
1926, withfinancial support from bankers, he purchased McKesson & Robbins
which was merged with his company.
In December 1938, Musica was confronted by his treasurer and director
who had uncovered fraud, waste, mismanagement and inclusion of fictitious
inventories and assets exceeding $10 million. A receiver was appointed by a
6

federal judge, and that same day the ever present George May of Price
Waterhouse met with the company's executives and assured them that, as far
as he knew, the books were in order. Eleven days later Musica committed
suicide. Investigation revealed that on stated assets of over $87 million, $10
million in inventory and $9 million of receivables were fictitious.
Price Waterhouse settled the trustee's claim by refunding $522,402.29
representing five years' audit fees. The SEC commenced an investigation
which exposed the lack of agreement among auditors as to what the appropriate
audit procedures were with regard to inventories and receivables. In the wake
of the scandal, but before the SEC could issue its final report, the AIA
established a committee in January 1939, to examine audit procedures. In
October 1939, the AIA issued its Committee on Auditing Procedures'
Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 1: Extensions of Auditing Procedure,
which required observation and testing of physical inventory and confirmation
of receivables.
The SEC's report, which was issued in 194013 contained the following:
• Price Waterhouse was found to be derelict in failing to follow
procedures which a diligent auditor would have used in the circumstances, and which were called for in the authoritative works on
auditing(e.g., Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice (1934), p.
157 and 182).
• While auditors claimed not to be insurers of financial health, "discovery of gross overstatement in the accounts is a major purpose of an
audit
"
• Management's activities are within the scope of an audit, so auditors
should be elected by shareholders.
• The profession did well to publish SAP No. 1, but it should also
distinguish between auditing "standards" and "procedures."
• Regulation S-X was amended so that the auditor's report states
whether the audit was made in accordance with appropriate GAAS.
The profession responded by having the AIA Committee on Auditing
Procedure prepare a statement defining audit standards. In 1947, the AIA
published a brochure incorporating the Committee's memorandum "Tentative
Statement of Auditing Standards—Their Generally Accepted Significance and
Scope." We now know this as Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1. The
statement distinguished between standards (which deal with "quality of
performance and objectives to be attained") and procedures (which "relate to
acts to be performed"). While over the years the interpretations have been
amended from time to time, the three original auditing standards ("General
Standards," "Standards of Field Work" and "Standards of Reporting")
remain the same.
The McKesson & Robbins case is a graphic illustration of how scandal and
litigation can result directly in long-term advances in the definition of a
profession's role, standards, and legal liabilities. Since this case resulted
directly in SAP NO. 1 and SAS No. 1, it is difficult tofind a more seminal
example.
7

2. Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass "Go"
Perhaps the most image-shattering cases for the profession have been
those which resulted in criminal convictions for independent auditors. Recently,
in connection with a federal investigation and indictments relating to a major
financial scandal, a picture of a Big Eight partner being led to his arraignment in
handcuffs appeared on page 1 of the New York Times Business Section. More
recently, a managing partner of a Florida practice office of a major accounting
firm pleaded guilty to several counts of fraud and criminal securities conduct,
including taking a payment from ESM Securities and giving a clean opinion in
the face of fictitious collateral securing millions of dollars of ESM's securities
transactions. In the same case, the company's lawyer (the son-in-law of ESM's
major benefactor) committed suicide. The lurid headlines created by these
criminal financial scandals have a far-reaching impact upon the public's
perception of and respect (or lack thereof) for the profession.
Three such criminal cases have had far-reaching impact upon the profession's self-image and its view of the attendant duties and liabilities. In 1968, a
senior partner, a junior partner, and a senior associate of Lybrand, Ross Bros.
& Montgomery were convicted (after a jury trial) of mail fraud and securities
fraud for certifying the 1962financial statements of Continental Vending
Corporation. The main defense was that thefinancial statements were in
compliance with GAAP. The trial court held, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 14 that compliance with GAAP was not a
complete defense against a charge of criminally certifying a false and misleading
financial statement, and that auditors must report major management misconduct.
The Second Circuit took its task of passing on criminal liability of
professionals quite seriously:
While every criminal conviction is important to the defendant, there is a
special poignancy and a corresponding responsibility on reviewing
judges when, as here, the defendants have been men of blameless lives
and respected members of a learned profession. . . .
In a widely quoted passage, the court enunciated an accountant's legal
responsibility to investigate management dishonesty:
[I]t simply cannot be true that an accountant is under no duty to disclose
what he knows when he has reason to believe that, to a material extent,
a corporation is being operated not to carry out its business in the
interest of all the stockholders but for the private benefit of its
president. For a court to say that all this is immaterial as a matter of law
if only such loans are thought to be collectible would be to say that
independent accountants have no responsibility to reveal known dishonesty by a high corporate officer. If certification does not at least imply
that the corporation has not been looted by insiders so far as the
accountants know, or, if it has been, that the diversion has been made
good beyond peradventure (or adequately reserved against) and effective steps taken to prevent a recurrence, it would mean nothing, and
the reliance placed on it by the public would be a snare and a
dilution. . . .
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The defendants were fined and placed on probation. In 1972, President
Nixon pardoned them.
In 1974, a partner and an audit supervisor were convicted after a jury trial
for criminal violations of the securities law by making false statements in a 1969
proxy statement for National Student Marketing (NSM). On appeal, the
conviction of the partner was affirmed, while the supervisor's was reversed. 15
The partner was sentenced to imprisonment for one year andfined $10,000.
The jail sentence was suspended to 60 days.
The charges centered upon NSM's policy of recognizing revenue which
was selected by the partner and based upon the percentage-of-completion
method. NSM was recognizing revenue when it allegedly received "commitments" onfixed-fee contracts to participate in marketing programs developed
by NSM which were aimed at the "youth market." NSM's utilization of the
method, and its decisions as to when it had "commitments" (i.e. recognizing
revenue on "unbilled accounts receivable") resulted in overstating "net
sales" by approximately $1 million and reporting "net earnings" of $702,270 in
its 1968 Annual Report when there were in fact no earnings at all. NSM
experienced an incredible stock price rise (from $6 to $80 in less than two
years) and used the stock to make a series of acquisitions.
After selecting the percentage-of-completion method for NSM's 1968
financial statements, the partner instructed the supervisor to check on the
commitments. The supervisor did so, but in a haphazard manner by telephone.
No written verifications were sought or received. The partner permitted NSM
to include $1.7 million of such commitments as unbilled receivables for 1968
and this in turn permitted NSM to show a profit instead of a loss. The footnotes
to the annual report'sfinancial statements did not disclose the "flimsy" nature
of the commitments.
Withinfive months of the publication of the 1968financial statements, NSM
had to write off" $1 million of the $1.7 million of commitments. When the
auditors learned of the circumstances of the write-off and the periods they
related to, they netted the reduced earnings against a favorable extraordinary
tax item instead of reducing earnings and sales for the prior period. Thus, the
auditors helped to conceal the actual write-off of profits. NSM then published
the Proxy Statement for the nine months following 1968 without disclosing the
problems with the earlier period.
The Second Circuit noted that the partner's action in allowing bookings on
commitments for 1968 "was contrary to sound accounting practice," 16 and
after discovering the bogus nature of them "[h]onesty should have impelled
[him] to disclose" the problems in the updated footnotes in the Proxy
Statement. The Second Circuit then enunciated what is now called the
"suspicious inquiry doctrine."
Shortly after the Natelli conviction, three independent auditors were
convicted in the aftermath of the Equity Funding Corporation of America
securities scandal. The three were the partner in charge and two audit
managers of Wolfson, Weiner, Ratloff & Lapin which had been merged into
Seidman and Seidman in 1972. After a jury trial, the three were convicted of
multiple counts of securities fraud and filing false SEC documents. The
conviction was upheld on appeal.17 The Equity Funding scandal, which involved
widespread use of computers to perpetrate a massive fraud and the spectacle
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of issuing new insurance policies to dead people to make Equity Funding's
growth track look continuous, was perhaps the most publicized securities
scandal of the 1960's and 1970's. Books have been written about the case.
Careers of attorneys were made while careers of investment advisors and
accountants were destroyed.
These cases, and cases like them, should stand as a beacon for the
profession signifying a line beyond which one cannot go for one's client.
Moreover, they clearly demonstrate that auditors are not exempt from criminal
liability.

3. Expanding Liability to Clients—The "Adverse Interest"
Analysis
Even as criticism of the accounting profession by governmental representatives, investors, customers of failed banks andfinancial services institutions,
and the courts grows, the profession's own clients are expanding the auditor's
responsibilities and liabilities. Thefinancial statements of a company are, legally
and under the accounting literature, management's reports of the company's
financial transactions. It often comes as a rude awakening then, when, after the
client's officers and directors have set accounting policy, prepared the financial
statements, and represented them to be true and accurate to the auditor, the
corporate client disclaims responsibility for the active fraud of its own officers
and directors, and sues the auditor for negligence in failing to discover and/or
disclose thatfraud. There was a time when clients were unable to make these
suits stick, but those days are gone.
The early cases concerning the allocation of blame for financial dishonesty
between the client and the auditor often arose where employees made
defalcations of the client's assets. The issue was generally addressedfrom the
perspective of whether the client should bear responsibility for failure to
properly supervise its employee, or whether the auditor should bear the loss
for negligence in not detecting the employee's dishonesty. Under ancient
common law theories of "agency" or respondeat superior the principal/
employer is responsible for the negligent or wrongful acts committed in the
course of the agent/employee's employment. When the employee actually
steals from his employer, the courts have ruled the illegal deed to be outside
the "scope of employment" (i.e., it is "adverse" to the "interests" of the
employer), and held the agency/respondeat superior doctrines inapplicable to
place the blame on the employer. Rather, in these cases the courts generally
adopted the old contributory negligence standard. Under this approach, even if
the auditor were negligent in detecting thefraud, there would be no liability for
the loss where the client was "contributorially negligent" and thus could have
avoided the loss by the exercise of reasonable care in supervising its own
employee.18 Even in these cases, auditors were sometimes found in "breach of
contract" and had to return their fees to the client.
This standard, which was the most favorable for auditors, began to be
reduced when courts overlaid a requirement that the auditor would not avoid
liability unless the client's contributing negligence somehow contributed to the
auditor's inability to detect the employee's fraud. 19 In such cases, the courts
acknowledged a belief that part of the function of the audit was "detecting
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defalcations which the [company's] negligence ha[d] made possible. . . ."
Thus, there was no automatic defense for the auditor just because the client's
negligence in supervising the errant employee permitted the loss to occur, but
there was a defense when the client's negligence permitted the auditor's
negligence or somehow undercut the auditor's ability to perform its job.
The tightening of the noose around auditors began in a series of cases
which adopted a variant of the "adverse interest" analysis. First, in Shapiro v.
Glekel, 20 the court utilizing the modified negligence test described above
refused to dismiss a case against the auditors of Beck Industries. Beck had
become a conglomerate by acquiring numerous companies in the 1960's. The
president and chairman of Beck's executive board had fraudulently prepared
financial statements which overstated assets and revenues. These inflated
statements helped keep Beck's stock price high, and the stock and fraudulent
statements were used in the acquisitions. Beck went bankrupt. The trustee for
the estate sued the auditors on behalf of Beck arguing that the "outside"
directors would never have authorized the aggressive acquisition program had
they known Beck's truefinancial condition.
The court found that however negligent or unlawful the conduct of Beck's
officers had been, it had not prevented the auditors from performing their
audit. In analyzing the case it is difficult to see how the actions of the president
and his cohorts were not on behalf of Beck and in the scope of employment.
They did not steal from Beck per se, rather they launched a scheme which
aggrandized the company and allowed it to acquire new assets (although surely
their own stock holdings and positions were benefited as well). If the auditors
were able to utilize the respondeat superior argument, they would certainly have
been able to avoid or significantly cushion liability.
To date the courts have refused to permit auditors to use such arguments.
A prime example is In re Investors Funding Corp., 21 where the company's
officers' attempted bribes led directly to the company's failure. In suing the
auditors after the company failed, the trustee claimed that the officers' fraud
and mismanagement would not have continued "but for" the auditor's actions.
The auditor staked its defense on the claim that it was a victim of the officers'
fraud, and not responsible for it. The court referred to the principles of
respondeat superior and observed that the adverse interest test (which lets the
employer off the hook when the employee's acts are "adverse" to the
employer") does not apply when the employee is acting at least partly for the
employer's benefit "even though the agent's primary interest is inimical to that
of the principal."
Nevertheless, the court refused to dismiss the trustee's case and found
that the officers' scheme to keep the company afloat was not even partly for the
benefit of the company. It accepted the trustee's allegations that the officers'
false financial statements prolonged the company's "artificial solvency," and
this was "predominantly antagonistic" to the company's interests. The court
held that this benefited only the officers and not the company.
Auditors have had a bright moment in the interim, such as in a case where
the court found a company's officers had turned the company into "an engine
of theft against outsiders" and refused to permit recovery on behalf of the
company against its auditors. 22 But for the most part, the courts have refused
to follow such logic, and refuse to saddle a client with the fraudulent or even
11

criminal acts of its own officers and directors, and do permit recovery against
auditors. 23
An interesting irony has developed with regard to the auditor's legal
liabilities as opposed to those of the officers and directors of America's larger
public companies. The former have come to be regarded as having a higher
standard of diligence and care—they are the "watchdogs"24—than the officers
and directors of their clients who have the underlying duty to honestly and
faithfully account to the public for their stewardship. Auditors have not been
permitted to avoid the acts of their own employees who have been found to
have hadfraudulent intent (even where no partners have such intent) again,
because the special duties of auditors require them to be even more vigilant in
monitoring their employees.25
In essence, the courts have permitted corporations whose downfall is
attributable to their own leaders to disclaim responsibility because the leaders'
acts were so wrongful as to be "ultra vires"—even though the corporation may
have been aggrandized, incurred increased assets, and grown in share price as
a result of those acts before the acts were discovered. The very shareholders
and creditors of the corporations have then been permitted to collect millions of
dollars in damagesfrom auditors and their insurers to pay for the ensuing drop
in share price, the debts, and the shortfalls created by the wrongdoers. On the
contrary, the courts have not permitted auditing firms to escape liability where
the acts of partners or junior auditors are clearly and undeniably contrary to the
audit firms' overall interests and their own published policies and procedures. 26
Has the pendulum swung too far? Should corporations, their shareholders and
creditors (whofrequently have significant corporate governance power through
debt covenants and agreements) share in the responsibility for ensuring that
their corporate leaders prepare and release accuratefinancial statements?

III. Expansion of the "Protected" Class
The subject of the expansion of class of those who will be permitted to bring
suit against the auditor always begins with a discussion of Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 27 even though Ultramares was not thefirst case to restrict the class of
those entitled to sue an auditor.28 In Ultramares, Touche, Niven & Co. was
retained to prepare and report on the balance sheet of Fred Stern & Co. as of
December 31, 1923, as they had done for three prior years. Fred Stern
financed his company through extensive borrowings, and Touche knew how
Sternfinanced the company. Touche was aware that Stern would show its
certified balance sheet to creditors. Touche supplied Stern with 32 copies of
the balance sheet, each as a counterpart original. There was, however, no
specific agreement with Touche as to who would see the balance sheets or how
many times they might be used. There was no identification of Ultramares, no
communication between Touche and Ultramares, and Ultramares had not been
a Stern creditor in earlier years. The subject of who would look at the balance
sheet was left indefinite.
The audit wasfinished and a net worth of more than $1 million was indicated
in the balance sheet. Touche issued a clean opinion. The books had been
falsified, and Stern was actually insolvent. Ultramares saw the balance sheet
and extended substantial credit to Stern before discovery of the insolvency. It
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sued Touche claiming the audit was negligent or fraudulent. There was no
indication of fraudulent intent ("scienter") and the trial judge dismissed the
fraud claim, but the jury found Touche negligent. The judge granted Touche a
dismissal judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Appellate Division reversed the judge's holding and held Touche negligent.
On appeal, New York's highest court reversed and found for Touche. In an
eloquent opinion the famous Judge Cardozo rejected "the assault on the citadel
of privity." "Privity" is the close relationship which exists between parties to
a contract. Cardozo was concerned to prevent the expansion of liability for
"negligent words" from growing to duplicate an action in fraud in the absence
of the "indispensable element" of scienter. In this sense he was four decades
ahead of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder. 29
Dispensing with the issue of fraud since there was none, Cardozo turned to
negligence. He held that auditors cannot be liable for negligence to third parties
where the auditor could only foresee the third-party plaintiff in a general way.
This was the case where plaintiff's loans to the audit client were within a "wide
range of transactions in which a certificate of audit might be expected to play a
part." Cardozo refused to unnecessarily enlarge the class of third parties
which might sue auditors:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether
aflaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences.
Judge Cardozo made it clear that he had no intention of "emancipating"
auditorsfrom liability. He simply would not extend it to an "indefinite'' group of
third parties in the absence of more than mere negligence. Much of what has
happened in the auditor's legal liability during the last fifty years can be viewed
as ebbs andflows in the application of the privity doctrine.

A. Privity and Unaudited Financial Statements
Conflicting opinions as to the range of accountants' liability have led courts
to issue confusing decisions where unaudited statements are involved. In a
number of cases, auditors have been found liable to their client for non-audit
work, 30 and to the public in actions by the SEC or criminal authorities.31 In
Natelli, supra, the court adopted what has come to be referred to as the
"suspicious inquiry" standard in connection with accountants involved in
preparing unaudited financial statements. The auditor has a duty to investigate
figures known by him to be suspicious, and to insist upon corrections in
published reports, even though no audit is conducted.
In cases involving nonaudited statements, the courts frequently frame the
critical issue as the question of extending accountants' liability to third parties
who are not in privity. One line of case law continues to accept the Ultramares
approach, while other courts take issue with Ultramares and generally rely on
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) standard in assessing the
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extent of the accountants' liability. Section 552 of the Restatement rejects
Ultramares to the extent that privity is the sole definitional criterion of duty.
The Restatement standard for negligent misrepresentation seems to be
"knowing reliance" rather than "reasonable foreseeability," the latter being
the hallmark of the negligence determination in other areas of tort law. Courts
using this analysis tofind liability focus on whether the accountant knew the
third party would rely upon thefinancial statement.
In Bonhiver v. Graff, 32 the Minnesota Supreme Court found an accountant
liable to a third party, a receiver of an insurance company, for failing to discover
an embezzlement during a write-up engagement that was never completed.
The court based its decision on the fact that the accountant had audited the firm
in a prior year and was aware of its poorfinancial condition. When the
accountant personally showed his workpapers andfigures to state examiners
who relied on such data, such knowledge on the defendants' part "rendered
them liable for their negligence" in the preparation of those workpapers. For
authority, the court analogized to the Natelli case. For additional authority
Restatement § 552 was applied.
A classic example of the Restatement reasoning is in Ryan v. Kanne. 33
There, the Iowa Supreme Court dealt a blow to the concept of privity,
increasing considerably the accountant's potential liability to third parties.
Kanne owned and operated certain businesses, including lumber companies,
which had incurred considerable indebtedness. He sought the services of an
accountant at the insistence of the officers of a creditor. The accountants were
to determine the true amount of the accounts payable. The accountant
submittedfinancal statements clearly marked "unaudited," but an accompanying letter described certain confirmation procedures which the accountants had
undertaken to verify the accuracy of theirfigures. When Kanne Lumber and
Supply, Inc. was incorporated and took over the assets and liabilities of Kanne's
lumber business, it discovered that the accounts payable were incorrect.
The Ryan court looked to Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin,34 as establishing the
guiding principle to be followed for determining auditor responsibility in this
context. In Rusch Factors, which involved a certified financial statement, the
federal district court expressed considerable doubt about the wisdom of
Ultramares:
Why should an innocent party be forced to carry the weighty burden of
an accountants' professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more
easily distributed and fairly spread by impositing [sic] it on the
accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the
risk on to its customers, who can in turn pass the costs on to the entire
consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the
cautionary techniques of the accounting profession?
The Ryan court concluded that "the test to be adopted is whether the third
party to whom the accountant owes a duty of care is actually foreseen and a
member of a limited class of persons contemplated." Recovery for negligence
is limited "to persons for whose benefit and guidance the accountant knows the
information is intended." The court approved the more liberal Restatement
position but declined to say whether liability should extend to all foreseeable
third parties.
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Despite the fact that the statements were clearly labeled "unaudited," the
court was unwilling to accept the accounting profession's concept of unaudited
services, a rejection which was probably attributable to the court's perception
of the public expectation of accountant responsibility in both audit and nonaudit
engagements.
Recently in Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 35 an Indiana corporate creditor
brought a diversity action against a CPA who was a resident of Nebraska. The
plaintiff claimed that financial documents prepared for the debtor were
"recklessly and wantonly prepared" and the accountant knew that the
unaudited, inaccurate statements failed to conform with generally accepted
accounting principles. The court rejected the accountant's motion for summary
judgment on strict Ultramares privity grounds because the case at hand was
"qualitatively distinguishable," and because "in light of the overwhelming and
subsequent erosion of the viability of the Ultramares decision, it is not so
readily apparent that the state courts . . . of Indiana and Nebraska would cling
to the outmoded and restrictive doctrine of privity as a precondition to a finding
of accountant's liability."
The court quoted Ryan and noted that the state courts of Indiana and
Nebraska might choose to follow § 552 of the Restatement as both have
followed the Restatement's positions in other areas.
A second case which relied on the Ryan rationale was Spherex, Inc. v.
Alexander Grant & CO. 36 General Home Products (GHP) engaged Alexander
Grant to prepare an unaudited financial statement for a twelve-month period
based onfinancial information provided by GHP. Copies of this statement were
submitted by GHP to Spherex to obtain credit. When Spherex subsequently
sustained afinancial loss in its dealing with GHP and sued Alexander Grant, the
latter contended that its liability did not extend to a third party creditor not in
privity.
The court began its analysis by noting that it had previously expressed
disfavor of the privity doctrine in personal injury cases: "Our reluctance to
apply the privity rule has extended to allowing a proper plaintiff to recover for
merefinancial loss resulting from the negligent performance of services."
Furthermore, the court noted a resemblance of this case to cases involving
contract law in that the duty owed by Alexander Grant to Spherex was "not
entirely dissimilar to the duty we have held a promisor owes to an intended
third-party beneficiary." Next, the court analyzed the evolution of the
Ultramares holding and its privity requirement. According to the New
Hampshire court's observation, "judges have not hesitated to permit recovery
where the plaintiff's identity was specifically known to the negligent defendant." The reason for this, the court stated, was that judges are seeking to link
the privity doctrine with Cardozo's "social utility" rationale of protecting
professions from the specter of unlimited liability to a virtually limitless class of
plaintiffs. The real question, said the court, is whether the defendant has some
special reason to anticipate the reliance of the plaintiff.
According to the Spherex court, the second reason for distinguishing the
Ultramares opinion is that it is "a relic of a bygone economic era." Both the
sophistication of modern accounting procedures and the accountant's central
role in thefinancing and investment industry are a far cry from the fledgling
profession in need of judicial protection that existed at the time of Ultramares.
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Under this court's theory, if the choice is between the reliant third party and
the CPA, the accountant should bear the burdens of legal responsibility. The
court buttressed this reasoning by drawing an analogy between an accountant
and a manufacturer under product liability law. Both are ' 'in the best position to
regulate the effects of [their] conduct by controlling the degree of care
exercised during the performance of [their] professional duties." The court
concluded that the Restatement harmonizes the accountant's contemporary
role and his potential liability, and "represents a reasoned approach to the issue
of professional liability for negligent misrepresentation.''

B. Potential Widespread Liability to Third Parties
In Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 37 the issue was phrased as
a broad question: "May an accountant be held liable for the negligent
preparation of an audit report to a third party not in privity who relies on the
report?" The court answered in the affirmative, based on the principles of
Wisconsin negligence law. The defendant accountants in this case regularly
preparedfinancial statements for their client CFA. In November 1975, Citizens
Bank made a loan to CFA after reviewing the statements Timm had prepared.
In early 1977, during the course of preparing CFA'sfinancial statement for the
previous year, Timm's employees discovered that the 1974 and 1975 statements contained a number of material errors totalling over $400,000. Once
informed of these errors, the bank called its loan, resulting in CFA going into
receivership and dissolving.
The court characterized the issue as one of first impression in the state of
Wisconsin. For authority, the court turned to sources such as Rusch Factors,
Ryan, and the Restatement § 552. The court also analogized to a Wisconsin
state case involving an attorney who was held liable to a beneficiary not in
privity for the attorney's negligence in supervising the execution of a will. The
court observed that the imposition of liability would make attorneys and
accountants more careful in the execution of their responsibilities:
Unless liability is imposed, third parties who rely upon the accuracy of
thefinancial statements will not be protected. Unless an accountant can
be held liable to a relying third party, this negligence will go undeterred.
This "public policy" rationale was the main argument on which the court
"hangs its hat." But there were "additional policy reasons to allow the
imposition of liability." The court feared that if relying third parties, such as
creditors, were not allowed to recover, the cost of credit to the general public
would increase. Accountants, on the other hand, might spread the risk through
the use of liability insurance. The court concluded that accountants' liability to
third parties should be determined under (and limited by) the accepted
principles of Wisconsin state negligence law:
According to these principles, afinding of non-liability will be made only
if there is a strong public policy requiring such afinding. . . . Liability
will be imposed on these accountants for the foreseeable injuries
resulting from their negligent acts unless, under the facts of this
particular case, as a matter of policy to be decided by the court,
recovery is denied on grounds of public policy.
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In Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 38 the New Jersey Supreme Court determined
on appealfrom a motion for partial summary judgment that public policy did not
preclude the imposition of liablity on accountants to third parties not in privity.
The plaintiff-shareholders acquired stock in Giant Store Corporation, allegedly
relying on the correctness of the audits done by defendants Touche Ross.
Unfortunately, Giant had manipulated its books by falsely recording assets it did
not own and omitting substantial amounts of accounts payable so the financial
information that Touche had certified in the 1971 and 1972 statements was
incorrect.
While the New Jersey court obviously strained to be methodical and
comprehensive, the reasoning of the opinion is tenuous at many points. The
court engaged in a two-step process to determine the accountant's liability in
this situation. "First, we shall consider whether, in the absence of privity, an
action for negligent misrepresentation may be maintained for economic loss
against the provider of a service.'' The case law in New Jersey is split on this
issue, according to the court. However, the court did note that the requirement
of privity was long ago discarded in product liability cases based on negligence.
After a review of the decisions demonstrating that negligent representations
referring to products may be the basis of liability irrespective of privity, the
court answered the question it had posed:
Why should a claim of negligent misrepresentation be barred in the
absence of privity when no such limit is imposed where the plaintiff's
claim also sounds in tort, but is based on liability for defects in products
arising out of a negligent misrepresentation? If recovery for defective
products may include economic loss, why should such loss not be
compensable if caused by negligent misrepresentation? The maker of
the product and the person making a written representation with intent
that it be relied upon are, respectively, impliedly holding out that the
product is reasonablyfit, suitable and safe and that the representation is
reasonably sufficient, suitable and accurate. The fundamental issue is
whether there should be any duty to respond in damages for economic
loss owed to a foreseeable user neither in privity with the declarant nor
intended by the declarant to be the user of the statement or opinion.
The second question which the courtframed was: "what duty [should] the
auditor . . . bear to best serve the public interest in light of the role of the
auditor in today's economy?" Whether a duty exists, asserted the court, is
ultimately a question of fairness. The judicial analysis that must be made
"involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk,
and the public interest in the proposed solution."
The court appraised the fairness of imposing a duty byfirst reviewing the
auditing function of an accountant, concentrating on how it has changed and
developed over the years. For example: "It is now well recognized that the
audited statements are made for the use of third parties who have no
contractual relationship with the auditor. Moreover, it is common knowledge
that companies use audits for many proper business purposes. . . . " And:
"The auditor's function has expandedfrom that of a watch-dog for management to an independent evaluator of the adequacy and fairness of financial
statements issued by management to stockholders, creditors, and others."
The court added that despite expanded liability, accountants have been able to
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obtain insurance to cover these risks, leading them to believe that auditors
should be able to "purchase malpractice insurance policies that cover their
negligent acts leading to misstatements relied upon by persons who receive the
auditfrom the company pursuant to a proper business purpose."
When the court tacked on to the previous discussion the ideas that the
imposition of a duty to foreseeable users will "cause accounting firms to
engage in more thorough reviews" and the extent of financial exposure already
has certain "built-in limits" to protect auditors from too much liability, the fate
of the defendant was sealed. The policy arguments made in Rusch Factors Inc.,
that the accountant can more easily carry the burden of liability were repeated
here, but the New Jersey court did add its own philosophy: "it is just and
rational judicial policy that the same criteria govern the imposition of negligence
liability, regardless of the context in which it arises." The court believed that
the investor and the general public will benefit in the long run when the liability
of the CPA for negligent misrepresentation is measured by the foreseeability
standard.
In applying the above analysis to the facts at hand, the court lookedfirst to
see whether the entity for whom the audit was being made (Giant) used it for a
"proper business purpose." Acccording to the opinion, the defendants should
reasonably expect that their client would distribute thefinancial statements
pursuant to matters relating to its business, particularly given that there was no
limitation in the accountants' opinion. The second requirement for finding
liability is justifiable reliance. "Having inserted the audit in that economic
stream" the defendants should be responsible for "their careless misrepresentations to parties who justifiably relied upon their expert opinions."
Rosenblum is afrightening spectre for the profession. At the same time as
auditors are unable to secure reasonable insurance coverage, courts assume
the fact of that coverage and extend liability even further. 39

C. The Ultramares Court Speaks Again
The New York Court of Appeals had an opportunity to revisit the privity
issue a little less than a year ago in Credit Alliance Corporation v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 40 which considered two different appeals by two different
accounting firms. In the Andersen case, plaintiff Credit Alliance and others
were majorfinancial services companies which financed the purchase of capital
equipment through installment sales or leasing agreements. They provided
financing to L.B. Smith (Smith), a "capital intensive enterprise that regularly
requiredfinancing." Plaintiff began to insist in 1978 that Smith provide audited
financial statements as a pre-condition to further loans. Smith provided its
consolidatedfinancial statements for the years 1976 and 1977 examined and
reported upon by Andersen. In reliance on the statements, plaintiff provided
substantial loans to Smith. Plaintiff continued to receive, rely, and lend on
Smith'sfinancial statements in 1979. Smith petitioned for bankruptcy in 1980
while in default to plaintiff on several million dollars of debt.
Plaintiff sued Andersen alleging negligence andfraud, claiming Andersen
knew or should have known that Smith was showing the statements to it for the
purpose of obtaining loans. Andersen's motion to dismiss the negligence claim
on privity grounds was denied in the lower court. The Appellate Division
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affirmed, finding plaintiff fit into a narrow New York exception to the privity rule
because the plaintiff was a member of the "limited class" entitled to rely on
Andersen's report. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision in favor of
Andersen.
In the second case, European American Bank (EAB) sued the firm of
Strauhs & Kaye (S&K) because it made large loans to Majestic Electro
(Majestic) beginning in 1979, allegedly in reliance upon interim and year-end
financial statements reported upon by S&K. S&K allegedly overstated Majestic's inventory and accounts receivable and did not disclose Majestic's poor
internal controls. Majestic went into bankruptcy in 1983 after defaulting on the
loans to EAB. EAB sued S&K, alleging negligence in auditing and that S&K
was familiar with the EAB-Majestic lending relationship and lending agreements, including the fact that EAB was receiving and relying upon the S&K
auditedfinancial statements. Indeed, there were allegations that S&K and EAB
representatives had been in direct oral and written communication during the
entire course of the lending relationship. On S&K's motion in the lower court,
the complaint was dismissed for lack of privity. The Appellate Division reversed
citing the direct communication between S&K and EAB—using a Restatement
§ 552 approach—and observing that S&K specifically knew EAB was relying on
thefinancial statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed in S&K's case.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the Ultramares case and its rationale and
reaffirmed it as expounded upon. The court observed that some relationships
are "so close as to approach privity" and that would be a sufficient predicate
for finding liability, thus the result in the EAB portion of the case. The Court of
Appeals focused on the fact that in Ultramares the accountants only knew
"generally" that third parties would see the report, and nothing had been said
between auditor and client about who would see the reports "or the extent or
number of transactions in which they would be used." The court distinguished
this situation from one where the facts bespeak "an affirmative assumption of a
duty of care to a specific party, for a specific purpose, regardless of whether
there was a contractual relationship." It found the Andersen case to fit the
Ultramares type of fact pattern, while the S&K case fit the latter situation.
The Court of Appeals set forth a test for guidance in determining whether
auditors should be held liable to those not in privity:
Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncontractual
parties who rely to their detriment on inaccuratefinancial reports,
certain prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the accountants must have
been aware that thefinancial reports were to be used for a particular
purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of which a known party or
parties was intended to rely; and (3) some conduct on the part of the
accountants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces the
accountants' understanding of that party or parties' reliance.
The court observed that different states had adopted different standards in
addressing the privity issue. Some like New Jersey and Wisconsin had thrown
it out and extended liability to any third party who could be foreseen to rely on
thefinancial statements. Others, like Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, Colorado
and Kansas follow a strict Ultramares privity test. Still others use the
Restatement approach. The New York Court of Appeals explanation of what
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Ultramares means and how liability may extend to third parties in appropriate
factual circumstances is certainly a reasonable, well-thought-out and refreshing
consideration of the issue. It is also another end of the historical thread linking
the development of today's standards to the earlier precedents.

IV. Where We Are Headed
This paper has considered the historical development of several facets of
auditor's responsibilities, standards and liabilities; the interplay between
litigation, legislation and professional standards; the broadening of the auditor's
responsibilities to its client even in the face of management's criminal
activities; the overlay of potential criminal liability to those who close their eyes
to suspicious developments and attempt blindly to follow GAAP; and, the
incredible expansion of third parties who have been held entitled to rely on
financial statements and to sue the auditor. It remains to consider what the
future may hold. It would be impossible to consider all ramifications outside the
context of a textbook or a novel.
In the ESM litigation referred to supra, Alexander Grant is being sued for
millions of dollars in damages by numerous customers of ESM including various
municipalitiesfrom around the country. The allegations of the suits incorporate
the expected common law negligence and fraud claims, and securities law
violations. They go further and allege violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),41 that Alexander Grant participated
with others through a "pattern of racketeering activity" to use ESM as an
enterprise to commit criminal acts. If successful in proving a RICO case,
damages to which the plaintiffs would be entitled would be trebled and could
theoretically approach $1 billion. While the allegations of ESM present a rather
wide departure from appropriate auditing and accounting standards, the
spectre of RICO liability for auditors in connection with "garden variety
securities fraud" cases looms ahead.
RICO was originally drafted to stem the inroads by organized crime into
legitimate businesses. It provides a civil suit remedy and has become a favorite
of the plaintiffs' bar. Last summer accountants were hoping for relief when the
Supreme Court decided Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 42 Unfortunately, the
Court refused to read RICO narrowly and ruled that its civil provisions could be
applied to virtually all commercial disputes. Justice White acknowledged the
problem, but observed that the cure "must lie with Congress." Congress,
however, has shown no serious intention to amend RICO. Certainly, on the
heels of the ESM scandal and the media attention given to the E.F. Hutton
overdrafting system, the public has not indicated that it favors a narrowing of
RICO's targets to accept "legitimate businessmen" such as auditors.
Even the foreign judicial systems and lending agencies have caught the
fever. In an Australian case, Cambridge Credit Corp. v. Hutcheson, the auditors
were found liable for a negligent audit and the plaintiff was awarded approximately $100 million (an amount exceeding the audit firm's assets as well as
those of its individual partners). In recent lawsuits in New York a foreign
government, England, and at least ninety other plaintiffs have sued Arthur
Andersen in several federal actions as a result of the collapse of John
DeLorean's automobile venture. The suits allege securities violations as well
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as RICO causes of action, and request $270 million in damages to be trebled to
nearly $800 million. The British government invested $120 million to finance
DeLorean's Belfast, Ireland factory.
Andersen issued a clean opinion for DeLorean Motor Company. The
plaintiffs allege that some of their money was diverted through a Swiss bank
account of GPD Services, Inc. (a Panamanian company) to DeLorean's
personal account. They claim as well that Andersen had ample knowledge of
questionable transactions between GPD and DeLorean's company. The plaintiffs suggest that Andersen workpapers indicate an awareness of problems
which should have brought the Natelli "suspicious inquiry doctrine" into
play.43
Dramatic, albeit not quite as dramatic, mega-suits have evolved against
auditors as a result of the Penn Square National Bank and Drysdale Government Securities scandals. The number of such lawsuits is not likely to decline in
the near future, thus making it more difficult for auditors to obtain insurance.
At the same time as these suits appear, our legislators in Washington
continue to examine the conflict-of-interest standards and other alleged
deficiencies of the profession. Representative John Dingell (D. Mich.) is
chairman of a House oversight subcommittee before which witnesses have
criticized the peer review system, the SEC's laxity in overseeing the
profession, and the fact that audit client's management hire,fire, and pay the
auditor. The latter criticism allegedly makes auditors reluctant to report
objectively on their client'sfinancial statements and/or to blow the whistle
where appropriate. In addition, certain accounting treatments which are
justifiable under GAAP have been questioned. Dingell and some of his
witnesses are unhappy with theflexibility afforded under GAAP for various
methods of depreciation, costing of inventory, as well as for alleged inconsistency of disclosure for various accounting treatments. The subcommittee has
been troubled by the issuance of clean opinions just prior tofinancial debacles
which have made front page news.
The Dingell subcommittee required the Big Eight accounting firms to
submit detailed disclosure reports relating to litigation losses as well as to
internal matters. As of yet, Dingell shows no lack of continued interest in
pursuing the oversight hearings. Not even Washington insiders are sure where
the subcommittee will end up. The ultimate questions, of course, are: Will
there be some form of more direct government regulation of the practice? Will
auditors be permitted to continue to practice in the scope of practice which is
currently enjoyed? Will more dramatic corporate governance mechanisms
become the rule?
Whatever the results of the trends, the pattern is a continuum of what has
been happening in the profession for more than 80 years. The financial
community's demand for accuratefinancial information has grown, not abated.
Auditors created a business for themselves over the past 130 years of fulfilling
the marketplace'sfinancial information needs. Indeed, the CPA's license is a
franchise to attest with respect to the market'sfinancial statements. That
marketplace, as well as the regulators responsible for oversight, had been
allocating greater and greater responsibility—with attendant legal liability—to
the profession. In many cases the expansion was based upon a now obsolete
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premise that the auditor could, in turn, assess that liability broadly through fee
structure and insurance coverage.
As the profession faces this challenge, several actions seem imperative.
The profession must reflect upon standards which are unclear, ambiguous, or
insufficient. The wide flexibility favored by George May is simply so out of favor
in several critical areas that it needs to at least be reexamined. The profession
must be even more vigilant in applying the suspicious inquiry doctrine. Several
more majorfinancial scandals where clean reports have been issued will only
spur on the regulators and the plaintiffs' bar. The profession and its representatives must be media-conscious and take initiative to get its message to the
public. It should perhaps explain the billions of dollars of financial transactions
which are successfully audited year-in-and-year-out. It should lobby and
communicate about the problems associated with RICO and the current use of
the adverse interest analysis. But, the profession is far from fatally diseased. If
history repeats itself, it will make the appropriate accommodations and move
forward.
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Discussant's Response to
" 'Under the Spreading Chestnut Tree'
Accountants' Legal Liability—
A Historical Perspective"
Thomas A. Gavin
The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
Paul has done an excellent job of developing the history of accountants'
legal liability. The message of the paper is enhanced by his introduction of some
of the cast of characters who have helped shape the development of the
subject—from the likes of George May of Price Waterhouse to Philip Musica,
alias Frank Donald Coster, of McKesson & Robbin's.
My discussion of the content of Paul's paper will not address the factual
settings which underlie the "landmark'' cases presented nor will it address the
general description of the all too well known tightening of accountants' liability.
Rather, my comments will be restricted to expanding some topics discussed by
Paul and possibly taking issue with respect to a few.

Whose Duty to Whom?—Some General Observations
The author presents the expansion of the role and responsibilities of the
public auditor as one resisted and fought aggressively by auditors. Furthermore, he notes that "changes were frequently the result of litigation losses
and/or government intervention.''
One might respond that the first of these observations is accurate but a
realistic occurrance due in part to a rather young profession trying tofind its
way to maturity while at the same time attempting to avoid the risks that might
abate the maturation process. The second comment about change resulting
from litigation could apply to many disciplines. Practicing professionals do not
allocate resources to develop procedures to prevent problems unless significant problems exist or critical problems are perceived as imminent. Some
might criticize this rather sympathetic response by stating that the accounting
profession has done too little too late. The Moss-Metcalf and Dingell committees might be among those critics.

Professionalism
I believe the examination of the legal liability of accountants cannot be
viewed as a single issue but must be couched in terms of the degree or extent
to which we view accounting as a profession. The degree of professionalization
of any occupation depends on how many of the following characteristics, and
how much of each, it possesses:
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a) General, systematic knowledge.
b) Authority over clients.
c) Community rather than self-interest; symbolic rather than monetary
rewards.
d) Self-control.
e) Recognition by the public and law of professional status.
f) A distinctive culture.
Eliot Friedson, on the other hand, contends that the sole defining characteristic
of a profession is its convincing of the public and the state of its right to selfcontrol over work-related matters (Ritzer, 1972). Students of accounting
history would have no problem seeing the relationship between all or part of
these two definitions of a profession and their own accounting profession.

A State of Change
A seesawing relationship does exist between the development by CPAs of
professional auditing standards and the liabilities of CPAs as public auditors to
their clients and the public. This seesawing seems quite appropriate given the
dynamic nature of both the accounting profession and our society's socialeconomic structure. Organizations and institutions, including professions, are
expected to be responsive to the changing needs of the society in which they
operate. Unobservant, rigid, and less responsive organizations and professions
go the way of the dinosaur.
Our mission should be to carry on a continuing dialogue with the users of
our products and services in a positive, nonadversarial way. Unfortunately,
much of our profession's highly publicized communication with users has been
through their representatives, Moss-Metcalf and more recently Dignell, and
the judicial system. More has been written on the users' lack of understanding
of accountants' products and service than has been written to address and
overcome the problem.

Sharing the Blame
The author raises two issues about the responsibility of employers for the
acts of employees. Thefirst relates to adverse interest analysis. The second
relates to the double standard held by the courts; CPAfirms appear to be held
to a higher standard of supervision for their employees than do clients in
supervising their employees.

Fraud or Poor Quality Control
Originally, the employer was responsible for the acts of his employee
(agency theory—respondeat supervisor) when the latter acted beyond the
scope of employment (adverse to the interest of the employer) if the employer
was "contributorily negligent" because of failure to avoid the loss by not
exercising reasonable care in supervising employee(s). This standard was
diluted by the "modified contributory negligence test" which narrowed the
employer's exposure to liability. The employer now must somehow contribute
to the auditor's inability to detect the employee's fraud.
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I would like to make two comments in response to what Paul has said about
adverse interest analysis. First, as much attention as employees' fraud
receives and as devastating as it is on employers (clients), the CPAfirms, and
the shareholders, fraudulent activities by employees account for only a small
percentage of the accountants' liability problems. St. Pierre and Anderson
undertook a study which showed that of 334 errors found in 129 law cases
examined, only 13 percent related to client (employee) fraud while 33 percent
and 15 percent related to problems interpreting accounting principles and
auditing standards, respectively (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984).
Second, the GAO recently issued a report stating that CPAs did not
satisfactorily comply with standards on 34 percent of the governmental audits
they performed, and more than half of the unsatisfactory audits had severe
violations of standards. Two prominent problems identified were insufficient
audit work in testing compliance with governmental laws and regulations and
the evaluation of internal accounting controls. Smaller CPAfirms had greater
problems in complying with standards (GAO, 1986). One might conclude from
the above discussion that CPAs have a problem with the professional characteristic of "self-control" as mentioned earlier in my remarks.

Spotlight on Management and the Board
Let's assume that material employee fraud, regardless of the small
frequency cited above, induces a state of trauma for the client, the public
auditor, investors and creditors. Are we, as accountants, to accept the courts'
shifting of burden to accountants with the formulation of the modified contributory negligence test? I think not! Clearly, the courts and users have fallen into
the expectation gap, the area where perceived levels of responsibility for such
things as fraud detection and compilation and review services exceed the
auditors' actual responsibility as expressed in professional standards and
determined by reasonable cost-benefit considerations. We must educate all
user groups including primary users such as investors and creditors, as well as
the secondary user groups composed of individuals in the judicial and legislative
branches of government.
I do agree with the author that the courts have gone too far in holding
auditors more responsible than the client's management and board for an
employee's action that is clearly beyond the scope of legal and reasonable
business practice. Of the four most commonly identified management functions
of planning, organizing, directing, and controlling, the courts seem to be
overlooking the last of the four functions. Broadly stated, controlling is the
process by which managers determine whether organizational objectives are
achieved and whether actual operations are consistent with plans.
The four management functions are interrelated and should not be viewed
as separate or discrete. All management functions may be viewed within the
context of control systems with the following objectives (IIA, 1978):
1. reliability and integrity of information;
2. compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws and regulations;
3. safeguarding of assets;
4. economical and efficient use of resources; and
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5. accomplishment of established objectives and goals for operations
and programs.
One might assume that the more effectively these control objectives are
achieved, the better the firm's managment.
Our socio-economic structure often permits an inbalance, for a certain
period of time, before adjustments are subsequently induced to return to what
society views as an equilibrium. Forces have been at work for more than ten
years to induce changes to check the undesirable behavior of corporate
managements and boards. These changes include:
1. passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977;
2. adoption of audit committees by many corporate boards;
3. introduction and/or enhancement of the internal audit function in
corporations; and
4. the collapse of the "good old boys" boardroom environment.
Collectively, these four changes have had, and will continue to have, a
dramatic influence on improving corporate accountability. An additional potential influence, but one that has yet to produce benefits because its work is not
completed, is the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Recently, the Commission's chairman, James C. Treadway suggested a
mandatory expanded role for internal auditors in some circumstances (IAA,
1986).
The items in the two previous paragraphs have heightened the independence and, in a general professional sense, the authority of the public auditor
over the client. As a result, CPAs now have a stronger degree of professionalism.

Supervision of Staff
Turning to Paul's comment on the double standard of the court, i.e., CPA
firms appear to be held to a higher standard of supervision for their employees
than do clients in supervising their employees. My response is: why not?
Professionals should be held to a higher level of care than non-professionals.
Firms that are members of the AICPA Division of CPA Firms are obligated
to adhere to quality control standards promulgated by the institute. Quality
control standards, among other things, call for establishing policies and
procedures for supervising the work of firm personnel. Seven of the nine
elements of quality control relate directly tofirm personnel (AICPA, 1986).
The fact that the profession has taken such a step attests to the fact that the
profession has attempted to meet its responsibility to society. Unfortunately,
membership in the division is not mandatory for all firms.

A Matter of Perspective
Any discussion about expanding the classes of plaintiffs who should be
permitted to be successful in their suit against the auditor is always explosive.
Discussants generally have a hard time balancing their own economic interests
with the general social good.
The courts, social commentators, and critics have had a hard time applying
existing responsibility models to the accounting profession. What other
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profession gets paid by the party with whom they contracted while the benefits
of that relationshipflow, in many cases, to their parties, aptly coined by Judge
Cardoza, "an indeterminate class"? The courts have had difficulty reconciling
the amount of the public auditor's responsibility with the amount of loss
suffered by potentially great numbers of people the public auditor himself
admittedly intends the product of his attest function to serve. At the extreme, a
judge, unfamiliar with all of the variables in play, might, after reading Statement
of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (FASB, 1978) think that public policy
dictates that liability for ordinary negligence be imposed on accountants for
foreseeable injuries resulting from their negligent acts.
The question is, are society's expectations realistic? Let's explore H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, one example that reflects society's expectations
through the pen of the judge who wrote the opinion1. Although the author first
discusses Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler is the initial case to hold accountants liable for ordinary negligence to
foreseeable third parties. On the surface, the logic underlying the New Jersey
Supreme Court decision appears sound. However, it isflawed. The author
recounts the court's two-step process to determine the accountant's liability. I
would like to use the same process but take a different approach than the
author in responding to the court.
The court began "first, we shall consider whether, in the absence of privity,
an action for negligent misrepresentation may be maintained for economic loss
against the provider of a service." The court continued:
If recovery for defective products may include economic loss, why
should such loss not be compensable if caused by negligent misrepresentation? The maker of the product and the person making a written
representation with intent that it be relied upon are, respectively,
impliedly holding out that the product is reasonablyfit, suitable and safe
and that the representation is reasonably sufficient, suitable and
accurate.
In response, I believe the differences found in the comparison made
between a manufacturer's product and a public auditor's opinion appear to far
outweight the similarities. The manufacturer controls, and is responsible for,
the process by which the product is made as well as the product resulting from
that process. Likewise, as pointed out earlier, the client controls, and is
responsible for, the adequacy of the accounting process and its product. The
public auditor, on the other hand, is charged to test management's assertions
which are articulated in thefinancial statements. A similar position is also held
by Gormley and Minnow (Gormley, 1984; Minnow, 1984).
The author then analyzes the court's second question—"what duty should
the auditor . . . bear to best serve the public interest in light of the role of the
auditor in today's economy?" The duty found to exist must be equated with
what is fair; the analysis of fairness "involves a weighing of the relationship of
the parties, the nature of the risks and the public interest in the proposed
solution.''
In response, the courts judging fairness in terms of the objectives of
financial reporting mentioned earlier totally avoid addressing the broader issue
which has given rise to the litigation explosion. It appears that the courts have
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rejected the idea that when professionals are working at the best of their ability,
within the concept of the average prudent auditor, there are chance occurrences that may still befall the client. The rejection of this assumption leads the
courts to accept the idea that all losses shall be borne by someone. This, in
turn, leads to the notion that the deep pocket has no bottom; a fountain of funds
for all those who, by mere chance, have suffered a loss. Courts in New Jersey,
Wisconsin, and most recently California, in International Mortgage Company v.
John P. Butler Accounting Corporation, view insurance as a readily available
vehicle for making the plaintiff whole and have extended the accountant's
liability to foreseeable parties. Resultant insurance premium increases, the
courts believe, can be passed along to all consumers.
The insurance public policy argument has been successfully employed in
many other segments of our society. So successful has been its use that the
insurance piggy bank is nearly empty.
Between 1975 and 1984 product liability cases have increased 600 percent
to approximately 10,500; suits against officers and directors have increased
more than 200 percent during the same time period (Samuelson, 1986). This
significant increase in liability cases is due primarily to the self serving interests
of the members of the Association of Trial Lawyers, whose ranks tripled in the
last 15 years to 60,000. This group has placed its own economic interests
ahead of the "public interest," or so many believe. A wave of reforms are
under consideration in state capitals and Washington. In Washington, the
Kasten bill limits the amount of contingency-fee lawyers can earn, and also
restricts joint and several liability (WSJ, 1986).

Summary and Conclusions
Survival of the profession has and will continue to be measured in terms of
the ability of its members to adapt to changes in society. Change should be
looked upon as an opportunity, an opportunity to serve, grow and mature.
The application of extending liability of accountants to reasonably foreseeable third parties will probably increase beyond the three states where it is now
applied. The profession can meet this challenge by aggressively pursuing:
• A continuing dialogue with users of financial statements as to the role
and responsibilities of the external auditor, corporate management,
and boards in thefinancial reporting process.
• Mandatory membership in the AICPA Division for CPA Firms for all
firms.
• A reasonable limitation, such as a multiple of the annual audit fee, on
the amount of liability extended to CPA defendants and elimination of
joint and several liability.

End Notes
1. 461 A 2d 138 (N.J. 1983)
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An Assertion Based Approach To Auditing
Donald A. Leslie
Stephen J. Aldersley
Donald J. Cockburn
Carolyn J. Reiter
Clarkson Gordon

1. Some History And Introductory Comments
It is our contention that there is a theory of auditing, that there exist a
number of basic assumptions and a body of integrated ideas, the
understanding of which will be of direct assistance in the development and
practice of the art of auditing. Further, it is our belief, which we attempt to
support in the following pages, that an understanding of auditing theory
can lead us to reasonable solutions of some of the most vexing problems
facing auditors today.
Mautz and Sharaf
The Philosophy of Auditing, p. 1
American Accounting Association, 1961
It is interesting to note that this is the Silver Anniversary of what is
probably the most recognized pioneering work on auditing theory. It is a
pleasure to have Bob Mautz with us today as a participant in Auditing
Symposium VIII.
The earliest reference to the concept of assertions that we could locate in
the auditing literature can be found in Chapter 5 of Mautz and Sharaf. After
publication of The Philosophy of Auditing by the American Accounting
Association in 1961, the concept of assertions appears to have gone into
hibernation until 1973 when it made a brief appearance in A Statement of BASIC
AUDITING CONCEPTS [ASOBAC]. The definition of auditing provided in
ASOBAC was:
Auditing is a systematic process of objectively obtaining and evaluating
evidence regarding assertions about economic actions and events to
ascertain the degree of correspondence between those assertions and
established criteria and communicating the results to interested users.
In the early 1970s R.J. Anderson recognized the merits of the assertion
concept described by Mautz and Sharaf and he organized the assertions by
financial statement component1 [assets, liabilities and income]. Figure 1, taken
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Figure 1
Components of the Objective of Substantive Verification
Assets

Liabilities

Income Components

To provide reasonable assurance
as to whether or not:

To provide reasonable assurance
as to whether or not.

To provide reasonable assurance
as to whether or not:

1. the reported assets really exist
(existence);

the reported liabilities really
exist (existence);

the reported transactions really
occurred (occurrence);

2. there are not other undisclosed
assets (completeness);

there are not other undisclosed
liabilities (completeness);

there were not other, undisclosed
transactions (completeness);

3. the enterprise really owns and
has clear title to the
reported assets (ownership);

the reported liabilities really
incide on the enterprise and not
on some other entity or person
instead (incidence);

the enterprise, and not some other
entity or person instead, was
really a party to the reported
transactions (propriety);

4. the assets are valued appropriately and accurately (valuation);

the liabilities are valued
appropriately and accurately
(valuation);

the income components are
measured appropriately and
accurately (measurement);

5. the assets are appropriately
described and disclosed
(presentation).

the liabilities are appropriately
described and disclosed
(presentation) .

the income components are appropriately described and disclosed
(presentation).

from The External Audit [Anderson, 1977], illustrates this structure. As the
first Chairman of the CICA Auditing Standards Committee, Anderson was also
instrumental in the CICA's decision to formally recognize the assertion concept
in its Handbook [Sections 5300.16-.21]. The commentary in Section 5300.17
immediately following a description of the assertions states:
The auditor seeks evidence with respect to these assertions primarily
through the performance of substantive procedures. Obtaining evidence relevant to one assertion, for example, existence of inventory,
will not compensate for failure to do so for another, for example, its
valuation. Some assertions will be virtually self-evident to the auditor,
for example, the "valuation" of cash, while others, such as the
"completeness" of accounts payable, may require extensive procedures.
Section 5300.21 concludes the discussion of assertions with the italicized
statement:
The auditor should evaluate all the evidence he has obtained and assess its
sufficiency and appropriateness. He should consider evidence supporting
and evidence refuting an assertion and should be alert for evidence
supporting one assertion but inconsistent with that supporting another.
[Jan. 1978]
The AICPA addressedfinancial statement assertions in August 1980 when
it issued SAS 31 on Evidential Matter [AU § 326.03 - .13]. Included in this
statement is a section on "Use of Assertions in Developing Audit Objectives
and Designing Substantive Tests" which includes the following sentence:
In obtaining evidential matter in support of financial statement assertions, the auditor develops specific audit objectives in the light of those
assertions.
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In the concluding paragraph of SAS 31 under the heading "Evaluation of
Evidential Matter" the Auditing Standards Board stated:
In developing his opinion, the auditor should give consideration to
relevant evidential matter regardless of whether it appears to corroborate or to contradict the assertions in thefinancial statements. To the
extent the auditor remains in substantial doubt about any assertion of
material significance, he must refrain from forming an opinion until he
has obtained sufficient competent evidential matter to remove such
substantial doubt, or he must express a qualified opinion or a disclaimer
of opinion.
In January 1982, the International Auditing Practices Committee of the
International Federation of Accountants issued International Auditing Guideline
8 on Audit Evidence. The content of IAG 8 is entirely consistent with the CICA
and AICPA material on assertions.
Although one can safely conclude that the use of an assertion based
approach for planning and evaluating an audit is in accordance with GAAS in
both Canada and the United States, assertion based methodologies do not
pervade either audit practice or audit literature. Most auditing books do little
more than make reference to SAS 31. It is not at all clear why the authors of
such books appear to be reluctant to adopt the assertion concept. The answer
may lie in the fact that auditingfirms have also been very slow to integrate the
concept into their audit approaches. Thus, academics in particular may be
reluctant to produce a publication that is a step ahead of practice for fear that it
will be rejected by their peers who would prefer to teach what they believe is
the current common methodology. At this time, only twofirms in the US have
exposed audit methodologies that utilize the assertion concept.2
An important characteristic of the assertion based methodology described
in this paper [an "optional'' rather than "mandatory'' role of internal control as
a source of assurance] is the subject of the paper to be presented tomorrow
morning by Thomas Bintinger. It would also appear that the role of internal
control in a GAAS audit may be addressed by the Auditing Standards Board of
the AICPA. At its March 1986 meeting, the Board reviewed a significant issues
paper on the subject prepared by the staff. The following were among the
issues identified:
1. Should there be a separatefield work standard for the study and
evaluation of internal control? Should the existing standard be
incorporated into the other standards of field work?
2. How should controls relevant to afinancial statement audit be
defined and classified? How does an auditor relate internal controls
to audit objectives?
3. What should be the relationship between reliance on internal controls
and substantive tests? To what extent can an auditor use internal
controls to reduce substantive tests?
4. Should a minimum study and evaluation of internal controls be
required in an audit of financial statements? If so, what should the
minimum be? Should there be a different minimum study for some
(i.e., public) clients than for others?
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5. What should be the auditor's reporting responsibility for his study
and evaluation of internal control performed incident to his audit of
financial statements?
The Board has instructed the staff to proceed to develop the issues into a
"concepts" paper that could then be used as a basis for discussion.
Mautz and Sharaf [1961, p. 148] expressed very strong views on the role of
internal control and they suggested that "a prudent practitioner will tend to
give this phase of the examination a full measure of emphasis." When one
considers the ASB issues noted above, it becomes obvious that a consensus
does not exist within the profession as to the role of internal control under
GAAS. We look forward to the discussion of this critical issue by Symposium
participants.

Achieving The Audit Objective Is All That Really Matters
In auditing, like many other aspects of life, achieving the objective is far
more improtant than how it is done. In other words, it is the final score that
counts, not how the game is played. An analogy will serve to illustrate this
point. Suppose that several individuals are in New York and all of them would
like to go to Philadelphia [their objective]. One might take a non-stop airplane
flight between the two cities while the second travels by train. The third might
make the trip by bus and the fourth by automobile. It would also be possible to
make the trip by any combination of airplane, train, bus or automobile. In fact,
one could even go by boat. For each individual, the most important thing would
be reaching the objective—Philadelphia. Each mode of transportation could be
judged on the basis of its efficiency, effectiveness and economy in achieving the
objective.
An audit [provided that we agree on the objective] is no different. Several
practitioners could undertake the same audit and each could conduct the audit
in a different way and yet still comply with GAAS. Once again, the important
point would be that each achieved the objective [to obtain reasonable assurance
that thefinancial statements "present fairly" (do not contain a material error)].
While the audit fee charged could vary significantly from auditor to auditor, that
is not an issue that the profession need concern itself with provided that an
agreed objective is being achieved by all participants. Over time, the market
place should take care of any significant differences in the "value for money"
being provided by practitioners.
Finally, we wish to stress that we recognize that the approach to auditing
described below is not the only way to achieve the objective of an audit. We
believe that the use of different audit methodologies, strategies, procedures
and techniques throughout the profession is a healthy situation. We offer this as
one alternative for consideration.

II. The External Audit Objective And The Elements Of An
Audit Strategy
Financial data are mainly assertions of intangible facts. Their verification
requires application of the techniques and methods of proof. Proof is apart
of the field of logic which has been described by some as the "science of
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proof." Logic is concerned with how we establish facts, conclusions, and
inferences as valid or invalid.
Mautz and Sharaf, p. 15
While some might argue otherwise, the objective of afinancial statement
audit is to arrive at an opinion as to the fairness (i.e. material correctness) of
the client'sfinancial statements. There are probably as many ways of achieving
this objective as there are auditors but, by and large, they all tend to have
similar characteristics (we all like to confirm accounts receivable, vouch fixed
assets, etc.) But what really distinguishes the good auditor is the type of
questions he asks. We can all remember those auditors who asked something
which, on the surface, seemed so innocuous, but led to a revelation in terms of
auditfindings when the client or, more likely, a third party responded. Asking
good questions is the crux of good auditing.
At the outset, the auditor may address the financial statement audit
objective by asking two questions:
1. What types of error can materially affect thefinancial statements and
what must I know to be satisfied that these error types have not
occurred?
or
2. What must I know to be able to conclude that thefinancial statements
are materially correct?
Obviously, no auditor approaches audit planning by asking one of the above
questions to the exclusion of the other. For example, when an auditor assesses
inherent risk he must consider a question similar to thefirst and when he plans
his substantive procedures he often focuses on questions similar to the second.
The real issue, therefore, is not whether the auditor asks thefirst or second
question, but which question he emphasizes and at what level in the hierarchy
of his planning process he places that emphasis.
In many cases, the audit strategy that follows when emphasis is placed on
answering the first question will differ, sometimes quite significantly, from that
directed at answering the second question. While answering either of the two
questions properly will obviously lead to an adequate audit, there may be
opportunities for audit cost savings if one option leads to selecting less costly
audit procedures than the other. Our view is that an auditor who emphasizes
the second question has a better chance of selecting the most efficient
combination of procedures. In this paper we will focus on the audit strategy that
follows from that question.
In the next three sections, we examine the three main elements of an audit
strategy:
1. The sources of audit assurance (See section III below)
2. The links between each of thefinancial statement item assertions
and the relevant procedures (See section IV below)
3. The interrelationships among thefinancial statement items (See
section V below).
These elements recognize that, in order to conclude as to the material
correctness of thefinancial statements, the auditor must obtain reasonable
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assurance with respect to the material correctness of each of the assertions for
eachfinancial statement item. Although their application is likely to differ, these
elements do not change in any significant way if we were to adopt thefirst of
the above questions as our basic strategy.
III. Audit Sampling, The Audit Risk Model And The Elements
Of An Audit Strategy
The auditor requires evidence in order that he may rationally judge the
financial statement propositions submitted to him. To the extent that he
makes judgments and forms his "opinion" on the basis of adequate
evidence, he acts rationally by following a systematic or methodical
procedure; to the extent that he fails to gather "sufficient competent
evidential matter" and he fails to evaluate it effectively, he acts irrationally
and his judgments can have little standing.
Mautz and Sharaf, p. 68
The essential features of the audit risk model, and its relationship to audit
sampling, can be found in the auditing literature in the 1930's and 1940's. For
example, the principles underlying the secondfield work standard of generally
accepted auditing standards, which permits a reduction in the extent of testing
conditional on the quality of internal control, can be found in auditing textbooks
written over 40 years ago:
In this day and age, when a business has a good bookkeeping system
and a good system of internal check, a test audit, which efficiently
samples the transactions throughout a period, is about as detailed an
audit as one would expect to find. 3
While this quotation was written in the context of comparing what we now
call judgmental sampling to a detailed or 100 percent audit, and hence is only
partly relevant to today's environment, it nonetheless represents an important
trade-off between the two fundamentally different types of audit evidence. It is
implicit in the statement that the preferred form of evidence in terms of quality
would be the detailed audit. However, the additional quality of this form of
evidence was (and is) not always worth the additional cost if it was possible to
place reliance on internal control and audit a sample. The reduction in quality in
making the trade-off was not considered significant and was implicitly recognized in the extent of testing that became customary.4
The increased use of statistical sampling methods in auditing5 has brought
with it the need to be more explicit in the related audit planning decisions.
Proper planning of statistical audit samples requires an explicit recognition of
the desired sampling precision and the sampling risk. While it is not quite so
simple, the sampling precision will be determined largely by materiality
considerations which leaves sampling risk as the controllable variable.6 It is the
sampling risk that is influenced by the availability of alternative forms of audit
evidence.
Over time, auditors have developed formal (and informal) methods of
analyzing the effect on sampling risk of the strength of internal control and
other audit procedures such as analytical review. This led to the audit risk
model.
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The audit risk model has taken on a variety of different forms over the past
twenty years. The AICPA's SAP 54 model published in 1972 is a discrete joint
risk model in which the audit risk is expressed as the product of the internal
control risk and the substantive testing risk. Teitlebaum [1973] illustrated the
Bayesian approach to the audit risk model and the pre-audit sample concept of
defining priors. The SAP 54 model was subsequently extended by Stringer
[1975] to explicitly recognize analytical review risk separate from the substantive sampling risk. Anderson [1977] presented audit sampling using an audit
risk model which explicitly recognized the role of inherent risk together with
the Bayesian interpretation [illustrated by Teitlebaum] in an auditing context.
Anderson's approach is further described in Leslie, Teitlebaum and Anderson
[1979] and in the CICA's Extent of Audit Testing Research Study [1980].
The logical evolution of the Anderson-CICA model is presented in Leslie
[1984, 1985] in which the effect of preventive internal controls is distinguished
from the effect of detective internal controls. (The essential Bayesian character
of inherent risk assessment is also clarified in Leslie's paper.) The conditional
dependency of the existence of preventive internal controls on inherent risk
leads to the prior probability of error concept. The audit risk model we shall
consider here is an adaptation of Leslie's model.
Our discussion has focused on arisk-based approach directed at determining substantive sampling risk. Anderson [1977, p. 130] introduced the degree
of assurance concept as the complement of the combined component risks (i.e.
inherent, control, and audit7). By recognizing the complement of each of the
individual component risks, we introduce the source of assurance concept and
the assurance-based approach to auditing.
The shift from a risk-basis to an assurance-basis is, on the surface, not a
dramatic step nor is it anything fundamentally new. In fact, some firms have
been using therisk-complementapproach of recording their risk assessments
for years.8 Our move to this approach was originally made because it was
considered easier to use than the risk-based approach. However, the shift has
the potential for facilitating a significant shift in philosophical attitudes towards
auditing. In the previous section we presented two alternative auditor questions from which an audit strategy could be derived. Thefirst question asked
"what can go wrong" and proceeds along arisk-based approach whereas the
second question asked "how could the auditor know something was correct''
and proceeds using a proof-based thinking process. The risk-complement
(source of assurance) approach can be effectively applied under a risk-based
philosophy, but its full potential is only realized under an assurance-based
philosophy.
Under therisk-based philosophy, the extent of detailed testing is viewed as
a focus for the risk analysis and the effect of each risk assessment is either to
increase or decrease the testing extent. The approach requires an analysis of
the possible causes of error and then an assessment of the chance of each type
of error occurring. This necessarily leads the auditor to invest time and effort
into reviewing and evaluating the internal control system because the system
will be a major factor in the assessed risks. There is no doubt that this riskbased approach is effective and, for the most part, efficient. Indeed, our firm
has been using this approach since the 1960's9 and during the lastfive years
has moved more towards the assurance-based alternative.
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The philosophical argument supporting the assurance-basis states that it is
generally more persuasive and efficient to establish the general validity of an
assertion than it is to enumerate the possible ways the assertion could be
incorrect and then check each of these possibilities. Thus, in an assurancebased approach, the material correctness of a particular financial statement
item assertion is an implicit hypothesis for which the auditor selects a
combination of sources of assurance which may support the hypothesis. The
combination is chosen within the constraints of available assurance (e.g. poor
internal controls provide no assurance) to achieve the objective in the least
costly way.
The audit assurance model we use, therefore, consists of the following
principal components:
Inherent nature of the item
• the complement of inherent risk,
which is defined in the usual way.
Preventive internal controls
• As explained in Leslie et al.[1979]
and in Leslie [1984,1985], preventive internal controls are related to
the level of inherent risk. The
greater the inherent risk, the
greater the need for preventive
controls and conversely. The combined assessment of inherent risk
and preventive internal controls is
referred to as the prior probability of error.
Compliance procedures (applied • The assurance from compliance
procedures is related to the existto preventive controls)
ence of suitable preventive internal controls and helps support the
assessment of prior probability of
error.
Detective internal controls
• Detective internal controls are applied subsequent to the processing
of data and increase the likelihood
of detecting any errors which may
have occurred and hence supports
the assessment of prior probability
of error. (Compliance procedures
on detective controls are part of
the detective internal control identification process.)
Analytical review
• The degree of assurance from
analytical review depends upon
whether a judgmental or regression analysis-based analytical review is being conducted. For
regression analysis-based analytical review, the assurance level
is determined primarily by the
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software whereas in the case of
judgmental analytical review the
assurance level depends upon the
quality of the analytical review as
assessed on a judgmental basis.
Other substantive sources
• These sources include substantive
sampling together with other nonsampling substantive procedures.
In addition to the above sources of assurance, the approach also permits the
explicit recognition of assurance from audit procedures directed at other
financial statement assertions as explained below in section V. A practical
illustration of the above assurance matrix structure is presented in Figure 2
which shows a Source of Assurance Plan for a particularfinancial statement
assertion. Note the various minima and maxima and the highlighting of the prior
probability of error. The risk-complements are recorded using Poisson factors
(-ln β) which, for purposes of acceptability by our practitioners, we have
called assurance factors.
One aspect of the use of the assurance-based approach in contrast to the
risk-based approach is the psychological effect of expressing the various
assessments using the positive rather than negative perspective. The positive
approach also facilitates discussion of testing extents and related assurance
levels with clients who find it easier to understand that a procedure is adding
assurance rather than reducing risk.

Technical Interlude: Inherent Risk, Smoke, and Fire
In the above discussion, the role of compliance testing was mentioned only
briefly. From the source of assurance plan it is apparent that compliance
procedures, which may include sampling, are directed at supporting the
assessment of the assurance from preventive internal controls. Our approach
to compliance testing has been based upon Dollar-unit sampling and makes an
explicit assumption as to the relationship between the frequency of compliance
deviations and the occurrence of monetary errors. The approach assumes a
three-to-one ratio between smoke (i.e. compliance deviations) andfire (i.e.
monetary error). This assumption has been discussed extensively by Leslie
[1985]. In this technical interlude, we introduce a model which indicates that
the actual ratio is dependent upon the inherent risk.
Consider a transaction stream of sales invoices totalling $1,000,000 in
which all invoices are $1 and are either correct or 100 percent overstated, i.e.
the customer should not have been charged at all. Materiality is $30,000 and
the invoice pricing process is such that for this audit year, the sales stream has
a 20 percent error rate before the effect of preventive internal controls.
Suppose the client has an independent price-check control procedure which is
100 percent effective when it is applied to a particular invoice and the only
method of determining whether the checking procedure is applied is to examine
the invoice. The issue is to determine the extent of compliance test that is
necessary in order to have 80 percent confidence that a material error is not
present after the effect of internal control.
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Let r be the rate of compliance deviations. Assuming the inherent error is
evenly distributed throughout the population and the compliance deviations
also occur evenly, the expected net error rate after the application of controls is
.2r. To meet our audit objective, we must compliance test so that there is only
a 20 percent chance that .2r >$30,000/1,000,000 where r is the upper limit of
compliance deviations at an 80 percent confidence level. Using discovery
sampling, the Poisson factor for 80 percent is 1.61 and hence the sample size is
1.61/(.03/.2) or 11 items. This compares with a sample size of 1.61 x1,000,000/(3 x 30,000) or 18 when a 3:1 ratio assumption is used. Obviously, in
this example, the actual ratio of compliance deviations to monetary errors is 5:1
(i.e. 1/20 percent). Applying similar reasoning to the general case in which the
inherent error rate is p, the actual ratio of compliance deviations to monetary
errors will be 1/p. Thus, if the population had a 10 percent inherent error rate,
then a 10:1 ratio would be satisfactory whereas a 50 percent inherent error rate
would need a 2:1 ratio.
Obviously this example is extremely simplified, not only in the specific audit
context but more importantly in the somewhat naive statistical approach taken.
A more realistic model might use a Bayesian approach for inherent risk but
would certainly need a more probabilistic approach to the distribution of
monetary errors and of compliance deviations. Nonetheless, the example
serves as an indication that in high inherent risk situations (i.e. when high
inherent error rates are more likely) the ratio of compliance deviations to
monetary errors will probably be lower than if the inherent risk were less.
More research into this issue seems warranted.

IV. Assertions And The Links To Internal Control Procedures
And Audit Procedures: Procedure Packages
Auditing is concerned with the verification or testing of financial statements and similar data. Such data consists of a series of assertions. . . .
The total number of assertions included in a set of financial statements is
considerable, but our interest here is in the essential nature of these
propositions, not in their number.
Mautz and Sharaf, p. 79
In the previous section we described the source of assurance concept
which categorizes audit procedures by the nature of the audit evidence they
provide. As was noted, the assurance sources are organized by financial
statement assertion which makes the linking of procedures (both internal
control procedures performed by the client and audit procedures performed by
the auditor) to assertions, a key element of an assertion-oriented audit
strategy. This linking deals with the relevance aspect of the audit evidence
that is obtained.
For example, a numeric continuity internal control procedure on work
orders is relevant to the revenue completeness assertion as is the audit
procedure of comparing paid service personnel hours with service revenue.
Similarly, the internal control procedure of checking invoice pricing is relevant
to revenue measurement as is the audit procedure of testing invoice pricing.
These are examples of procedures linked to transaction stream assertions
[revenue completeness and revenue measurement].
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Internal control procedures are generally linked to transaction streams and
not balance sheet items, as the latter are usually residuals of the netting of the
underlying transaction streams. For example, the accounts receivable balance
is the residual of the revenue and cash receipts streams. An exception to this is
inventory when the inventory balance is derived from the inventory count and
not from the underlying transaction streams, purchases and cost of goods sold.
In this case the client may have controls over the count such as a second
employee checking the count figures, an example of an internal control
procedure directed at a balance sheet item.
Audit procedures may be linked to transaction stream assertions or to
balance sheet item assertions. An example of the latter would be inventory
pricing tests, an audit procedure relevant to inventory valuation.
The linking of procedures to assertions is usually straightforward. However, there are some twists. For example, a particular procedure may be
relevant to more than onefinancial statement item assertion as is the case with
a receivables circularization, an audit procedure which is relevant for both the
existence assertion and the valuation assertion (with respect to overstatements
and, to a much lesser extent, with respect to understatements).
The above discussion has focused on individual procedures. However, what
is normally required is a package of procedures which jointly provide evidence
relevant to a particular assertion. For example, the receivables circularization
must be accompanied by adding the receivables trial balance and reconciling it
to the general ledger in order to properly address the existence assertion.
Similarly, when looking at internal control procedures to place reliance on
internal control, the auditor considers a package of procedures. The package of
procedures must be complete in the sense that the appropriate environmental controls are present (for example, controls over program maintenance,
masterfile changes, proper segregation of duties) and the package of controls
covers all steps in the accounting process,from initiation to thefinal recording
in the general ledger. For example, the package of internal control procedures
relevant to revenue measurement would not only include the checking of
invoice pricing but also controls over the master price lists and the recording of
invoices in the revenue journal.
In principle, the link between assertions and procedures can be followed in
either direction, from assertions to procedures or procedures to assertions.
The audit strategy described here is driven by assertions and thus the link is
made from assertions to procedures. Alternative audit methodologies which
make the linkfrom procedures to assertions are procedures-driven. In these
latter methodologies, assertions are recognized but are not the driving
force behind the audit planning. In our practice we believe the assertiondriven methodology has some advantages over the alternative because it asks
the question why before deciding how. It is moreflexible since the auditor can
plan to select, using a source of assurance plan within the constraints of the
situation, the most economical combination of procedures packages that are
relevant for each assertion.
One aspect of the aboveflexibility is the non-mandatory nature of a review
and evaluation of internal control. An auditor would still carry out a review of
the internal control environment and obtain knowledge of the client's accounting systems (this is consistent with the minimum level of review of internal
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control as described in SAS 43) but a review of internal control procedures
packages would only be carried out for those internal control procedures
packages on which the auditor intends to rely.
This approach to internal control is consistent with emphasizing the second
question in section II at the strategic planning level. If the first question had
been emphasized, the auditor would normally require a review of the specific
internal control packages to identify where in the process errors could occur.
Using the assertion-oriented approach at the strategic planning level permits
the strategy decision to be made before the auditor applies the "what can go
wrong'' approach at the detailed level.

Technical Interlude: Internal Control in the Audit
Environment
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, internal control is treated as
one of a number of sources of assurance for the auditor. There are two
implications of looking at internal control in this way. Thefirst is that the auditor
should review and evaluate internal controls only when it helps to achieve the
audit objective (obtaining sufficient appropriate/competent audit evidence) in
the most cost-effective way possible. The second is that the auditor should
review and evaluate internal controls when it is necessary in order to achieve
the audit objective, i.e., when the only reliable method of obtaining sufficient
appropriate audit evidence requires the auditor to look to internal control as a
major source of assurance. This latter case arises most frequently when the
auditor is concerned about the completeness assertion—for example, completeness of deposits in a deposit taking institution. Looking at internal control
in this wayflows logically from the question "What must I know to be able to
conclude that thefinancial statements are materially correct?"
Viewing internal control in this way also logically leads to the view that the
second examination (field work) standard can be eliminated from generally
accepted auditing standards. Auditing is an audit evidence gathering process.
The review and evaluation of internal control is one part of this process. It can
be subsumed within the existing third examination (field work) standard—the
audit evidence standard.

V. Interrelationships Among the Financial Statement Items
Part of an auditor's task is to recognize the subsidiary assertions
contained within any financial statement propositions. Only if these are
identified can evidence be obtained to support or contradict each one.
Failure to identify all subsidiary propositions is failure to recognize the full
scope of the audit problem. This in turn makes the obtaining of adequate
evidence and fully rational judgment most unlikely.
Mautz and Sharaf, p. 104
The third element of the assertion-oriented audit strategy is a structure
which takes into account the interrelationships among thefinancial statement
item assertions that arise from the accounting model. The recognition of the
interrelationships is crucial in the development of a cost-effective audit
strategy. Needless to say, the basic accounting interrelationships here amount
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to elementary bookkeeping concepts and can be found, in one form or another,
in any practical audit approach.
The starting point for identifying the interrelationships are the accounting
cycles (e.g. sales/receivables/receipts, purchases/payables/payments). Looking at the accounting cycle, sales/receivables/receipts, the relationship between the accounting cycle components can be expressed in the form of a
simple arithmetic equation:
Receivables (beginning of year) + Revenues (during the year)
- Cash receipts (during the year) = Receivables (end of year)*
* prior to considering bad debt provision and write-offs.
Given the above relationship, it seems obvious that procedures addressing
the assertions related to the transaction streams—revenue and cash receiptsshould also provide assurance with respect to the assertions related to the
receivables and vice versa, procedures addressing receivables' assertions
should also provide assurance with respect to the underlying transaction
stream assertions.
To account for the assurance from the procedures in an appropriate
manner, the auditor needs to link transaction stream assertions to the related
balance sheet item assertion. This can be readily accomplished by considering,
for each transaction stream assertion, what balance sheet item assertion would
be affected if the transaction stream assertion was not supported. For
example, consider revenue -occurrence. The impact of a revenue - occurrence
error on the balance sheet item accounts receivable would be the recording of a
non-existent receivable balance and therefore revenue - occurrence is linked to
receivables - existence. Similarly, if all cash receipts were not recorded (i.e.
cash receipts - completeness error), then again this would result in nonexistent receivables balances. Therefore, cash receipts - completeness is
linked to receivables - existence. Links between all transaction stream
assertions and related balance sheet item assertions can be established in a
similar manner. The following simple rules may be used as a shortcut to
correctly identify the links.

Balance Sheet Item
Assertion

Related Transaction Stream
Assertions

1. Valuation
2. Existence

Measurement.
Occurrence if transaction increases
balance sheet account.
Completeness if transaction decreases
balance sheet account.
Completeness if transaction increases
3. Completeness
balance sheet account.
Occurrence if transaction decreases
balance sheet account.
An auditor would consider the interrelationships among the financial
statement item/transaction stream assertions in developing an audit strategy
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which produces a cost-effective combination of procedure packages. For
some assertions, the greater part of the assurance required may be obtained
from procedure packages linked to the balance sheet item assertion whereas,
for other assertions, the greater part of the assurance required may be
obtained from procedure packages linked to the transaction stream assertions.
For example, in many situations the greater part of the assurance required with
respect to receivables - existence is obtained from the receivables circularization whereas the greater part of the assurance required with respect to
receivables - completeness is obtained from audit procedures, and control
procedures, directed at revenue - completeness and cash receipts - occurrence.
An important consequence of these accounting interrelationships is their
effect on the audit assurance that is applicable to a particular financial statement
assertion. For example, the audit assurance on accounts receivable - existence
will depend, in part, upon the assurance on revenue - occurrence and on cash
receipts - completeness. However, since an existence error in accounts
receivable could arise from either the revenue stream or the cash receipts
stream, the combined assurance from sources directly connected with the
related streams that is applicable to accounts receivable - existence cannot
exceed the minimum assurancefrom either of the two related streams. This
particular consequence is the main result of recognizing the effect of accounting
interrelationships. In our experience, its effect has been somewhat less than
explicit in many existing audit strategies. [See Appendix A for A BAYESIAN
MODEL FOR COMBINING INFORMATION.]

VI. Audit Evaluation As The Start Of The Planning Process
Because the auditor determines the type of audit evidence pertinent to his
needs, then collects that evidence, and finally uses it in arriving at
judgments, it behooves him to take special precautions in reviewing it for
pertinence, credibility, and usefulness.
Mautz and Sharaf, p. 106
Planning an audit is like planning anything else. If you do not have a
reasonably clear notion of where you are going, then you should not be
surprised at where you end up. But to know where you end up, you have to be
able to determine where you are at a point in time. Audit evaluation is how the
auditor determines the state of his opinion on the client's financial statements,
i.e., where he is at a point in time.
Audit evaluation is multi-dimensional. On the one hand, the auditor deals
with the concept of materiality and its relationship to the errors (or departures
from generally accepted accounting principles) in the financial statements while
on the other hand the auditor must deal with the degree of assurance he has in
his audit opinion. This multi-dimensional viewpoint is illustrated in Figure 3.
Thus, an audit evaluation consists of an estimate or projection of the error
in the client's financial statements together with some perception or measure
of the degree of assurance that the auditor has with respect to the estimate.
The former depends primarily on the actual error in the client's financial
statements whereas the latter depends primarily on the intensity of the audit
work.
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Our approach for summarizing the errors on an audit focuses on their effect
on pre-tax income but also recognizes their effect on the rest of the financial
statements. The achieved10 degree of assurance is summarized on the various
source of assurance plans. The combined effect of these two evaluations is the
maximum possible error in pre-tax income which includes the SAS 47 concept
of an allowance for further undetected error in addition to the most likely error.
Given this approach to audit evaluation, the planning process involves important judgments as to a reasonable materiality level and an indication of the
desired overall degree of assurance for the auditors' opinion. We have not
introduced anything new in this section because the approach we use for
dealing with audit evaluation is already described in existing literature. 11

VII. Operationalizing The Elementary Concepts In A Practical
Audit Methodology
Audit evidence is obtained through the application of the basic audit
techniques in the form of procedures designed to fit the specific situation.
Mautz and Sharaf, p. 100
The various audit methodology components we have discussed in the last
four sections can be found in the structure of any practical and effective audit
strategy. They do not represent a fundamentally new discovery, but they do
represent a way of thinking about the audit process that has the potential for
changing the perspective some auditors take in their work.
For example, an auditor who follows a risk-based strategy would view the
audit of accounts receivable-existence along the lines shown in Figure 4. The
two transaction streams, sales and cash receipts, would be audited during the
current or interim audit, either by transaction testing or internal control work,
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and the accounts receivable-existence assertion would have been audited
during the balance sheet or financial statement audit. This customary division of
the audit process into two stages separates the often complex internal control
system components from the comparatively simpler balance sheet accounts.
The perspective we have described in the previous sections attaches
assertions to the transaction streams in the diagram (i.e. sales-occurrence and
cash receipts-completeness) and then organizes the various sources of assurance (or risk elements, if the risk-based approach is preferred) according to
their relevance to the particular assertions. Instead of burying the complexity
of the client's business in an interim auditfile, in which the links to the financial
statement assertions may be difficult to identify, even when reviewed by the
audit partner, the essential structural complexity of the client's business
operation is brought forward and highlighted as an integral part of the audit
process. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
The shift we are making is therefore not merely to introduce some new
terminology or to call risk by another name. We are shifting our audit thinking
to a more comprehensive level that deals with each of the sources of assurance
in a consistent manner. In order to make practical use of this audit methodology, we need to deal with the now more visible complexity.
A large portion of the complexity in the planning process is due to the effect
of the interrelationships among thefinancial statement items' assertions (see
section V). This aspect can be simplified (and ultimately automated) through an
audit strategy structure which permits the use of some simple rules based on
accounting cycles.
The first simplification is to achieve some parsimony in the planning
process. This can be accomplished if the audit strategy is organized so that
each accounting cycle is included once and only once. The auditor would start
out by listing the derived components. The derived component12 of an
accounting cycle is the component for which the value is derived from the
netting of the related components. In other words, the derived component is an
image of the net results of its related components at a point in time (e.g.
receivables usually represents the netting of revenue less cash receipts at a
point in time).
Balance sheet items will usually fall under this definition, whereas income
statement items and other transaction streams such as cash receipts will not. 13
Double-entry accounting ensures that an accounting cycle will always include
one and only one derived component and therefore organizing the audit
strategy by the derived components ensures that each accounting cycle is
included once and only once.
The prior probability of error and the effect of internal control on the audit
assurance is relevant only to the generating components of the accounting
cycle, i.e. those components which are not derived. The generating components determine the value of the derived component. Because of its residual
balance nature, the sources of assurance for a derived component do not
directly include the prior probability of error or the assurance provided by
internal controls. Typically, generating components involve transaction streams
such as sales and cash receipts. For controls such as safeguarding inventory, it
will often be necessary to attach the controls to a related transaction stream
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assertion. This arises when planning for an inventory roll-forward situation
since the inventory balance is derived and cost of goods sold is generating.
The audit planning process can then focus on an accounting cycle's derived
component for a detailed analysis of the assurance sources in the components
of the accounting cycle which affect the derived component. To perform this
analysis the auditor would, for each derived component assertion, identify the
related generating component assertions along the lines given in section V. For
example, for the sales/receivables/receipts cycle the following relationships
would be identified:

Derived Component Assertions
Receivables - Existence/Ownership

Related Generating
Component Assertions

Revenue - Occurrence
Cash receipts - Completeness
Receivables - Completeness
Revenue - Completeness
Cash receipts - Occurrence
Receivables - Valuation14
Revenue - Measurement
Cash receipts - Measurement
As explained in section V, assurance may be obtainedfrom a combination of
procedure packages addressing transaction stream assertions (usually generating component assertions) and balance sheet item assertions (usually derived
component assertions.) In principle, the auditor could directly plan to obtain the
required overall level of assurance on each of the derived component
assertions for the entire audit. However,from our discussions of accounting
interrelationships, this would clearly involve a considerable amount of duplication and would be unduly complicated. In some cases overauditing may occur
whereas in others there may be some underauditing. The solution is to employ
the following direction of assurance rules in the development of the audit
strategy.
If the derived component assertion is:
1. asset
— existence/ownership
2. liability — completeness
3. expense — occurrence
or
4. revenue — completeness
a Source of Assurance Plan [SAP] will be set up whereby the
assurance required from procedure packages directed at the derived
component assertion will be reduced by the minimum of the assurance
from sources directed at the related generating component assertions.
If the derived component assertion is other than one of the four listed
above, no procedures directed at the derived component assertion will
be planned. Instead, all the required assurance will be obtained from
audit plans providing overall assurance with respect to each of the
related generating component assertions. If the related generating
component is already included on another audit plan then no further
planning is required for that related generating component assertion.
51

By following these direction of assurance rules throughout the entire
audit plan, it can be shown that:
1. The assurance required from procedures directed at a derived
component assertion is reduced by the minimum assurance obtained
from procedures directed at the related generating component
assertions.
2. The assurance obtained from procedures directed at the derived
component assertion also provides the same level of assurance with
respect to each of the related generating component assertions.
[See Appendix B for a proof of this DIRECTION OF ASSURANCE THEOREM]
Continuing with the example of receivables and following the direction of
assurance the following plans would be required:
1. receivables — existence
2. revenue
— completeness
3. revenue
— measurement
Cash receipts - occurrence and measurement would be addressed by the cash
plans. An example of a receivables-existence SAP is shown in Figure 6. Note
Figure 6
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how the generating components play an explicit role here when the plan is
directed at a derived component. (The SAP in Figure 2 is for generating
components only.)
Obviously, if the above approach was followed for all accounting cycles in a
client's business, the number of components and plans would likely be
unmanageable. To simplify the process, we categorize accounting cycles as
major (i.e., with a material amount and a large number of transactions) and as
minor. The above process is applied to the major accounting cycles. For the
minor accounting cycles such as prepaids and long-term debt (in some cases),
the auditor usually employs a package of substantive procedures directed at the
derived component assertions without performing a detailed analysis by source
of assurance.

VIII. Automation
Since micro-computers did not even exist in 1961, Mautz and Sharaf can
be forgiven for not addressing their eventual role in automation of the
audit.
L, A, C & R
With the dramatic increase in the use, and usefulness, of microcomputers in
accounting firms, it should not come as a surprise that the audit methodology
we have described in this paper has been automated for use on microcomputers. The software, which we have called ADAM15 [audit decision assistance modules], runs on IBM-XT's and compatible computers and has been
under development since 1982. During the development period, progressive
versions of the software have evolved in a series of prototypes, paralleling the
evolution of the audit methodology during this period. The current version of
the software has been in limitedfield use since mid-1985 and we anticipate
increasing use throughout our practice.
In the previous section, we commented on the inherent complexity of the
audit planning process when the role of the client's internal control system is
highlighted at the planning stage. Although we use simplifications in the
methodology to deal with this complexity, there remain a number of areas
where automation can be of assistance.
Figure 7 is a functional schematic of ADAM which shows some of the logical
links between the various functions. Staff using ADAM begin by entering some
overall planning information, including decisions on planning materiality and the
overall level of assurance for the audit, and then summarize their knowledge of
the client's accounting system by setting up thefinancial statement components and the principal journal entries. Staff then identify the major and minor
accounting cycles and use ADAM's tentative audit strategy (TAS) modules
which automatically develops a customized TAS, setting up the linkage
structure from the TAS to the source of assurance plans, procedure packages
and results that is appropriate for the particular client. The ADAM SAP's are
essentially the same as those presented in Figures 2 and 6 but they are
automated and integrated with the underlying procedure packages. The
procedure packages include standard audit questionnaires together with
automated planning for representative compliance and substantive sampling
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applications. The latter are integrated with the overall planning decisions,
representative sample selection, sample evaluation and overall audit evaluation.
Needless to say, we believe ADAM represents the automation of a
substantial portion of the technical audit planning and evaluation task and feel
that it is a major step towards an automated audit file.
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IX. Prospectus
In the past, auditing has been conceived only as a practical subject with
little need for or possibility of any underlying theory. Thus attention has
been given to its practical applications to the almost complete exclusion of
theoretical considerations. We hope we have indicated the close connection
between the theory and practice of auditing, for we are convinced that the
only sure solution to practical problems is through the development and
use of theory. Auditing stands at the threshold of service opportunities we
can as yet scarcely foresee, even in dim outline. With a well-developed
theory it will not only be prepared to take advantage of such opportunities
but will be able to escape confusion and misplaced effort in its desire for
real service.
Mautz and Sharaf, p. 248
Auditing is a pragmatic art. In order for it to continue to be of economic
value to society, auditing must continue to address society's needs which are
not static but ever changing, ever evolving. The demands placed upon auditors
should be expected to evolve over time, albeit at a gradual pace. As new
economic entities, transactions and activities are created, as some increase in
importance and others decline in importance, it will be impossible for the
auditing profession to stand still. There is no such thing as a status quo when
faced with the inexorable march of time.
Audit methodology deals primarily with the how of auditing and to a large
degree it is reactive to the audit requirements imposed by society. These
requirements are, by far, the most significant factor in the evolution of audit
methodology. But to some extent, audit methodology is proactive since new
audit techniques may permit the auditor to broaden the scope of his responsibilities and address issues that were previously impossible or uneconomic to deal
with. Obviously, future audit methodologies will result from the interplay of
these two factors.
Current professional developments, such as the introduction of attestation
standards and standards for reporting on forecasts and projections, are
responses to the needs of society. These expanded requirements will probably
lead to some changes in existing audit methodologies as our present strategies
are extended to provide the service. The extension of the SAS 47 risk model to
the broader range of assertions contemplated in the attestation standards is one
example of this evolution.16
One area to which a great deal of attention is being directed at present is the
possible extension of the auditor's reporting responsibility to include reporting
on internal control. Although the U.S. profession is thefirst to deal with this
possibility at an official level, there is no doubt it will be given consideration in
other countries, including Canada. It is therefore instructive to consider the
implications of such an extension on audit methodology, particularly in light of
the audit methodology we have described in this paper.
Perhaps the most important thing to recognize is that, generally, auditors
have never looked at a client's internal control system in the broad sense that
the client's management typically applies:
Canadian managers seemed to have little difficulty in defining internal
control as a broad concept. From this perspective, internal control was
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found to encompass accounting, management and operational controls,
including such factors as organizational structure, quality of personnel
and management, delegation of responsibility commensurate
with authority, and effective and efficient management.17
This is illustrated in Figure 8 which shows a broadly defined internal control
concept with the various systems. The accounting system is shown at the
center for our purposes here and its tentacles or nerves stretch into each of
the various systems.
Auditors who follow an internal control oriented audit approach will, for the
most part, focus attention on aspects of the various systems which are directly
related to the extensions of the accounting system (shaded regions in the
diagrams). In the assertion-oriented audit methodology we have described in
this paper, attention is directed first at the accounting system and then along
the various tentacles as considered necessary given the strategic audit plan.
However, in this context neither approach can be considered comprehensive in
the way it addresses internal control. Hence, any extension of auditor's
responsibilities towards reporting on internal control will require either a
careful limitation on the scope of the responsibility or a possibly radical change
in the nature of the audit methodology that is employed.18
Developments from within audit methodology have also had an influence on
its evolution. The increased importance of statistical sampling and its effect on
the audit risk model has been described above. The development and more
Figure 8
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widespread use of techniques such as regression analysis in analytical review is
another example of how audit techniques can affect the overall methodology.
One technological development that should have a considerable effect on audit
methodology is the microcomputer. In time, these remarkably powerful
machines will become as prevalent as the hand held calculator, if they are not
already. Their considerable computational power will permit the development
of a computerized audit file in which expert systems and comprehensive
decision support capabilities can play a major role. Technologically these are, no
doubt, exciting times.

Epilogue
In this paper we have described an assertion-based approach to auditing.
We have focused at the strategic level and explained the consequences of our
strategic emphasis in terms of its effect on the elements of the audit strategy.
Our description has included an outline of a practical approach for applying the
methodology together with its automation on a microcomputer. But in the final
analysis, have we introduced anything that is fundamentally new? Perhaps we
have. For example, we have refined the approach for reviewing and evaluating
internal controls conditioned on our inherent risk assessment and we have
directed the auditor to a more comprehensive view of thefinancial statements
in which the role of transaction streams and their assertions is placed on an
equal footing to the remainder of thefinancial statements. But surely, these are
not new discoveries.
We believe our contribution is the bringing together of all of these known
and familiar concepts and, usingfinancial statement item assertions as the
organizing principle, integrating the various elements into a cohesive, consistent framework that provides a practical and effective audit methodology for our
professional environment.

End Notes
1. First exposed at the Frontiers of Auditing Research conference at the University of Texas at
Austin in 1976 [published in 1977].
2. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., "Unique Audit Methods: Peat Marwick International," by
Robert K. Elliott, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Spring 1983. Arthur Young at the
University of Southern California Symposium on Expert Systems and Audit Judgment, 1986.
3. See Hanson [1942] p. 6.
4. Some would argue that there was no reduction in quality when sampling was employed
because of the more intensive and effective effort that could be directed at a sample.
5. See Stringer [1975], Elliott and Rogers [1972], Anderson and Teitlebaum [1973] and Kinney
[1983].
6. The oversimplification is due to not recognizing the interplay between statistical precision
and the α and β risks. For example, in dollar-unit sampling α risks can be contolled by adjusting
from planning materiality to a basic precision which allows a margin for expected error. See Leslie,
Teitlebaum and Anderson [1979].
7. This refers to substantive procedures including testing.
8. See Holstrum and Kirtland [1982] for one example.
9. See Skinner and Anderson [1966] and Anderson [1977].
10. To say achieved is an overstatement. The auditor can only believe he has achieved the
desired degree of assurance.
11. See for example, Leslie, Teitlebaum and Anderson [1979] and Leslie [1985].
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12. We would like to acknowledge the contribution of Jean Pare [formerly with our National
Office and now with Arthur Young in London, England] for suggesting the concept of derived and
generating components.
13. An exception is inventory at the count date. In this situation, inventory is not derived from
purchases and cost of goods sold. Instead, cost of goods sold is derived from inventory and
purchases.
14. Valuation refers to pricing. A separate audit plan would be designed to address net
realizable value.
15. We wish to acknowledge the contribution of David Pollard, leader of the ADAM
development project.
16. See Stilwell and Elliott for an explanation of this approach.
17. See Etherington and Gordon, p. 2.
18. One might consider re-orientation of the audit objectives to the non-accounting systems on
which the effect of audit procedures directed at components of the accounting system could be
recognized. For example, responses to accounts receivable confirmations could give some
information relevant to operations such as customer service and perhaps marketing.

References
American Accounting Association, Studies in Accounting Research #6, A Statement of Basic
Auditing Concepts, Sarosota, Florida, (1973).
Anderson, R.J. The External Audit, Pitman Publishing, Volume 1 (1977).
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, Extent of Audit Testing, A Research Study (1980).
Elliott, R.K., and Rogers, J.R., "Relating Statistical Sampling to Audit Objectives," The Journal of
Accountancy 0uly 1972).
Etherington, L.D., and Gordon, I.M., "Internal Control in Canadian Corporations," CICA and
SMA (1985).
Hanson, A.W., Auditing Theory and Its Application, McGraw Hill (1942), p. 6.
Holstrum, G.L., and Kirtland, J.L., "Audit Risk Model: A Framework for Current Practice and
Future Research," Symposium on Auditing Research V, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign (1982).
Kinney, W.R., Jr. "Quantitative Applications in Auditing,'' Journal of Accounting Literature (Spring
1983).
Leslie, D.A., Teitlebaum, A.D., and Anderson, R.J., "Dollar-Unit Sampling: A Practical Guide for
Auditors," Copp Clark Pitman (1979).
Leslie, D.A., "An Analysis of the Audit Framework Focusing on Inherent Risk and the Role of
Statistical Sampling in Compliance Testing," Auditing Symposium VII, The University of
Kansas (1984).
Leslie, D.A., "MATERIALITY: The Concept and its Application to Auditing," CICA (1985).
Mautz, R.K. and Sharaf, Hussein A., The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association
(1961).
Skinner, R.M., and Anderson, R.J., Analytical Auditing, Pitman Publishing (1966).
Stilwell, M.C., and Elliott, R.K., "A Model for Expanding the Attest Function," Journal of
Accountancy (May 1985).
Stringer, K. W., "A Statistical Technique for Analytical Review,'' Journal of Accounting Research,
Supplement (1975).
Teitlebaum, A.D., "Dollar-Unit Sampling in Auditing," a paper presented at the National Meeting
of The American Statistical Association (1973) Appendix III, pp. 34-40.

58

Appendix A
Technical Interlude:
A Bayesian Model for Combining Information
We introduce an example in which explicit Bayesian priors are assessed for
revenue-occurrence and for cash receipts-completeness and then combined to
give a prior for accounts receivable-existence. In this example, the subjective
probabilities are attached to specific financial statement and transaction stream
assertions and their combination is the result of the interrelationship between
the components of the sales/receivables/receipts accounting cycle.
In our example, we use the following assumptions:
Sales:
$1,400,000
Cash Receipts:
$1,200,000
Accounts Receivable:
$350,000
Materiality:
$20,000
Tables 1(a) and 1(b) show the posterior probability calculations for sales and
cash receipts separately. The sample sizes represent either representative
substantive samples (assuming such testing is an appropriate procedure) or an
equivalent pre-audit sample size.
Table 2(a) shows the combined error rates that arise from combining the
error rates from the two streams. Thus, the error rate of .09143 for a salescash receipts error rate pair of (.01, .015) is computed as [(.01 x 1,400,000) +
(.15x1,200,000)]/350,000 which reflects the fact that a sales-occurrence
error and a cash receipts-completeness error will be additive in accounts
receivable.
Table 2(b) shows the combined (posterior) probabilities of each of the salescash receipts error rate pairs in the corresponding positions to Table 2(a).
These probabilities are simple products of the posterior probabilities from
Tables 1(a) and 1(b). Table 2(c) shows the probability of obtaining zero (100%
tainted) existence errors in a sample of the indicated size drawn from the
accounts receivable population for each of the error rates in Table 2(a) [again, in
corresponding positions]. Table 2(d) is the element by element product of
Tables 2(b) and 2(c) and Table 2(e) contains the relative frequencies of each of
the probabilities in Table 2(d). The Table 2(e) entries are the posterior
probabilities for each of the error rates in Table 2(a).
Given the posterior probabilities in Table 2(e), it is possible to compute the
total of the posterior probabilities for these error rates in Table 2(a) which
exceed materiality. For the example used in Tables 1 and 2, the posterior
probability of a material error, i.e. one exceeding $20,000, is .12628.
In the above example, the prior probabilities and pre-audit sample sizes
resulted in a fairly low risk of error before the effect of the sample from
accounts receivable. It is instructive to consider some alternative combinations
of the various factors. Table 3 shows posterior probabilities of error greater
than $20,000 under a variety of situations. Case A shows the posterior risk in
accounts receivables-existence when no errors are possible in cash receipts
and the only sample is in the sales stream. As would be expected, the .05431
probability agrees with the probability of an error rate greater than .015 in the
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sales stream alone as shown in Table 1(a). A similar effect occurs when the
(pre-audit) sample size in cash receipts is made very large (e.g. 1,000,000 or
more).
In Case B, less optimistic prior probabilities are assumed and the result of
the limited (pre-audit) samples is a very high posterior probability of a material
error. Case C illustrates the effect of sampling in accounts receivable (e.g. a
circularization of accounts) in reducing the case B posterior risk to a more
acceptable level. Cases D and E illustrate the effect of concentrating the audit
effort on the streams and then on the residual balance. This is a very graphic
example of the necessary extent of reliance an auditor must place on the
transaction stream assurance sources in comparison with that needed on the
balance sheet account. The differences in overall sample size are mainly due to
the relative magnitudes of the streams ($2,600,000) in comparison with the
balance sheet amount ($350,000).
Although the above combining model has some appeal, it does possess
some technical weaknesses. Foremost among these is the assumption that the
posterior probabilities for sales-occurrence and cash receipts-completeness
are independent. We know this is not the case. For example, if the client has a
good credit department that actively follows up old unpaid accounts, it is
unlikely there will be a large amount of sales-occurrence or cash receiptscompleteness errors. This one detective control is common to the two streams
and therefore its effect on the posterior probabilities from each stream is
dependent. Nonetheless, this weakness should not undermine the example as
an illustrative theoretical model, but it should be kept in mind when interpreting
the results.
An extension of this Bayesian combining model directed at pre-tax income
could possibly serve as an approach for combining results for the audit as a
whole. Although the practical utility of such a model would have to be
questioned (it would be many dimensional), it would certainly have some
theoretical value. One of the main theoretical conclusions implied by such a
model can be seen in our example here. Even if the individual prior probabilities
and pre-audit samples are independent, the combination of the effect of these
probabilities, which is determined by the nature of the accounting model, leads
to an overall model in which there are significant dependencies. An auditor
wishing to draw some conclusions at the end of the audit cannot set his prior
probabilities on each of the individual transaction streams (etc.) independently.
They are related by the overall evaluation model and their reasonability must be
assessed at both the individual level and at the overall level. This is entirely
consistent with the overall audit evaluation approach outlined in SAS 47 and
Leslie [1985].

Appendix B
Technical Interlude:
A Direction of Assurance Theorem
One of the major assumptions made in developing audit strategies is that by
focusing attention on achieving the desired overall assurance on a subset of the
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financial statement assertions the auditor will obtain the desired level on all of
thefinancial statement assertions. This permits the use of simplifications in the
planning process and ensures the audit has complete coverage of the financial
statement assertions. In order to apply this approach, it is necessary to
introduce a method of identifying the subset. The direction of assurance rule
provides the identification method and the direction of assurance theorem,
which we will outline below, states that the rule leads to minimal sufficient
audit plans, within the context of the problem framework set out below.
We consider a simplified situation with three accounting cycles:
1. Cash, Cash disbursements, Cash receipts
2. Accounts receivable, Cash receipts, Revenues
3. Accounts payable, Cash disbursements, Expenses
The results derived in this analysis would extend to more complex situations.
From these cycle elements, the corresponding accounting cycle equations can
be written, using the obvious notational abbreviations, as:
Cash (t) = Cash (t - 1 ) + REC(t) - DIS(t)
A/R(t) = A/R (t - 1 ) + REV(t) - REC(t)
PAY(t) = PAY (t-1) + EXP(t) - DIS(t)
We will call these the normal form of the cycle equations.
The accounting cycle assurance formula for a given accounting cycle
equation can be derived by writing the accounting cycle equation in the form
desired and then writing the accounting cycle assurance formula that corresponds beneath it. For example:
REV(t)
O/S
REV

A/R(t)
+
REC(t)
A/R(t-1)
O/S
REC(t) O/S
audited in prior years
AR(t)U/S
U/S
U/S
This assurance formula shows how audit assurance (measured discretely in
terms of Poisson factors) on A/RO/S and RECO/S provides assurance on
REVO/S. The " ^ " symbol in the formula indicates that only the minimum
assurance can be carried over.
In the remainder of this discussion, the assurance formulas will be written
out explicitly using the following symbols for the direct assurance obtained
with respect to each component error exposure (we focus here on error
exposures rather than assertions since the main results arise from interrelationships between various accounting cycle components of an arithmetic
nature. The extension to assertions is straight forward.): CashO, CashU,
RECO, RECU, DISO, DISU, A/RO, A/RU, REVO, REVU, PAYO, PAYU, EXPO
and EXPU. Thus, REVO represents the assurance level, expressed as a
Poisson factor, obtained from audit procedures directed at the revenue
account and effective at detecting overstatements. Since it is an assurance
level, it can be derived only from inherent assurance, internal control
assurance (preventive or detective), analytical review assurance or substantive
procedures such as testing of the revenue transaction stream. In any particular
situation, some of the sources may not be available ... e.g. direct inherent
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assurance (and internal control assurance) on A/RO is negligible although this
type of assurance can be found in the related component exposures REVO and
RECU. Similarly, there is little direct assurance possible on A/RU.
The total assurance on any particular component exposure will be expressed as vx(*) where * represents the component exposure and x represents/indicates the accounting cycle (x is one of either cash (C), receivables (R)
or payables (P) cycles). Thus,
v R (REVO) = REVO+ min {A/RO, vc(RECO)}
is the explicit formula for the accounting cycle assurance formula: REVO/S
A/RO/S RECO/S introduced above. The fact that REC is an element of
both the receivables (R) and cash (C) cycles requires the use of vc(RECO)
when it appears in a formula for an R-component exposure.
The formula says that the total assurance on revenue overstatements obtained
from the revenue cycle is equal to the sum of the direct assurance on REVO/S
plus the minimum of the direct assurance on A/RO/S and the total assurance on
receipts overstatements obtained from the cash cycle.
Using this notation, it is possible to develop audit programs that ensure a
sufficient level of audit assurance is obtained on eachfinancial statement
component exposure. Stated in terms of the v x operator, if the required overall
level of assurance is 3.0, then a sufficient audit plan must have:
I.
III.
V.
VII.
IX.

v c (CashO)≥3.0
vR(A/RO)
≥3.0
Vp(PAYO)
≥3.0
vR(REVO)≥3.0
vP(EXPO)≥3.0

II. vc(CashU)≥3.0
IV. vR(A/RU)≥3.0
VI. vP(PAYU)≥3.0
VIII. vR(REVU)≥3.0
X. vP(EXPU)≥3.0

For convenience, each of the v x formulas will be referred to as source of
assurance plans, i.e. SAPs.
Obviously, an auditor could develop a sufficient audit plan by entering
factors so that each of the above ten inequalities was satisfied, but this would be
inefficient since it would not recognize the structural relationships between the
various component exposures. Thus, for efficiency, the auditor is interested in
finding the minimum number of SAPs which when "satisfied," i.e., indicate the
required overall level of assurance, imply that all the other SAPs are satisfied.
The following theorem answers this question for the three-cycle situation.

Direction of Assurance Theorem
In the three-cycle situation, a minimal sufficient audit plan must have at least
five SAPs. The following SAPs constitute a minimal sufficient audit plan:
I.
III.
VI.
VIII.
IX.

vc(CashO)≥3.0
VR(A/R0)≥3.0
vP(PAYU)≥3.0
VR(REVU)≥3.0
vP(EXPO)≥3.0
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Proof
To prove the theorem, it is necessary to show that a minimum of five SAPs
is required and that the five SAPs listed provide a sufficient plan since they
imply that the remainingfive SAPs are also satisfied. We begin by expressing
each of the SAPs in terms of the basic assurance elements (e.g. EXPO, CashU,
etc.) and writing out the equivalent inequalities. These are as follows:
I. vc(CashO)≥ 3 is equivalent to
1. CashO + RECO + REVO≥ 3
2. CashO + RECO + A/RU≥ 3
3. CashO + DISU + PAYO≥ 3
4. CashO + DISU + EXPU ≥ 3
III. VR(A/RO)≥3 is equivalent to
1. A/RO + REVO≥ 3
2. A/RO + RECU + CashU ≥ 3
3. A/RO + RECU + DISU + PAYO≥ 3
4. A/RO + RECU + DISU + EXPU ≥3

II. v c (CashU) ≥3 is equivalent to
1. CashU + RECU + REVU ≥3
2. CashU + RECU + A/RO ≥3
3. CashU + DISO + PAYU ≥3
4. CashU + DISO + EXPO ≥3
IV. v R (A/RU)≥3 is equivalent to
1. A/RU + REVU ≥3
2. A/RU + RECO + CashO ≥3
3. A/RU + RECO + DISO + PAYU ≥3
4. A/RU + RECO + DISO + EXPO ≥3

V. Vp(PAYO)≥ 3 is equivalent to
1. PAYO + EXPO ≥3
2. PAYO + DISU + CashO≥3
3. PAYO + DISU + RECU + REVU≥ 3
4. PAYO + DISU + RECU + A/RO≥ 3

VI. Vp(PAYU)≥ 3 is equivalent to
1. PAYU + EXPU≥3
2. PAYU + DISO + CashU ≥3
3. PAYU + DISO + RECO + REVO≥ 3
4. PAYU + DISO + RECO + A/RU ≥3

VII. VR(REVO) ≥3 is equivalent to
1. REVO + A/RO ≥3
2. REVO + RECO + CashO ≥3
3. REVO + RECO + DISO + PAYU ≥3
4. REVO + RECO + DISO + EXPO ≥3

VIII. VR(REVU) ≥3 is equivalent to
1. REVU + A/RU ≥3
2. REVU + RECU + CashU≥3
3. REVU + RECU + DISU + PAYO≥ 3
4. REVU + RECU + DISU + EXPU ≥3

IX. vP(EXPO)≥ 3 is equivalent to
1. EXPO + PAYO ≥3
2. EXPO + DISO + CashU ≥3
3. EXPO + DISO + RECO + REVO≥ 3
4. EXPO + DISO + RECO + A/RU ≥3

X. Vp(EXPU) ≥3 is equivalent to
1. EXPU + PAYU
2. EXPU + DISU + CashO ≥3
3. EXPU + DISU + RECU + REVU ≥3
4. EXPU + DISU + RECU + A/RO ≥3

Thus, in the above analysis, each of the ten SAPs has been analyzed into its
equivalent set of four inequalities that must be satisfied by the basic assurance
elements. There are 40 such inequalities but they are not all distinct as a
cursory review of the table would show.
The distinct inequalities in the above list can be grouped into 2-term, 3term and 4-term subgroups as follows:

Distinct inequalities
2-Term

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

A/RO + REVO≥ 3
A/RU + REVU ≥3
PAYO + EXPO ≥3
PAYU + EXPU ≥3

3-Term

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

CashO + RECO + REVO≥ 3
CashO + RECO + A/RU≥ 3
CashO + DISU + PAYO ≥3
CashO + DISU + EXPU ≥3

4-Term

(a) A/RO + RECU + DISU + PAYO≥ 3
(b) A/RO + RECU + DISU + EXPU ≥3

(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
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CashU + RECU + REVU ≥3
CashU + RECO + A/RO ≥3
CashU + DISO + PAYU ≥3
CashU + DISO + EXPO ≥3

(e) A/RU + RECO + DISO + PAYU≥ 3
(f) A/RU + RECO + DISO + EXPO ≥3

(c) PAYO + RECU + DISU + REVU≥ 3 (g) PAYU + RECO + DISO + REVO≥ 3
(d) EXPO + DISO + RECO + REVO ≥3 (h) EXPU + DISU + RECU + REVU≥ 3

There are 20 distinct inequalities here. Since each of the ten SAPs is
equivalent to only four inequalities, it is therefore obvious that at leastfive are
required in order to form a sufficient audit plan. This proves thefirst part of the
theorem. To prove that SAPs I, III, VI, VIII and IX are sufficient, it is only
necessary to show that each of the above 20 inequalities are included in the set
of inequalities implied by these SAPs.
Thus,
I. is equivalent to 3 - T(a), 3 - T(b), 3 - T(c), 3 - T(d)
III. is equivalent to 2-T(a), 3-T(f), 4-T(a), 4-T(b)
VI. is equivalent to 2-T(d), 3-T(g), 4-T(e), 4-T(g)
VIII. is equivalent to 2 - T(b), 3 - T(e), 4 - T(c), 4 - T(h)
IX. is equivalent to 2-T(c), 3-T(h), 4-T(d), 4-T(f)
Simple inspection shows that the above are indeed distinct and therefore
equivalent to the distinct inequalities listed above. This proves the theorem.

Corollary
By reflection (i.e. o/s u/s, u/s o/s), the SAPs II, IV, V, VII and X are a
minimal sufficient audit plan.
Thus, as one would expect, minimal sufficient audit plans are not unique.

Corollary: Direction of Test Concept
In the three-cycle situation, the audit strategy of testing debit account
overstatement exposures directly, credit account understatement exposures
directly and then relying on the accounting model to provide assurance in all
other areas leads to a sufficient audit plan.
Proof: The sufficient audit plan of the Theorem is an example of this strategy. If
sufficient direct procedures are applied to CashO, A/RO, PAYU, REVU and
EXPO, the required SAPs listed in the theorem are obviously satisfied.
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Discussant's Response to
"An Assertion-Based Approach to Auditing"
William L. Felix, Jr.
The University of Arizona
Critiquing an assertion-based approach to auditing is a bit like criticizing
motherhood and apple pie, given its reliance on Mautz and Sharaf and an
existing SAS, but my role here today is not to toss bouquets. My discussion of
this paper will begin with a number of general issues where I think the paper
misses its target or I have doubts about its content. I will conclude my
discussion with a few points of lesser significance. These comments are
intended to stimulate discussion.

Some Basic Issues
The authors of this paper present a wide-ranging analysis of their views on
an assertion-based approach with some interesting insights into Clarkson
Gordon's use of this method in their development of microcomputer technology for audit practice. While very interesting and appealing ideas are
presented, there are some major omissions that are critical to a careful
evaluation of the ideas in this paper.
Beyond the author's assertions, there is no convincing argument in this
paper as to why an academic or practitioner ought to view an assertion-based
approach as either more effective or more efficient than some particular
alternative or as a dominant strategy with respect to all available alternatives.
An example of this lack of convincing argument is included in the last paragraph
on the first page where it appears the authors suggest that since an assertionbased approach to auditing is in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, that it should be used by practitioners and authors of auditing books.
This is clearly an inadequate criteria. Our choices of both general audit
philosophy as well as specific audit policies should be based on perceptions of
improved efficiency and/or effectiveness. Ideally such perceptions would be
based on some analysis or empirical data. Such evidence or other supporting
analysis seems to have been omitted from the paper. If the authors or Clarkson
Gordon have such data or analysis, it would be very worthwhile to present that
information.
An assertion-based approach could be viewed as a planning framework to
organize thinking about or planning for the types of errors that: 1) are possible
or likely; 2) for which internal accounting controls may be considered; and 3)
for which effective substantive tests (analytical review or substantive tests of
details) need to be considered. Although the authors do not address the
differences specifically, a useful focus for our following discussions might have
been to identify key differences between the risk-oriented error-discovery
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audit that the authors seem to be referring to as a foil and an assertions-based
approach. By considering the specific differences between the two methods,
possibly in the context of a specific illustration, we could have discussed how
the assertions-based approach differed in terms of our own criteria. Such a
discussion will be difficult today because we lack those specifics.
The questions stated in Section II are instructive. The authors' categorization of an error-based (negative) approach and an assertions-based (positive)
approach is questionable. I prefer their following observation that both
questions are probably considered jointly in many audit-planning approaches.
Also, both questions can be stated either positively or negatively. However,
since the authors appear to favor the second question in its positive form, it is
worth reminding the group of the evidence from the philosophy and psychology
of decision making. A number of authors have noted that the search for
evidence to support a belief is suspect behavior on philosophic grounds (see for
example On Scientific Thinking) 1;and empirical evidence in psychology
suggests that human decision makers are overly inclined to recognize evidence
that supports their views and ignore contrary evidence (see for example Waller
and Felix).2 Both of these observations suggest that there is considerable risk
in pushing auditors to look for supporting evidence alone as suggested in the
second question. However, the use of research from supporting disciplines
uncritically is very questionable. Research on the issues implicit in an auditor
searching for evidence to refute an assertion (negative approach) as opposed to
searching for evidence to support an assertion (a positive approach) is needed.
In view of the comments above, I also found the eighth paragraph in Section
III difficult to follow. An assurance as opposed to a risk approach does not differ
as to "a proof-based thinking approach" per se. As the approaches are being
used by the authors, they do differ in the direction of the implicit hypotheses
about errors, but the concepts of evidence and the support of beliefs of which I
am aware say very little about proving anything in an absolute sense.
In reading Section 4 of the paper, I must have missed something. The title
suggests that "Assertions And The Links To Internal Control Procedures And
Audit Procedures . . . " will be analyzed. Instead, the discussion seems to
focus on procedure packages (also included in the title) without linking
assertions and internal controls. To be fair, careful study of Figure 2 will supply
some insights into the authors' implicit views. An explicit discussion of their
views would still be preferable.
The authors sketch very briefly a Source of Assurance Plan (SAP). I
suspect that this SAP is central to their planned microcomputer decision
support package, but as described, it includes some unstated efficiency and/or
effectiveness tradeoffs which are important to facilitate understanding. At a
minimum, a brief comment as to how these tradeoffs were made would be very
informative.

Some Other Comments
I disagree strongly with the description in Section III of the degree of
assurance availablefrom analytical review. The authors describe the degree of
assurance as depending upon the type of procedure used to organize analytical
review evidence. As is true of all audit evidence, the degree of assurance an
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auditor obtains should depend on the quantity and the quality of the evidence.
Not, as is described in this case, the choice between judgmental or statistical
methods.
I agree with the author's position that internal control may be viewed as
one alternative source of evidence, at least in a conceptual sense. However,
this position is not unique to the assertions-based approach. It also raises the
possibility that the approach may push auditors too far. Even in an assertionsbased audit, internal control may be critical to adequate evidence in a client of
larger size. In developing new approaches and new philosophies about carrying
out the auditor's opinion formulation process, the central role of internal
controls, particularly at the point of capture of transactions in large clients, may
need special emphasis in order to avoid understating their significance.
In Section VI and also in Figure 3 a multidimensional evaluation concept is
"asserted." It is not clear how this evaluation concept operates or relates to
the notion of aggregating achieved levels of assurance and materiality across
assertions and across balances. If there is some other role to this multidimensional evaluation concept, this discussion needs to be expanded significantly.
Otherwise, Figure 3 adds little and should be omitted.
The notions of derived components and generating components were
difficult to follow. Are they just complicated ways of labeling transaction flows
into balances or are there more insights intended? Knowing Don Leslie I
suspect there is more intended but it did not come through in my reading.
As always, a Leslie or a Leslie and others paper is stimulating reading. Our
progress as both efficient and effective auditors requires that we continually
question and reevaluate all that we do. This paper is an important contribution
to that progress.

End Notes
1. Tweney, R.D., M.E. Doherty and C.R. Mynatt, On Scientific Thinking, Columbia
University Press (1981), p. 458.
2. Waller, W.S. and W.L. Felix, Jr., "The Auditor and Learning from Experience: Some
Conjectures," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 9, No. 3/4 (1984).
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3
On the Economics of Product
Differentiation in Auditing*
Dan A. Simunic
Michael Stein
University of British Columbia

I. Introduction
Corporatefinancial statement audits have traditionally been viewed as
homogeneous across auditors. For example, the Commission on Auditors'
Responsibilities ("Cohen Commission") in its Report [1978, p. 111] stated
that:
When a product or service offered by different suppliers differs
significantly to the user, or appears to differ significantly, it is easier for
one of its producers to maintain a higher, noncompetitive price. Public
accountingfirms go to considerable length to develop superior services
for their clients, but there is little effective product differentiation from the
viewpoint of the present buyer of the service (emphasis added), that is,
management of the corporation.
In support of this view, it is usual to assert that the identity of thefirm which
performs an audit is irrelevant since every examination must conform to
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and allfirm partners must be
fully professionally qualified. Thus users of financial statements have no reason
(nor basis) to distinguish among auditing firms.
At the same time, however, it has also been recognized that a company
which may have a perfectly satisfactory relationship with a local accounting firm
will often change auditors to a well-known nationalfirm when that company first
sells securities to the public. It is usually alleged that such "displacement"
occurs as a result of pressure from underwriters (see, for example, Wall Street
Journal, July 18, 1983, "Small CPA Concern Sues an Underwriter Over Loss
of Client") or because of other unwarranted "biases." For example, Arnett
and Danos [1979] use the term "perceptual barriers to viability" to describe
these "biases." Under the assumption that the services of auditingfirms are
homogeneous,
it
follows
that
professional
accounting
*The research study, upon which this paper is based, was funded by a grant from the Canadian
Certified General Accountants' Research Foundation (Vancouver, B.C.), whose support we
gratefully acknowledge. Also, we have benefited from the comments of participants in the
accounting workshops at the University of Alberta, University of British Columbia, Ohio State
University, and Washington University (St. Louis) on earlier versions of the paper.
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bodies, such as the AICPA or CICA, should strive to eliminate "biases,"
perhaps by "educating" managers, underwriters, and other financial statement
users. However, if we drop the homogeneity assumption, then auditor
displacement at the time of an initial public offering of securities (to the extent
such displacement actually occurs) may simply be evidence of rational economic
behavior.

1.1 The Product Differentiation

Hypothesis

Recently, several researchers [Simunic, 1980; De Angelo, 1981(a) and
1981(b); Dopuch and Simunic, 1980 and 1982] have suggested that audit
services, like most products, are likely to be differentiated.
De Angelo [1981(a)] argues for the existence of audit quality differentiation,
in the sense of systematic differences in auditor independence, essentially as
follows. First, she assumes that the production of audit services for a specific
client over time is subject to a learning curve. Given this condition, if,
whenever a client changes auditors, there is competitive bidding among
potential suppliers, then the first year's audit fee will be less than the avoidable
cost in that year. This is referred to as "low balling." In other words, the
auditor is "forced" (through the competitive bidding process) to invest in the
client by passing through into his initial fee bid the discounted future cost
savings due to learning. The investment will be recovered (along with at least a
normal return) through fees in subsequent years which exceed avoidable costs,
and these "excess fees" constitute client-specific quasi-rents.
With respect to auditor independence, the important feature of this
argument is that the quasi-rents can be lost (and the auditor earn less than a
normal return) should a client unexpectedly change auditors. Thus, other things
being equal, the existence of client-specific quasi-rents gives a client more
bargaining power vis-a-vis the incumbent auditor, potentially impairing that
auditor's independence. However, De Angelo argues, other things are not
equal in that an incumbent auditor who is tempted to "cheat'' in order to please
one client must also consider the possible loss of his other clients, should his
malfeasance subsequently be discovered. Hence a large audit firm with many
audits and earning large aggregate client-specific quasi-rents faces a higher
potential opportunity loss from "cheating'' to retain a client than would a small
audit firm with few clients. The aggregate quasi-rents are said to constitute a
"collateral bond" against auditor "cheating." As a result, auditor independence will be positively correlated with audit firm size.
Note that De Angelo's argument is essentially mechanistic, being driven by
an assumed audit learning curve and competition in the bidding process. Many
objections can be raised against the reasonableness of this scenario, including
the fact that the existence of a significant learning curve in auditing has not been
empirically demonstrated.1 In addition, De Angelo ignores the demand for
differentiated audit services, except in the narrow sense that a client is not
willing to pay the cost of an independent audit to an auditor who, in fact, is not
perceived as supplying such audits (i.e., a "cheater").
In a second paper, De Angelo [1981(b)] broadens her notion of audit quality
into "the market assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a)
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discover a breach in the client's accounting system and (b) report the breach"
[p. 186]. Differences in quality supplied are still motivated by differences in
auditor collateral bonds; that is, audit quality is correlated with auditfirm size.
In addition, De Angelo conjectures that the demand for differences in audit
quality arises from differences in agency costs across clients. Several of the
linkages (particularly the connection between the size of the collateral bond and
the probability of discovering a breach) in that paper are very vague. However,
some of the arguments (discussed later) are consistent with the present work.
At about the same time, Dopuch and Simunic [1980; 1982] proposed a
demand based model of product differentiation wherein audit services possessed two characteristics valued by a company's top management: a contribution to organization control and credibility with externalfinancial statement
users. They argue that credibility is simply associated with an auditor's
reputation or brand name. The demand for credibility is assumed to arise when
there is an asymmetry of information between top management and investors
about the honesty of top management. In this situation, a costly audit by a
credible auditor can either signal management's honesty to investors or reduce
agency costs by restricting top management's ability to conceal, through
misrepresentation in the financial statements, the consequence of actions taken
which were in the best interests of top management ("self-serving behavior")
but not shareholders. Dopuch and Simunic argue further that top managements' utility functions and opportunity sets for "self-serving behavior" likely
vary across companies. Hence, "the market is not likely to be characterized by
a single value of credibility demanded and supplied" [1982, p. 413]. Note that
an important element of any market characterized by information asymmetry is
the question of observability. Thus, Dopuch and Simunic argue further that
auditor credibility must be associated with an observable characteristic, such as
the name of the auditor, rather than the undisclosed details of the audit
examination.
These arguments are silent as to the specific rank ordering(s) of auditors on
a credibility dimension and the theory is sufficiently general to allow different
orderings of auditfirms in different circumstances. For example, auditors may
possess different local, regional, or client industry-specific reputations. However, from the observed dominance of the Big Eightfirms in the market for
audits of publicly held companies, Dopuch and Simunic infer that audits of such
companies by Big Eight firms are more credible than audits by smaller firms.

1.2 Previous Tests for Product Differentiation
Several researchers have attempted to empirically test this "product
differentiation hypothesis," generally in the simplified two-class form wherein
audits by Big Eight firms are hypothesized to be of higher quality than audits by
non-Big Eight firms.
Nichols and Smith [1983] examined the stock market reaction to auditor
changes between auditor classes during the years 1973-79 by 51 companies
whose common shares were listed on either the New York or American Stock
Exchanges. In a series of tests, they found that while abnormal returns were in
the directions predicted by the product differentiation hypothesis (i.e., negative
residuals were associated with Big Eight to non-Big Eight changes while
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positive residuals were associated with non-Big Eight to Big Eight changes),
the mean differences were not statistically significant. They concluded that the
magnitude of any market revaluation of the firm arising from a change in auditor
class may not be detectable using conventional methods, particularly for large,
listed companies.
Shockley and Holt [1983] used multidimensional scaling to examine how a
sample of bank chief financial officers rated the Big Eight CPAfirms. The basic
issue tested was whether or not purchasers of audit services could systematically differentiate among the Big Eightfirms (i.e., whether there was product
differentiation within the Big Eight). Shockley and Holt found that bankers
tended to differentiate among these auditfirms largely on the basis of market
shares within the banking industry. They therefore suggested that industry
expertise may be a source of audit quality differentiation.
Healy and Lys [1983] used the product differentiation hypothesis to explain
the acquisition by Big Eightfirms of smaller auditfirms. They conjectured that
auditor mergers may be the least costly method for the clients of the acquired
firm to change the quality of their auditing. However, not all clients of the
acquired firm are likely to demand a change in audit quality at the time of the
merger. Hence, any systematic differences between those clients which stay
with the acquiring Big Eightfirm and those which revert to a smaller auditor
would represent factors associated with the demand for audit quality. Their test
consisted of an examination of switching vs. non-switching clients of J.K.
Lasser & Co., following its merger into Touche Ross, and the clients of S.D.
Leidesdorf & Co., following that firm's acquisition by Ernst & Whinney. The
results were weakly consistent with the product differentiation hypothesis in
that switching vs. non-switching clients differed on certain plausible dimensions, including size and leverage. However, other plausible explanatory
variables, including changes in client capital structure, were found to be
insignificantly different between the two groups.
Palmrose [1984] investigated the association between agency cost variables
and the use of different classes of auditors. She hypothesized that the higher
the expected level of agency costs arising from a certain ownership-management structure in a company, the higher the level of audit quality which will be
demanded. The test consisted of a series of logistic regressions of auditor
choice (Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight) on a set of potential explanatory variables
which measured expected agency costs (i.e., client size, degree of separation
between ownership and management, leverage, and the existence of management compensation plans tied to accounting numbers). The sample consisted of
a cross-section of 276 companies classified by industry. The results were
inconclusive and somewhat anomalous in that client size was the only consistently significant explanatory variable (i.e., the clients of the Big Eight firms
tended to be larger). In addition, leverage was the only other variable which
was sometimes significant, but in the wrong direction. That is, the clients of
Big Eightfirms tended to have lower leverage (lower expected agency costs),
which was contrary to the hypothesis.
One direct implication of product differentiation in auditing is that there
should be related systematic differences in audit prices. As pointed out by
Simunic [1980], the market for audits is a hedonic market wherein differentiated products are not observable directly, but rather are revealed by differ72

ences in prices associated with differences in observed product characteristics.
Thus, if Big Eightfirms deliver a higher quality of service than non-Big Eight
firms then, other things held constant, audit prices should likewise vary
between the two groups.
The existing evidence on this point is mixed. Simunic [1980] found that
prices charged by the Big Eight firms in the United States were, on average,
not significantly different and perhaps somewhat lower than non-Big Eight firm
prices, across all sizes of clients. Note that his sample consisted of a cross
section of 397 audits of companies ranging in size from $500,000 in assets (and
sales) to about $10 billion in assets (and sales). Using a pooled cross section of
136 Australian companies, Francis [1984], on the other hand, found that prices
charged by Big Eightfirms were significantly higher than prices charged by nonBig Eight firms. This is consistent with the results reported by Taffler and
Ramalinggam [1982] using data from the United Kingdom. However, in addition
to the institutional differences between countries, the companies in Francis'
sample were significantly smaller (by about a factor of 10) than those in
Simunic's U.S. sample. In a subsequent paper, Francis and Stokes [1985]
report that the positive difference between Big Eight and non-Big Eight firm
prices seems to be largely confined to the very smallest companies in their
sample (mean assets of $1.8 million Australian dollars). This leads the authors
to speculate that scale economies to Big Eight firms and consequent lower
production costs may "swamp" the price effects of product differentiation,
.except for audits of very small companies where "scale economies are less
likely to exist" [p. 12].
The conflicting nature of this evidence may, at least partially, be due to the
difficulties of inferring audit prices from audit fee data. An audit fee, which alone
is directly observable, can be thought of as the product of price times audit
quantity purchased by the client company. Hence in a cross section (and time
series) of fees, sources of extraneous differences in audit quantities must be
carefully controlled before inferences about prices can be made. While there is
now considerable evidence about the major determinants of audit fees [e.g.,
Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1983; Maher, Broman, Colson and Tiessen, 1985],
the specifications of existing models are no doubt imperfect and omitted
variables may bias regression coefficients. In addition, many audit fee determinants are correlated with company size, the relation between fees and size is
nonlinear, and, because of the dominance of the Big Eight firms in the audits of
large companies, it is very difficult to obtain a sample of audits wherein the
clients of Big Eight and non-Big Eight firms are well matched on a size
dimension. Hence, a failure to properly control the nonlinear client size effect
on fees can easily lead to a biased coefficient on an auditor identity variable.
Add to these econometric difficulties the possible confounding effects of scale
economies to large auditors, and it is not surprising that no clear evidence on
product differentiation has yet emerged using audit fee data.
In summary, the empirical tests of the product differentiation hypothesis
have, to date, been suggestive but inconclusive. But, this is not surprising
given the early stage of the research on this topic, as well as the economics of
auditing in general.
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1.3 Plan of this Paper
The economic foundations for the product differentiation hypothesis in
auditing are only roughly and incompletely sketched out in the existing
literature. Our objective in this paper is to develop these foundations, which
serve as a basis for a theory of auditor choice by top management of a company.
Note that the auditor choice decision is non-trivial only under the hypothesis
that auditor services are somehow differentiated. The assumption of homogeneous audit services implies that the assignment of auditors to clients is random
or simply a function of auditor cost conditions. For example, if only the largest
auditingfirms are fully able to exploit available economies of scale due to input
indivisibilities, then there is no meaningful auditor choice and these largest
firms will eventually (in a world of transaction costs) "sweep" the market for
audits.
In Section II, using Lancaster's [1966] "characteristics" framework, we
begin by analyzing the attributes of the audit service which may be valued by
top management. In doing so, we consider the distinction between audit quality
and quantity and their relation to audit service inputs. We then analyze the
"product location" decision of auditors, and develop the argument that the
credibility of an audit is communicated to externalfinancial statement users
(e.g., prospective shareholders and creditors) through an audit firm's brand
name. Thus it is the brand name which has ex ante value to top management
when seeking to influence the decisions of users. We conclude this section with
a discussion of some welfare implications of product differentiation.
In Section III, we associate auditor credibility with the power of an auditor's
tests (in a statistical sense), and analyze the sources of demand for different
levels of credibility. We argue that an auditor's brand name induces a Bayesian
revision of users' prior probability distributions that financial statements
contain material error. In a world of rational users who can "price protect"
themselves when transacting with management, cross sectional differences in
the prior probability of error and the wealth effects of error will cause top
managers of different companies to demand different credibility levels. We
examine the role of future rents and quasi-rents in "enforcing" the delivery of
a particular expected power of test, and consider the implication of our analysis
for rates of litigation ("hit rates") which can be expected to occur across audit
firms whose credibility varies. Finally, we compare our analysis to that of De
Angelo and present some examples to illustrate the main ideas. The paper
closes with some concluding observations and comments.

II. Economics of Product Differentiation
2.1 Basic Concepts
Consistent with the traditional view of financial statement audits, the
standard assumption in microeconomic analysis has been that the products
produced byfirms in a particular industry or market are homogeneous. That is,
within an industry, consumers cannot distinguish the product produced byfirm i
from that produced byfirm j. More formally, this assumption is expressed by
the condition that the cross price elasticity of demand for the product of the i t h
firm in an industry with respect to the price of product of the j th firm in the
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industry is infinite, or the products are perfect substitutes.2 An implication of
this assumption is that a single price must prevail within the market.
Chamberlain [1933] was the first economist to suggest that no two firms
are likely to make precisely the same product, even though they operate in the
same industry. He coined the term "monopolistic competition" to describe a
market where there are many sellers, each one producing a somewhat
differentiated product. If, on the other hand, there are only a few firms in the
industry, the market can be described as a differentiated products oligopoly.
Note that differentiated products are assumed to be strong substitutes, but not
perfect substitutes for each other. That is, their cross price elasticities are finite
and relatively large. If the products are very weak substitutes in demand (cross
price elasticities approach zero), then the products are no longer simply
differentiated, but the firms can be thought of as operating in different
industries. In fact, a criticism of Chamberlain's work has been that the notion of
differentiated products is really nothing new, but simply causes us to think
more deeply about which group of firms ought to be considered an industry
[e.g., Stigler, 1968]!
Following Chamberlain, and the essentially concurrent work by Hotelling
[1929] on spacial duopoly, there were few contributions to the economics of
product differentiation until the work of Lancaster [1966; 1971] on the nature of
product characteristics. In considering exactly how products may be differentiated, Lancaster proposed the notion that a commodity is not desired in and of
itself, but rather for the bundle of utility bearing characteristics it contains. For
example, a specific brand and model of automobile provides not only the
obvious characteristic transportation, but also some amount of the characteristics safety, social prestige, driving entertainment, pleasant appearance, etc. Each
of these characteristics commands an implicit price in a market, and the
observed market price of the commodity (e.g., automobile) will be a linear
combination of the measured quantities of each of the component characteristics. Since quantities of characteristics vary across products, observed prices
will also vary. Hence in order to compare product prices, construct price
indices over time, or test hypotheses about market behavior using price data, it
is necessary to control for differences in product characteristics. A way to do
this is to estimate the coefficients of a hedonic regression function where
product price is the dependent variable and quantities of characteristics are the
independent variables. This is essentially the theoretical rationale underlying
the studies of audit fees discussed in Section 1.3
The notion of characteristics suggests that there are two basic ways in
which products can be differentiated. In the simplest case, the industry's
product contains only one characteristic, but products of variousfirms differ in
the amount of the characteristic each contains. This situation can be described
as vertical product differentiation and it implies that products can be ordered on
a single dimension, which can be labeled product quality. The more general
case, where the product possesses many characteristics and producers differ in
the amount of each characteristic their product contains, can be called
horizontal product differentiation. Note that in this case, the description of each
firm's product is a k component vector of quantities (where k is the number of
characteristics or dimensions) and, in general, the products of various suppliers
cannot be ordered.
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2.2 Demand for Audit Service Characteristics
Before proceeding further, it is useful to relate these concepts to the audit
services market. First, it is important to recognize that audit services are not a
consumption good, but rather a factor of production. That is, neither audit
services nor their component characteristics are direct objects of utility to any
ultimate consumer, and the demand for audit services is not the outcome of a
standard constrained utility maximization problem. Thus, the demand for
differentiated
audit services cannot arise from a simple assumption that
consumers vary in their tastes, preferences, and incomes.
As a factor of production or intermediate good, the demand for audit
services is derived from the objective function of the top management of the
audited company. We assume that this objective is to maximize own expected
utility.4 Some insight into the characteristics of the audit service which may be
valued by (or increase the wealth of) top management can be derived by
considering various possible relationships between top management, shareholders, and creditors.
Top managers are also owners and there are no creditors
These assumptions describe a smaller closely-held company with no debt.
Will audit services be demanded at all in this situation? The answer would seem
to depend crucially on the size and complexity of the company and the resulting
degree to which top managers can personally monitor the various activities of
their subordinates. The less their personal control over the organization, the
more likely an outside audit would be valuable to top management. The audit
service would be part of the control system over the information produced
within the organization, and hence the company'sfinancial statements. This
demand, which arises from the internal agency problems of an organization,
may be termed a control demand. Therefore, a plausible audit service
characteristic along which auditors can be differentiated is the contribution of
the audit to the organization's internal control system.
Top managers are separate from owners and there are no creditors
These assumptions describe a publicly held company with an all-equity
capital structure (ignoring government regulations and any mandatory audit
requirement). There is now an agency relationship between top management
and outside shareholders.5 Given the existence of this agency relationship,
there is likely to be a demand for an independent attestation (audit) as to the
truthfulness of the information reported by top management to the outside
shareholders, and, in general, both parties (groups) might benefit from such an
audit [Beaver, 1981]. The key attribute of the audit service is likely to be its
credibility as perceived by the shareholders. Hence, this is a second characteristic or dimension along which audit services can be differentiated.
Effects

of the introduction of debt into the capital structure

The issuance of debt by a closely held company creates an agency
relationship between the debtholder(s) as principal and an owner-manager as
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agent. After the issuance of debt, the owner-manager is motivated to take
actions which increase the value of the equity, but decrease the value of the
debt. A major potential source of such agency costs is adoption of an
investment policy in which projects with a high variance but low expected net
present value are substituted for lower variance but higher net present value
projects [Jensen and Meckling, 1976].6 Note that the owner-manager will
exclusively earn the possible high returns from high variance projects, but
shares the risk of possible low returns or losses with the debtholders. This
agency relationship is likely to give rise to the use of restrictive covenants in
debt agreements [see Smith and Warner, 1979] as well as a demand for
independent attestation to verify both the compliance with these agreements
and the truthfulness of generalfinancial information reported by the ownermanager to the debtholders. As with public shareholders, credibility or
reputation is thus likely to be an important audit service attribute. Of course,
both the manager-shareholder and manager-debtholder agency relationships
will exist simultaneously if debt is issued by a publicly held company, reinforcing
the demand for audit service credibility.
In summary, two major audit service characteristics arise from a consideration of the possible organization structure of the audited company:
1) the contribution of the audit to organization control, and
2) the credibility of the audit as perceived by shareholders and creditors.
The importance of these two characteristics was confirmed in a recent study of
881 small, closely held U.S. companies by O'Keefe and Barefield [1985]. Of the
companies who voluntarily purchased audits in this sample (132 companies or
15 percent), 57 percent listed "enhances credibility (of financial statements)
with outside users" as the most important reason for the purchase, while 46
percent listed "augments internal control" as the second most important
reason.7 Moreover, other reasons for the purchase were mentioned only
infrequently (e.g., 12/17 percent listed "limits liability" as a primary/secondary reason).
A third possible characteristic which top management may value is the
scope of the product line offered by an auditfirm, in particular the availability of
various management consulting type services from the audit supplier. Such
product availability reduces management's search costs when seeking to
acquire consulting services. In addition, it is often claimed that production of
auditing creates a knowledge externality or spillover which reduces the costs of
consulting services when the services are produced jointly. This issue was
analyzed and tested by Simunic [1984] who found that the pricing of audit
services is consistent with the hypothesis that knowledge spills over from
auditing to consulting. Thus, managers in certain circumstances may be better
off by purchasing the audit servicefrom a supplier with a wide product line.
However, this need not be true in all situations. For example, in the data set on
publicly held companies underlying Simunic [1980; 1984], 235 of 381 companies
or 62 percent purchased no consulting servicefrom their auditor over a threeyear period.8 Further, of the 277 companies audited by a Big Eightfirm, 163 or
59 percent purchased no consulting service from their auditfirm during the
period. Hence, the value of wide service scope to managers can be assumed to
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vary, creating a third characteristic along which auditfirms can be differentiated.

2.3 Distinctions Between Characteristic Quantities, Quality of
Service, and the Quantity of Inputs and Output
Based on this analysis, a description of the audit service purchased by a
particular client9 from a particular audit firm requires, in principle, the
specification of a vector of quantities of three service characteristics:
{control, credibility, product line} or {c1; c 2 , c 3 }.
A unit of each characteristic is assumed to be costly to produce. For example,
the offering of a line of consulting services which may or may not be demanded
by a particular client is costly to the auditfirm. Or the development of a certain
credibility10 level with outside shareholders and creditors is also costly.
Therefore, each service characteristic commands a positive implicit price—say
λ1, λ2 and λ3 — in the market.
With differentiated audit services, quality of service comparisons can be
made using any dimension of interest if the quantities of the suppressed
characteristics are at least equal. For example, an audit service described by
the vector {2, 8, 5} is of higher quality than the service {2, 5, 5}, of lower
quality than the service {2, 9, 5} and not comparable in quality to the service
{1, 10, 5}.
In addition to the quantities of service characteristics from which quality of
service rankings can sometimes be made, auditing also has a pure quantity
dimension. This is so because audit service contexts differ radically across
companies. We have argued that some differences in client contexts are the
basis for a demand for differentiated audit services. However, other contextual
differences lead to supplier choice and the delivery of a certain quantity of
service on the basis of supplier efficiency considerations in a context taken
alone. To make this distinction meaningful, it is necessary to clearly specify a
base level or standard service. All client context differences which affect the
resources expended by a supplier in providing the base level service are
sources of pure audit quantity differences. Conversely, any context differences
which lead to different choices of service vectors, {c1, c 2 , c 3 }, are sources of
product differentiation among auditors.
The base level service is defined by the simple purchase of an audit
opinion.11 If management only values an audit opinion per se (perhaps because
an audit is mandated by law), then management would simply choose the leastcost producer in the circumstances. This characterization of the problem is the
basis for the traditional view that all auditors deliver the same homogeneous
product—an appropriate audit opinion. Empirically, it motivates a search for
auditor scale economies [e.g., Danos and Eichenseher, 1982]. The hypothesis
of product differentiation motivates a search beyond the opinion to distinguishing service characteristics. Of course, management still demands an efficient
producer of a particular characteristic vector, but auditor choice is no longer a
cost minimization problem. Rather, it requires explicit recognition of a benefit
function to top management.
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If the pure quantity of auditing is measured by q, then an audit service fee
can be denoted as
F = (λ1C1 + λ 2 c 2 + λ 3 c 3 )q.
While audit fee data are not examined in this paper, some examples of fee
determination are useful to illustrate the ideas. Suppose that a client wishes to
purchase a base level service—an audit opinion. Management deems the audit
valueless in controlling the organization and has no use for consulting services.
Since some auditor must sign the opinion, credibility or c 2 can arbitrarily be
assigned a minimum value of 1. Hence the characteristic vector demanded
would be the base level {0,1,0} and the fee would be
F = λ2q
where q depends on company size, complexity, etc. Consider now an identical
company, except that management values the auditor's ability to perform
certain consulting services as needed. Say the desired characteristic vector is
{0, 1, 1}. Note that this is a higher quality service. The service fee would be
F = (λ 2 + λ3)q where F > F .
The fee now reflects the presence of both attributes and is scaled by q. Finally,
suppose there exists another identical company in terms of size, complexity,
etc. whose top management chooses an audit service which improves organization control, has a higher credibility with outsiders than the base level, and is
obtained from a supplier who is capable of rendering certain consulting services
as needed. Say the vector {2, 3,1} characterizes this service. The fee for this
service, which is of higher quality than in the previous case, would be
F' = (2λ2 + 3λ 3 + λ3)q where F' > F > F .
What is the role of service inputs in this fee model?12 The outputs of the
audit service are the quantities {c1, c 2 , c 3 } and q. These outputs are related to
inputs through a production function, but the relationship need not be simple.
For example, it seems likely that control and credibility are largely joint
products, thus restricting the values c1 and c 2 can assume. On the other hand,
the breadth of the available product line is not a function of variable audit
service inputs but requires the incurrence of a fixed cost by the auditing firm.
Higher levels of available services presumably are associated with higher fixed
costs. Thus, distinguishing between inputs and output is important in conceptualizing the audit service; but detail specification of the input/output relationship is not possible, nor usually necessary.

2.4 Product Location in Characteristics Space
If audit services are differentiated, then the question arises as to what
service designs will be offered for sale in the market? Also, can a given audit
firm be expected to supply a single type of service (i.e., a vector with specific
characteristics {c1, c 2 , c3}) or simultaneously supply a variety of characteristic
vectors? These are important issues from the point of view of both purchasers
and producers. Audit firms presumably want to design services so as to
maximize economic rents; conversely, the services (and prices) which emerge
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in market equilibrium affect the welfare of purchasers. In the economics
literature, these issues are described as "product location" decisions since the
insights are frequently derived by analogy from formal models of spatial
competition.
Consider first the question of whether a producer will offer a single or
multiple characteristic vectors. For typical goods, it is common to observe a
company which produces and markets a variety of product types. For example,
in a study of product characteristics of the U.K. fertilizer industry, Shaw [1982]
found that 69 different compound fertilizers were available in 1978 from three
major producers. These products largely differed only in composition with
respect to the three plant nutrients—nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash. In this
setting, labeling presumably allows the consumer to choose the most suitable
product for a particular situation, and the identity of the sellingfirm may well be
irrelevant.
As product characteristics become more subtle and thus more difficult to
enumerate and measure, a company will use separate brand names to identify
products with specific sets of characteristics. For example, automobile manufacturers sell a variety of models which presumably differ as to the amounts of
the characteristics—transportation, safety, prestige, etc.—each provides. In
the limit, if a company is (somehow) precludedfrom developing a multiplicity of
brands, the relevant brand will be the name of the company itself. In that
situation, where the nature of the product precludes direct communication of
component characteristics and thefirm name is the brand, each supplier will
produce a product with a single set of characteristic quantities.
Turning to the location decision, rent seeking suppliers can be expected to
locate (i.e., choose a vector) in response to demand and the location choices of
other suppliers. Unfortunately, the economics literature offers few general
results on equilibrium location choices, as solutions are very sensitive to
alternative plausible assumptions about the behavior of competitors, the nature
of the space in which competition occurs, and the distribution of customers
[Eaton and Lipsey, 1975]. However, some insights can be obtained by
considering the basic factors which affect the location decision [see Waterson,
1984].
Three cost elements enter into economic models of location:
a. a transportation cost per unit of distance,
b. production costs which can consist of afixed and/or variable component,
and
c. relocation costs.
The existence of fixed costs is crucial to the solution. If there are no fixed costs
of production, then firms will simply produce at all points at which there are
customers. That is, demand will be perfectly satisfied without the incurrence of
transportation costs. The assumption of fixed costs implies that the number of
suppliers must be limited to maintain profitability; hence customers will vary in
distance from the nearest supplier. A second key assumption concerns the
possibility of relocation. That is, once a supplier chooses a location, are there
costs of relocation? In general, if relocation is costless but there are fixed
production costs, there is no unique equilibrium solution [Eaton and Lipsey,
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1975]. Conversely, if initial location choice is irreversible and suppliers enter a
market sequentially, then the equilibrium location pattern will be symmetrical
for a uniform distribution of customers. For example, if buyers are uniformly
scattered along a line segment of fixed length, sellers will anticipate that
unusually large "gaps" in the market will befilled by competitors and hence
will array themselves at equally spaced intervals [Waterson, 1984]. However, if
customers are located in clusters, a closer packing of suppliers will occur in
areas of high demand density with the "gaps" increasing in width in areas of
low demand density [Shaw, 1982].
Let us now relate these ideas to the audit service. If different quantities of
control, credibility, and product line scope can be readily observed and
measured by top management (i.e., these attributes are like nitrogen,
phosphorus, and potash!), it would seem that each auditfirm can produce a
multiplicity of characteristic vectors to meet (perhaps imperfectly if there are
fixed costs) client demand. However, even if top management possesses such
complete information, the situation is complicated by the fact that credibility is
purchased solely to influence the decisions of shareholders and creditors. These
outside parties, who may be numerous and geographically scattered, are very
unlikely to possess complete information. We therefore conclude that, for
them, the audit firm's brand name or reputation is the relevant measure of
credibility. However, brand name will be less important for the other two
characteristics where the outputs (and inputs) can be more easily observed by
top management, who directly value these characteristics. An implication is
that each auditfirm will be identified with a single level of credibility at any
moment in time, but may offer a multiplicity of control levels and, perhaps,
product scope levels.13 In the next section, we analyze the auditor choice
decision given this information asymmetry and develop more precisely our
notions of credibility, brand name, and reputation.
With respect to the product location decision of auditors, thefirst step is to
identify the analogues of transportation, production, and relocation costs. Note
that transportation costs are incurred whenever suppliers and customers are
physically separated. Thus, in a characteristic space, an analogous cost arises
if, given the equilibrium distribution of characteristic vectors of suppliers, top
management incurs an opportunity loss of wealth or utility. For example,
suppose managers rationally want to purchase an audit of near zero credibility,
but no such service is available on the market. Acquiring a credible audit
implies an opportunity loss or transportation cost. 14 Or suppose management
wants an audit of certain credibility from a supplier who also specializes in a
certain type of consulting service, but no such supplier exists. Again, an
opportunity loss is incurred. From the previous discussion, note that such
opportunity losses will arise only if there arefixed costs of producing at certain
locations, that is, particular characteristic vectors.
Since very little is known about the production functions of public accounting firms, we can only speculate about the importance of fixed costs in
producing a level of control, credibility, and product scope. However, it seems
likely that there are significant fixed costs associated with a firm's capital
commitments. The most important of these will be the technology adopted and
the human capital (expertise) of professional staff. For example, Kinney [1985]
has argued that auditing firms can be categorized on an audit technology
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dimension into "unstructured" vs. "structured" firms. Thefirst group tends
to minimize the constraints imposed on professional judgment whereas the
second uses statistical methods, decision aids, etc. to constrain and "improve"
judgment. It seems plausible that fixed costs increase as "structure" increases. Fixed costs are also likely to increase as the professional staff
becomes more specialized (narrow). For example, the offering of a specialized
consulting service to clients, such as industrial engineering for plant design and
cost control, no doubt adds to an audit firm's fixed costs.
Two conclusions follow from this discussion. First, auditingfirms probably
vary in the level of fixed costs they incur. Second, the higher thefixed cost
commitment, the less flexible the firm will be in producing a variety of
characteristic vectors. This seems to be the basis for the often heard claim that
small audit firms are moreflexible in meeting a client's demands, although large
firms may be more efficient in performing specific, complex tasks. With respect
to the three audit service characteristics, fixed costs can be important in all
cases. As a result, all possible combinations of control, credibility, and product
scope are not likely to be available in the market.
Finally, consider the costs incurred by an auditfirm when attempting to
move from one characteristic vector to another vector. Typically, relocation
costs are those fixed production costs which are "sunk" at a specific location.
These costs may be particularly high when information about characteristics is
conveyed by the brand name. Schmalensee [1978] points out that, for
consumer goods, the "repositioning" of brands can be so costly that it is
frequently cheaper to simply abandon an established brand whose sales have
fallen to low levels and introduce a new brand. Again, while there is no
empirical evidence on the point, such costs are likely to exist in auditing. For
example, if an audit firm invests in structured technologies which facilitate the
production of high levels of control and credibility but are unnecessary for
producing low levels of these characteristics, an attempted movefrom the high
level will be costly. Or, if afirm enters into an employment contract with a
specialized consultant, firing the consultant will be costly. Perhaps most
important, as with consumer goods, it may be very costly for a firm to change
the credibility level associated with its brand name. In fact, high costs of
directly relocating a brand may be an important motivation for mergers
between CPA firms.
If costs of relocation are substantial (therefore locations more or less fixed),
the characteristic vectors of auditfirms will tend to be separated. For example,
there will be an array of credibility levels associated withfirm brands. Thus any
grouping of suppliers into broad classes such as Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight is
necessarily arbitrary and should be tested for within-group homogeneity. Note,
however, that auditfirm product vectors will tend to be clustered in response
to concentrations of client demand.

2.5 Welfare

Implications of Product Differentiation

When dealing with differentiated products, a social welfare question which
can be asked is this: given a location equilibrium, will the variety of characteristic vectors offered for sale in the market be optimal?15 This evaluation involves
a trade-off. On the one hand, the greater the variety of characteristic vectors,
82

the better the market caters to diverse consumer tastes and preferences. On
the other hand, the assumption of differentiated products (imperfect substitutes) implies that the demand curves faced by suppliers are downward
sloping and equilibrium must occur where average production costs are still
falling. Thus differentiated products imply a loss of efficiency. Unfortunately,
the welfare properties of the free market solution depend on the specific values
of parameters. That is, in general too many or too few product varieties may be
produced and sold [Friedman, 1983]. Hence beyond these general statements
the economic literature offers no conclusion about the welfare implications of
product differentiation in auditing from the usual perspective.
However, a somewhat different question appears to be more relevant here;
namely, is it socially desirable for auditors to offer differentiated services at all
to their clients? Since the demand for auditing is not a consumption demand but
rather is derived from top management's objective function which is assumed
to be maximization of own wealth or utility, are demand differences, in some
sense, socially legitimate? There is no special problem if top management's
objective is consistent with the objectives of shareholders and creditors. Such
mutuality of interests would occur with respect to the characteristics control
and product line scope. That is, all three parties are presumably interested in
efficient monitoring of organization subordinates and efficient acquisition and
utilization of consulting services. However, the credibility characteristic is
clearly different in that the purpose of auditor credibility is to ameliorate an
agency problem between top management and the other two groups. Thus, the
legitimacy of product differentiation on this dimension is likely to be a
controversial, but interesting question. To answer the question, we must
analyze the nature, role, and demand for credibility in more detail.

III. Auditor Credibility and Auditor Choice
3.1 Nature of Audit Service Credibility
Dopuch and Simunic [1982] describe auditor credibility as follows (p. 407):
An auditor's attestation to the authenticity of financial statements adds
credibility to these top management assertions. Credibility is judged by
users. More credible reporting simply means a report is more likely to
be truthful or lack intentional misrepresentation. . . . Shareholders will
rationally expect that attestation by a credible auditor reduces the
probability that management is able to successfully conceal 'self-serving
behavior.'
This is consistent with both Watts and Zimmerman [1980] and De Angelo
[1981(b)] who argue that the ex ante value of an audit to shareholders and
creditors depends on these individuals' (or "the market's") perception of the
joint probability that a given auditor will discover errors and irregularities in a
set of financial statements and report those findings truthfully (without
omission or bias).16 Recall that this is also De Angelo's definition of audit
quality.
The concept can be made more precise by considering a simplified Bayesian
model of an auditor's decision problem. Assume an auditor faces a two-action,
two-state reporting decision where the states of nature are: (s1) — the financial
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statements are correct, and (s2) — thefinancial statements are materially
incorrect. The available actions are: (a1) — give an unqualified opinion, or (a2)
— give an appropriately qualified or adverse opinion. Assume the auditor has
performed all the usual audit tests at a certain intensity level, measured by n,
which yield possible signals, t. Further, the test results, t, indicate the
presence of only immaterial errors. Then the posterior probability of s 2 will be:
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2)
p"(s2|t,n) =

1(t|n,s2)p'(s2)+ 1(t|n,s1)(1 -p'(s 2 ))

where
p" = a posterior distribution on the states
p' = a prior distribution on the states
1 = a likelihood function
This expression can be simplified if it is assumed that the auditor cannot commit
a Type I error. That is, if the auditor receives a signal, t, which indicates
material errors are present, he will keep sampling. If the state of nature is s 1 ,
additional evidence should lead to the discovery that sampling error is
responsible for the faulty signal. Thus, 1(t|n,s1) = 1 and 17
p"(s2|t,n) =

1(t|n,s2)p'(s2)
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2)+ (1-p'(s 2 ))

Assume that, given p"(s2), the auditor will take action a 1 .
A measure of the credibility of thefinancial statements (the "package")
reflecting all available information about management, the auditor, and organizational and environmental factors would be 1-p"(s 2 ). On the other hand, a
measure of the credibility of the auditor, or audit service, is 1 - 1(t|n,S2), which
is the power of the auditor's tests (the complement of the probability of a Type
II error).

3.2 Demand for Credibility
It is generally agreed that a major purpose of financial statements is to
provide information which is useful in assessing a company's future cash flows
[e.g., Beaver, 1981]. It is also reasonable to assume that when top management has agency relationships with creditors and shareholders, errors in
financial statements (both historical statements and those to be delivered in the
future) will not be merely random or capricious. Rather, such errors will tend to
reflect top management's own expected utility maximizing motives, which will
typically be to inducefinancial statement users to overestimate these flows. 18
The probability that such errors are detected ex ante (before users assess the
firm's cashflows) increases with the credibility of the audit.
The cashflows of thefirm are important because the wealth of users will be
a function of such flows and any errors in their assessment. For example,
unrecorded liabilities may cause a banker to assess a downward biased
probability of the borrower's bankruptcy and hence, charge too low an interest
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rate. Or, overstated historical revenues may cause a purchaser of common
stock to pay an inflated price relative to the true value of shares. Of course, if
the error is subsequently discovered, an injured user will seek to recover his
losses from any person who, through negligence or fraud, created the error or
failed to detect and report it. But such ex post compensation is not likely to be
complete. As a result, users will value a credible audit ex ante and, ignoring the
costs of auditing, prefer more credibility to less.
In order to transform the ex ante value of credibility to users into an
effective demand for credibility by top management, it is necessary to identify a
mechanism through which costs to users from possible financial statement
errors are imposed (at least partially) ex ante on top management. A reasonable
assumption is that users of financial statements are rational and "price protect''
themselves in transactions with management. That is, they anticipate the costs
that top management, acting in its own self-interest, can impose upon them,
and adjust the terms of contracts accordingly. An extreme form of "price
protection" is refusal to transact. For example, a bank may demand a high rate
of interest on a commercial loan where the application is supported by
unauditedfinancial statements, or may simply refuse to make such a loan. Or a
prospective shareholder will submit a low bid for stock if the company's
financial statements have not been verified by a credible auditor, or may refuse
to buy such shares. Thus, under the rational user assumption, top managers
will demand credible auditing in their own interests.
The auditor's decision problem from the previous section can be extended
to provide insights into the demand for credibility. Assume a particular user
assesses the present value of a company's future cash flows, given all the
available information, including a set(s) of unaudited financial statements, as the
value, ø. 19 However, if these statements contain a material error(s), actual cash
flows will yield a lower present value of ø-w. The user's wealth is some
increasing function, g, of the firm's cash flows. Thus, the user's expected
wealth is
[1-P'(s2)]g(ø) + p'(s2)g(ø-w)
{3.1}
where p' is his assessed prior distribution on the states.
Note that a credible but costless audit can benefit the user in two ways:
1) The audit can induce a Bayesian revision of p' to a posterior distribution,
p". If p"(s2) < p'(s2), the user's expected wealth is increased.
2) If the user is risk averse, the auditor may function as an insurer against
the risk of loss of w, thus increasing the user's expected utility.
However, after assuming the risk, the auditor will himself be motivated
to minimize the insurance premium by performing an audit examination.
This will lead to a Bayesian revision of the auditor's prior, p', to a
posterior distribution, p".
In both cases, if audit credibility were costless, a perfect audit, which reduced
p"(s2) to zero, would be demanded.20
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3.3 Determinants of the Level of Credibility Demanded
However, credibility is not a free good and its cost is normally borne by the
audited company. Given the other audit service attributes, the auditor's fee for
credibility is X2c2q and for a specific company (fixed q), an increase in c 2
requires an increase in audit intensity, n. Thus, choice of credibility can be
conceptually reduced to choice of n.
The ideal way to proceed at this point would be to specify a model of the
determination of audit intensity in a multiple person setting, obtain an optimum
solution, and perform comparative static analysis to identify demand determinants. However, this approach is not possible as no such model exists.
A more restrictive but useful approach is to consider the choice of n by a
representative risk neutral user in a single-person decision setting. That is, the
user either performs the audit himself or delegates its performance to an
auditor whose interests are perfectly aligned with his own. Assume there is an
audit technology and an associated cost function, γ(n). Given p', g(w), and a
loss from Type I error, 21 all assessed by the user, an optimum audit intensity,
n*, can be calculated by performing a Bayesian preposterior analysis. It is well
known (e.g., see Kinney, 1975) that, in this setting, n* is an increasing function
of two key parameters of the problem, the loss from Type II error, g(w), and
the value of p'(s2). Assume the "auditor" performs this optimum examination,
receives the signal t, which indicates no material errors exist, and issues an
unqualified opinion. Then the representative user's expected wealth after the
audit is
[1-p"(s2|t,n*)]g(ø-γ(n*)) + p"(s2|t,n*)g[ø- w-γ(n*)]

{3.2}

where γ(n*) is also the auditor's fee, λ 2 c 2 q. The net gainfrom auditing, and
receiving an unqualified opinion, to the risk neutral user is {3.2} minus {3.1}.
This must be positive, since n* was computed optimally by equalizing the
marginal value of information to marginal audit cost.
This analysis suggests that users' demand for credibility will depend on two
factors:
1) the larger the lossfrom materialfinancial statement error, the higher the
level of audit service credibility demanded, and
2) the higher the prior probability users assess that thefinancial statements
will be materially in error, the higher the level of credibility demanded.
If users can price protect themselves in transactions with management, these
factors can also be expected to drive top management's demand for audit
credibility.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to consider the exact sources of the
benefits from credibility implicit in our analysis of the problem. Expression
{3.1} states that user wealth is lower in state s 2 than in s1. It is the avoidance of
this loss which drives the demand for credibility. In some cases, by detecting
material errors when they exist, an audit can simply shift a cost from users to
top management. However, in the majority of cases, when no material errors
are detected (or detected errors are corrected), an audit can overcome an
information asymmetry between management and users about the presence of
material errors in the.financial statements. This is valuable to managers whose
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statements (unknown to users) are, in fact, "fairly presented." Finally, the
knowledge that an audit will be performed can have a direct productive effect,
resolving a "moral hazard" problem [e.g., Baiman, 1982] thus reducing
agency costs in the relationship between top management and users. This will
occur if managers anticipate that a credible audit will reduce their ability to
conceal actions (e.g., shirking) that are not in the best interests of users.
In addition to these effects an audit may also have some insurance value to
risk averse users. But such a role is dubious, since auditors are not strictly
liable for losses to users; even under the most severe liability statutes, an
auditor can invoke a "due diligence" defense. However, recent court decisions
[e.g., Collins, 1985] suggest that this insurance role of auditors may be
increasing in importance.

3.4 Effect of Information Asymmetry About Audit Service
Production
If one assumes that users can observe the production function of the
auditor, hence the power of the auditor's tests and the level of credibility
delivered, any auditor could supply any level of credibility demanded by top
management.22 But this is clearly not the case. The auditor has complete
information about his production process, and top management may be able to
observe audit production imperfectly. However, users are precluded from
directly observing the performance of the audit. As stated in the last section,
this information asymmetry will cause users to rely upon the auditor's brand
name or reputation as a surrogate measure of audit service credibility. We now
develop this argument.
A possible method which could be suggested to overcome the information
asymmetry would be simple disclosure of the details of the auditor's examination. In fact, one could even argue that the current stylized claim to audit
performance "in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards" is
sufficient, since the reader is informed that the auditor "did what he should
have done" in the circumstances. However, the auditor is an economic agent
who can be expected to pursue his own self-interest, and such disclosures and
claims are in themselves meaningless. This is so because the information
asymmetry is associated with a moral hazard problem between the auditor and
users. In the absence of observation, the user has no reason to believe that the
auditor has performed the examination he claims to have performed.
Note that users (as principals) can attempt to resolve this moral hazard
problem by contracting with the auditor on mutually observable information of
some sort. This approach is taken in two agent analyses of the auditing
problem, such as in Antle [1982]. However, these models are of little empirical
relevance because, in the real world, such contracting simply does not occur.
Moreover, even the terms of any contract between the top management and
the auditor are not observable to users.
Hence, because an auditor cannot directly communicate, in a meaningful
way, variations in the power of his tests and users value different levels of
credibility in different circumstances, auditors must specialize in the delivery of
credibility levels. That is, while an auditor's credibility may change over time, it
must be fixed at a moment in time across engagements. Returning to the
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fertilizer example, an auditor cannot combine different proportions of nitrogen,
phosphorus, and potash as required by users and sell these different products
in uniform, unlabeled bags!
As a result, each auditor's brand name or reputation will imply delivery of a
certain level of credibility and, at any moment, there is afixed rank ordering of
auditors based on perceived credibility. Top management's choice among
different credibility levels thus requires a choice among auditors.

3.5 Reputation Investments, Audit Failure, and Auditor
Liability
An auditor can acquire a reputation to perform audits of a certain level of
credibility through various means. For example, it is likely that he must invest
in technology, physical facilities, personnel and their knowledge, organization
control systems, etc. to efficiently produce a credibility level. Moreover, it is
reasonable to assume that efficient production of more powerful audit tests
requires a higher level of such investments. Thus users could infer the
auditor's credibility level by observing these investments directly, through
advertising, or through informal communication of various sorts. Note that
auditor specialization imposes a far lower information burden upon users than
would a need to infer varying credibility for each auditor for each audit! Note
also that the higher the level of fixed investments which are specialized to
production of a certain credibility level, the higher the relocation costs and the
more stable the auditor's brand name over time.
A potentially useful source of information about brand name is the rate of
audit failure for which an auditor is held to be liable. However, the connection is
not a direct or simple one. Consider the following descriptions of four possible
engagements:
Case 3
Case 4
Case 1
Case 2
P'(s2)
.2
.5
.5
.5
g(w)
$2
$2
$1
$1
n
n1
n2
n1
(n 2 >n 1 )
(n 3 >n 2 >n 1 )
1-β
.90
.95
.99
.90
Auditor
X
Y
Z
Z
.02
.05
.01
.09
P"(s2)
In Case #1, the user's assessment of the prior probability of material error and
the loss from such an error leads to a demand for audit credibility of 1 — β
(where β is the conditional probability of a Type II error) of .90. The user
believes this power of a test will be delivered by auditor X and, after observing
an unqualified opinion signed by auditor X, will assess a posterior probability of
undetected material error, of .02. Note that 1 -p"(s 2 ) or .98 is the user
assessed credibility of thefinancial statement package. In Case #2, since the
user assesses a higher prior probability of material error, he demands a higher
power test which, he believes, is supplied by auditor Y. Case #3, with a higher
assessed error cost, motivates a demand for a still higher level of credibility,
which the user believes is supplied by auditor Z.
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An audit failure occurs when there is actual ex post discovery of a material
error in a set of auditedfinancial statements. Note that, when auditing is costly,
a rational user anticipates this possibility whenever p"(s 2 )>0. However, if an
error is actually discovered, a user who relied on the auditor's brand name is
motivated to seek recovery of losses suffered on account of the error and may
file suit against the auditor (and top management). The auditor, on the other
hand, will raise a due diligence defense and maintain that he was not negligent
in the performance of the audit.23 If the auditor complied with generally
accepted auditing standards and obtained evidence deemed by the court to be
sufficient and appropriate in the circumstances, he will not be liable to the user.
If the user, the auditor, and the court all have homogeneous assessments of
p'(s2) and g(w), then auditors X, Y and Z should not be liable in Cases #1 to 3.
In each instance, the auditor promised to deliver a certain level of credibility
through his brand name and did so. However, in Case #4, auditor Z is expected
to deliver a test whose power is .99 but fails to perform such a test. The user
believes the posterior probability of loss is .01, but faces an actual probability of
loss of .09. If an audit failure occurs, a lawsuit isfiled, and the court agrees with
the user's parameter assessments (i.e., that a .99 audit was appropriate in the
circumstances), the auditor should be found negligent and liable to the user for
losses.24
Given this process, what rates of successful litigation can users expect to
observe with respect to auditors and what is the information conveyed by these
rates? Because of the inherent uncertainties surrounding the audit and litigation
process, the auditor's credibility level which is assessed as delivered ex post
can be viewed as a drawing from a probability distribution, whose mean is the
current credibility level associated with a brand name. Under these circumstances, the normal rate of successful litigation across all credibility levels should
be approximately uniform. Any auditor can be found negligent in supplying a
service, no matter what the exact specification of that service. Thus auditor
"hit rates" provide no information about the absolute or relative (across
auditors) powers of auditors' tests as such. However, if an auditor experiences
an unusually high "hit rate" during a period, this may be evidence that he is
reducing his delivered credibility level to a lower value. That is, the rate
provides information about deterioration (intentional or unintentional) of the
auditor's reputation. Conversely, if the auditor experiences an unusually low
rate, this may be evidence that he has increased the power of his tests beyond
expected levels and is repositioning his brand name by investing in reputation.

3.6 Implications of the Analysis for Auditor Behavior
An auditor's brand name or reputation is the basis on which users predict
the level of credibility he will deliver. A wealth maximizing auditor can be
expected to position his brand in the market seeking to maximize his monopoly
rents. That is, he will seek a niche where there is high demand and few
competitors. In addition, if there are sunk costs associated with a particular
credibility level, his return on these immovable investments is a quasi-rent
[Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978]. To protect his rents an auditor is
motivated to maintain intertemporal stability in his delivered credibility level.
Other things being equal, the higher the rents, the greater the motivation to
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maintain the level of service [Klein and Leffler, 1981]. However, note that rents
can exist at any credibility level in the market.
It is useful to contrast this result with De Angelo's claim, discussed in
Section 1, that larger audit firms will report more truthfully than smaller firms
for fear of losing their larger aggregate quasi-rents. Note that De Angelo
focuses on the second aspect of credibility, that an auditor will report his findings
honestly, rather than the probability of discovery of errors in audit testing which
is the focus of our analysis. This is an important difference because an auditor
who fails to report a known material error commits a fraudulent act, not mere
negligence. Penalties for fraud, if discovered, tend to be severe no matter what
the circumstances. In particular, potential penalties an auditor faces personally,
such as a jail sentence and loss of certification and license to practice, probably
override any concerns with rents. Thus, one can reasonably argue that the
probability of deliberate misrepresentation by auditors is constant, regardless
of the auditor's brand name. However, a reporting issue may well arise when
the criteria determining what constitutes an error and/or materiality are
ambiguous. These situations require the exercise of professional judgment and
the ability to make decisions deemed to be "correct" ex post can vary among
auditors. Such abilities can readily be encompassed in the concept of power of
test and hence auditor brand name.
Returning to De Angelo, our analysis then differs from hers in two basic
ways. First, her focus on the probability of misrepresentation as the element of
credibility on which auditfirms differ casts an unnecessarily pejorative tone on
product differentiation. Second, she makes an extreme assumption about
relocation alternatives—namely, if an auditor is caught cheating, he will lose his
other clients. Thus her quasi-rents from multi-period pricing motivate stability
of location, but the auditor's choice is simply the current location (which is a
mechanistic function of audit firm size) and being out of the market! By
contrast, in our analysis, the prospect of earning monopoly rents motivates an
auditor's brand name location while the desire to maintain monopoly rents and
quasi-rents from any immovable resources motivates an auditor to remain in
that location over time.
To summarize and illustrate these ideas, consider how auditors are
expected to match-up with a set of available clients. Assume three companies
where users value low, medium, and high levels of auditor credibility,
respectively, and three auditors (X, Y and Z) exist. Assume the auditors agree
with user assessment of p'(s2) and g(w) and hence with the power of tests
appropriate in each situation. Also, the auditors have homogeneous production
functions and can produce the three levels of auditing for $100, $200, and $300,
respectively. The possible auditor-company pairings are shown below:
Auditor
X

Credibility Demanded
Low
Medium
$100
$200

High
$300

Y

$100

$200

$300

Z

$100

$200

$300
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Assume audit services are differentiated but an auditor can "tailor" an
examination to the demands of users through explicit contracting. Now if the
audits were put up for bid, each auditor's bid would at least cover his costs for
each client and, in a competitive setting, auditor choice would be indeterminate.
Now assume auditors have brand names in the eyes of users where X —
low, Y — medium, Z — high. The bids on the main diagonal are clearly
acceptable to users. However, the upper right hand off-diagonal bids are not
acceptable because the production process is not observable. Moreover, even
if auditors are liable for negligence, these bids are still not acceptable so long as
users value credibility ex ante because litigation is not a perfect substitute for
loss prevention (i.e., users do not expect full loss recoveryfrom the auditor).
The off-diagonal bids at the lower left are somewhat more problematic.
Given the brand names, the bids are acceptable to users, who would appear to
be receiving afree goodfrom auditors Y and Z. Moreover, since auditors agree
with users as to the power of tests appropriate in the circumstances, there is
no expected auditor liability problem! The difficulty here arises from the
assumption that production functions are homogeneous. If, in fact, there are
fixed costs of producing a particular credibility level and higher credibility
production is associated with higherfixed costs, then these off-diagonal bids
would tend to be higher, for a given company, than those on the main diagonal.
Thus auditor choice would be determined consistent with the perceived brand
name.
Finally, note that in this example since there is only one auditor appropriate
for each company, auditors will earn monopoly rents. However, in general,
there can be many auditors at a particular location in the limit driving monopoly
rents to zero [see Rosen, 1974].

3.7 An Alternative View: Credibility As a Posterior Probability
In previous subsections, auditor credibility has been identified with the
power of the auditor's tests. An alternative possibility is to associate it with the
posterior probability of financial statement error, or 1 -p"(s 2 ). Note that this
corresponds with what has previously been labeled the credibility of the
financial statement package. This alternative view is attractive because it
assumes that users care about the possibility of financial statement errors and
their consequences, but not about the separate contributions of the auditor and
top management. Consistent with this assumption, auditors may be liable for all
undetected materialfinancial statement errors, but users still value credibility
ex ante because expected loss recovery is not complete. In this setting, an
auditor's brand name would imply a level of 1-p"(s 2 ). That is, different
auditors would be associated with a different posterior probability that the
financial statements were erroneous. However, the Bayesian revision would be
performed only by the auditor; users would be concerned only with p"(s2). In
effect, the user delegates to the auditor the responsibility for performing tests
consistent with various prior probabilities of error.
The demand for different levels of 1-p"(s 2 ) can be derived from the
different dollar (or utility) consequences users face in different circumstances.
That is, the greater is g(w), the higher the level of credibility demanded. Since
auditor tests and p"(s2) are not observable directly, users must still rely upon
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the auditor's brand name which must be assessed from various sources of
information, including advertising, levels of fixed investment, etc. However,
the rate of successful litigation against an auditor can now be associated more
directly with a brand name.
As before, an auditor is motivated to deliver 1 -p"(s 2 ) consistent with his
brand name to preserve rents at that location. However, since auditors are
liable for all undetected errors, the "hit rate" observed will be a proxy for
p"(s2). Note that each auditor expects to incur a particular "hit rate" and such
rates are expected to vary. But since auditing is costly, so long as there are
variations in dollar consequences, variations in auditor credibility and "hit
rates" are desirable from an economic point of view. Again, being a low
credibility auditor does not have pejorative implications! If auditors in this
situation were allowed to invoke a negligence defense, then the above
implications would still go through, so long as the success of such defenses
were randomly distributed across auditors and engagements.
While this alternative view of auditor credibility seems to capture certain
aspects of reality (e.g., the delegation for responsibility to the auditor) better
than when credibility is identified with the power of the auditor's tests, both
scenarios have essentially the same implications for auditor choice.

3.8 Auditor Choice by Top Management
In the previous section we identified three audit service characteristics,
control (c1), credibility (c2), and product line (c3), which top management may
value. Levels of control and product line will be demanded through management's desire to maximize corporate profits or firm value as a determinant of
management's own compensation. Since there is no conflict between users and
management with respect to these two characteristics, the choice can be
expected to be optimalfrom both groups' point of view.
There is a conflict between users and management with respect to auditor
credibility, and management can be expected to make an optimal choice, given
its own interests. However, if users are rational and price protect themselves
when transacting with management, this choice can be expected to at least
directionally reflect users' demand determinants.
Formally, top management's problems of choosing an optimum set of audit
service characteristics for a period can be described as follows:
Max
Ө[ø(c1,c2,c3) - wp"(s2|c2) - F(c1,c2,c3)]
{3.3}
(c1c2c3)
s.t.
c1 - k(c2) = 0
where Ө is some benefit function to top management and F is the audit fee
function. Note that the audit service determines an expected present value of
net cashflows to the firm as perceived by financial statement users. If users
are "price protected'' then top management expects to gainfrom the purchase
of credibility. Also, a constraint is included to recognize that control and
credibility are likely to be joint products in production and hence not
independent in the audit fee function.
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Management's solution to this problem determines an optimum characteristics vector, (c1*, c2*, c3*). However, there is no guarantee that this vector of
characteristics will be available in the market since, we have argued, production
of all three characteristics likely involves fixed costs. Thus, the final step will
be a choice of the specific auditor who minimizes opportunity cost (i.e., the
"transportation cost") associated with the suboptimal choice.

3.9 Illustrative Example
To illustrate some of the ideas concerning auditor choice developed in this
section, consider the simple case of a company with no debt solely owned by a
100 percent owner and manager who wishes to sell 50 percent of his common
shares to an outsider or "user" who will assume an active role in future
management. (That is, no external agency relationship is created. The situation
when a new agency relationship arises is examined subsequently.) Assume the
company has been in business for one year and the owner has prepared a set of
unauditedfinancial statements which show a net operating cashflow of $10,000
for the year. The user is risk neutral and has an opportunity rate of return on
investment of 10 percent. Assume that the user believes the company's cash
flows will follow a random walk in perpetuity. Thus, the best point estimate of
future cash flows is simply the level earned last year.
If the user knows thefinancial statements to be accurate, the assessed
value of thefirm will be $100,000 and the user should be willing to pay up to
$50,000 for a 50 percent interest. However, this is not likely to be the case.
Rather, the user will recognize that the owner-manager has an incentive to
overstate the reported cashflows of thefirm, but not all owner-managers will
necessarily do so. If thefinancial statements are in fact erroneous (assume the
true cash flows were only $8,000 last year), the true value of the firm is
$80,000.
Suppose the user assesses a prior probability of .3 that the financial
statements are in error. Since the user can price protect himself through his
offering price for the shares, it would appear that he would be willing to pay no
more than 50 percent of the expected value, or $47,000. Since the manager
who prepared thefinancial statements knows their true state, he knows that
this price is too high. Thus, he would gladly accept the offer of $47,000 if the
statements were erroneous, but would reject it if the statements were correct
and auditor credibility was available to convince the user of their truthfulness.
Assume, for the moment, that the statements do not contain material
errors. Suppose an optimum audit, which maximizes {3.3}, costs $3,000 and
induces a Bayesian revision of probabilities by the userfrom p'(s2) = .3 to
p"(s2) = .1. Such an optimum audit implies an optimum level of credibility, or
c2*, purchased by the manager or (suppressing c1 and c3)
max .5[$100,000 - $20,000 p"(Si|c2) - F(c2)] =
.5[$100,000 - $20,000 (.1) - $3,000] = $95,000.
Note that Ө = .5 in this case is thefraction of equity being sold to the user.
Thus, if thefinancial statements are correct and the auditor cannot commit a
type I error, he will issue an unqualified opinion. Having seen this opinion and
the identity of the auditor, the user is willing to pay up to $47,500 for the
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shares. Since the user is price protected both with or without the audit, it is the
manager who gainsfrom the purchase of credibility.
Returning to the question of the appropriate offering price if there is no
audit, consider the transaction in a market context. Suppose, for example, that
ten investment opportunities of identical characteristics are available to the
user. Furthermore, his prior probability of error is correct in the sense that
three managers have overstated their reported cashflows while seven have not
done so. If the user, without seeing an audit, offers to purchase a 50 percent
interest in somefirm at $47,000, he can be certain that only a manager who
misrepresented his cashflows will accept! Thus, he would not, in fact, offer
$47,000, but only $40,000. At this price he will be fully protected against loss
and managers whosefinancial statements are correct will be motivated to
purchase auditor credibility, as described above. Thus, in a market context,
where there are many similar potential users, there will be a distribution of
auditor - client pairings, with perhaps some managers, who misrepresented
their cashflows, purchasing no auditor credibility.
This example illustrates only one possible situation in which auditor
credibility is valued by managers. The case is referred to in the literature as an
"adverse selection problem" [e.g., Baiman, 1982] and credibility here serves
as a signal of a manager's honesty, which itself is exogeneously given.
However, since the user is fully price protected against manager misrepresentation, auditor credibility may also change the reporting behavior of a manager.
For example, since the manager whose statements are unfair has fooled no one
in this illustration, he may be motivated to correct existing errors and submit to
a credible audit to increase the selling price of the shares.
Now consider the same situation, except that the user does not intend to
assume an active role in the management of thefirm, but will retain the former
owner as the manager. Thus an agency relationship, and an attendant moral
hazard problem arises. To forecast future cashflows as simply a continuation of
the historicalflow (either $10,000 or $8,000) would be naive, since the future
agency costs which can be expected to result from the manager's reduced
ownership interest in the firm are being ignored. Given the manager's known
future trade-off between firm value and perquisite consumption, assume the
user forecasts maximum agency costs to be $1,000 per year.
In the absence of the agency relationship, the user would have assessed a
prior probability of error of p'(s2) = .3. However, knowing that the agency
relationship will be created, we argue that the user is likely to assess a higher
prior probability that thefinancial statements are erroneous. This is so because
it is in the manager's interest to try to induce the user to bear some or all of the
future agency costs through an initial overvaluation of thefirm. Moreover, the
larger the expected future agency costs, the larger the difference between the
true and reported cashflows is likely to be. Returning to the example, if the
manager still reports $10,000 and the user believes cashflows could have been
$8,000 with a probability of p'(s2)= .4, he will offer ½[($8,000 - $1,000) ÷
.1] = $35,000. Again, managers who have not misrepresented their cash flows
are motivated to hire auditors of appropriate (and relative to the previous case,
higher) credibility. Conversely, given the user's complete price protection,
managers who have initially misrepresented their cashflows may be motivated
to change their reporting and purchase a credible audit.
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Finally, in this case, if the user views a credible audit now as a commitment
that such audits will continue to be obtained in the future, he may reduce the
amount of his forecasted future agency costs below $1,000. This is so because
a credible audit prevents (imperfectly) managers from concealing the effects of
such behavior (e.g., shirking, consuming excess perquisites, etc.) by overstat
ing the cash flows reported in future financial statements. Depending upon the
manager's utility trade-off between firm value now and the present value of
future perquisite consumption, it may be optimal for the manager to commit to
such future audits, thereby increasing the selling price of the shares.

IV. Concluding Comments
In this paper, we have analyzed the nature of differentiated audit services
and the determinants of auditor choice. The perspective on the audit services
market developed here differs significantly from the typical textbook view of
auditing where any auditor can do anything, and also, we believe, from the
conventional thinking of auditing practitioners and academics. Two conclusions
in particular should be emphasized: First, we have argued that differentiation on
an auditor credibility dimension arises from differences in demand which are
themselves a function of differences in company characteristics. Thus, a
ranking of audit firms on a credibility dimension has no pejorative implications.
Second, given such differences in demand and auditor location, we expect to
observe a relatively stable distribution of auditor-client pairs which reflects the
optimum decisions of top management under existing circumstances. As we
have seen, both the relationship between top management, the auditor, and
financial statement users, and the characteristics of the audit service are quite
complex. Our objective has been to develop a logical structure for this complex
reality as a basis for understanding different auditor choices by top manage
ments of different companies.

End Notes
1. Note that in his study of Australian audit fees, Francis [1984] found no evidence of lowballing. Also, while De Angelo demonstrates that "low balling" in first period bids is an equilibrium
strategy in a world of certainty, it is not obvious that this bidding strategy is necessarily an
equilibrium under uncertainty. However, even if low-balling does occur, the "strength" of the
collateral bond will decrease over time as the initial fee discount is recovered through quasi-rents.
Since auditor-client pairings tend to be long-lived (about 20 years on average), the motivational
impact of the residual collateral bonds that will exist at any moment in time is not obvious.
2. Let q denote the quantity of product of the i firm and p denote the price of the product of
the j firm, then the cross elasticity coefficient is
t h
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j
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n = (∂q /q )/(∂p /p )
ij
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i
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where q = f(p) is the demand function faced by firm i and p = (p .. .p ) is the vector of prices for
the products of the m firms in the industry.
3. However, as noted earlier, there is a further complicating factor in such studies in that an
audit fee is not a simple price, but rather the product of price times quantity of service purchased.
4. The standard assumption is that managers' utility functions include both wealth and effort as
arguments. Managers are assumed to derive utility from wealth and disutility from effort.
However, auditors and their services do not enter directly into the utility function.
5. The agency relationship has a long history as a form of social interaction. Ross [1973]
characterizes the agency relationship as arising "between two (or more) parties when one,
designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the
i

i

1
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principal, in a particular domain of decision problems." Because the agent is himself an expected
utility maximizing individual, it is unrealistic to assume that he will always necessarily act so as to
maximize the expected utility of the principal. However, the principal can limit the divergence of
interests by establishing incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs. Likewise the
agent may incur bonding costs to guarantee to the principal that he will not take certain actions. But
these mechanisms are unlikely to perfectly align the divergent interests of the principal and
agent(s)—it is, in fact, unlikely to be optimal to try to do so—with the result that there will still be
some residual loss. Note, however, that the expanded opportunity set which the agency
relationship allows must yield a net benefit to the principal (and perhaps the agent), else the
relationship would simply not arise [see Jensen and Meckling, 1976].
6. In addition to this potential "asset substitution" problem, Smith and Warner [1979] list
three other sources of conflict between an owner-manager and debtholders:
1) dividend payment—increasing dividend payout after the debt issuance (in the extreme,
paying a liquidating dividend to shareholders, leaving the debtholders with a worthless claim).
2) claim dilution—unexpectedly issuing additional debt of equal or higher priority after the
current debt issuance.
3) underinvestment—refusing to invest in positive net present value projects whose
primary benefit accrues to the bondholders.
7. While only 15 percent of the companies voluntarily purchased a full audit, another 69 percent
purchased either a review or compilation service, which are lower cost partial substitutes for the
audit service. Moreover, as with the audit, the primary and secondary reasons given (with
essentially the same frequencies) for the purchase of these audit substitutes were "control'' and
"credibility."
8. In this data set, consulting services were defined to include any non-audit service except
corporate tax work (i.e., return preparation, planning, etc.).
9. Throughout this monograph, the term "client'' refers to the top management of a company.
10. A complete discussion of the exact nature of audit credibility is deferred until Section 3.
11. More precisely, it is the purchase of the best form of audit opinion (i.e., unqualified,
qualified, or adverse) which management can expect given the characteristics of the financial
statements being audited.
12. A related question is—how does the model compare to the way audit fees are ostensibly
determined in practice? Audit services not performed under afixed fee arrangement are normally
billed using a set of hourly rates for the various grades of professional labor utilized. Even with a
fixed fee, the amount bid can be conceived as a function of expected labor usage and the billing rate
structure. But this process only defines a "standard fee" or upper bound on the amount collected.
The standard fee may be discounted for a variety of reasons including perceived inefficiencies in
labor usage, because the job utilizes resources which would otherwise be idle or underemployed,
or under the pressure of competition. In addition, of course, the process through which standard
billing rates are set is not known, hence the (billing rate x time) model is not a particularly useful
way to view the process of audit fee determination.
13. Product scope would be measured by the expertise of thefirm in supplying various types of
consulting services. At a moment in time, the total level of suchfirm expertise isfixed. Note that it
is thefixed costs associated with maintaining an expertise level for sale as needed which will cause
the implicit price of scope (λ 3 ) to be positive. However, only certain subsets of the total service
package may be relevant and therefore priced to certain subsets of clients. For example, the ability
to design and install computerized hospital accounting systems will be relevant to some clients but
irrelevant to others. Hence, an auditfirm may simultaneously offer different levels of c 3 to different
types of companies.
14. The offering of "near audit services," such as reviews and compilations, by public
accounting firms represents an attempt to reduce client opportunity losses in this situation.
15. The criterion of optimality normally used is whether the sum of consumer's surplus plus
producers' excess profits is maximized [Schmalensee, 1978]. In an auditing context, consumer
surplus can be interpreted in the normal way except that the demand curve is derived from top
management's objective function.
16. Auditors frequently distinguish between "errors," which are mechanistically caused by
deficiencies infinancial reporting systems, and "irregularities," which are the result of intentional
attempts to bias, conceal, or otherwise misrepresentfinancial information. We make no distinction
between these situations. However, it has been suggested that optimum audit program design,
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given the possible presence of "irregularities," must recognize the gaming nature of the situation
[Fellingham and Newman, 1985].
17. This is essentially the audit risk model proposed by the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants [CICA, 1980].
18. Auditors have long recognized that the greatest risk with respect to the financial
statements of publicly held companies (and companies with significant debt) is that assets, and
hence net income, are overstated. The reasonableness of this concern was confirmed by St. Pierre
and Anderson's [1984] study of 129 lawsuitsfiled against auditors in the U.S. during the 1960's and
1970's. Of the 334 alleged errors in these suits "none. . .concerned errors in undervaluing assets,
recognizing inadequate amounts of revenue, or recognizing excessive expenses" (p. 242).
19. To focus on the essential auditing aspects of the problem, assume a world of certainty,
except for the state of thefinancial statements.
20. This statement assumes that the audit evidence indicates that no material errors exist.
Presumably, if top management knew that a perfect audit would be performed, they would not
attempt to deceive users. However, if this were not the case, the perfect audit still would resolve
all uncertainty. Knowing that p"(s2) = 1, users could behave accordingly.
21. If the user falsely rejects the null hypothesis that thefinancial statements do not contain
material errors, he may choose not to transact with top management or may request contract
terms which will not be acceptable to management. In either case, the user loses whatever net
benefits were available to him in the "trade."
22. Assuming the auditor was technically capable of performing an audit of the company—given
its size, complexity, geographic dispersion of operations, etc.; that is, he can deliver the required q,
efficiently. Also, efficient production of higher levels of credibility may require higher fixed costs.
This is discussed in Section 3.5.
23. This is, in fact, his "worst case" defense under statutes such as the Securities Act of
1933. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and probably under common law appealing to
the Ultramares decision, the auditor can claim a mere absence of gross negligence orfraud as his
defense.
24. For what amount of damages should the auditor be liable? In principal, since the auditor
increased the user expected loss by $.16 through his negligence, this should be the amount of
damages assessed each time the auditor is negligent. However, not all instances of negligence are
likely to be discovered ex post. While negligence by the auditor increases the probability of
undetected material error (e.g., from .01 to .09 in case #4), negligence need not result in an actual
audit failure. For example, assume auditor Z performs 100 audits in a given year (such as case #4)
where users expect .99 credibility but only .90 is delivered. Users expect three audit failures and
losses of $6. However, suppose nine audit failures occur causing losses of $18. Users will
presumably seek damages of $18 but only $12 should be awarded, else the auditor is being
implicitly held to a perfect audit standard. Conversely, if users are only awarded the increase in
expected loss in each casefiled or $.16 x 9 = $1.44, they are grossly undercompensated. How
much would actually be awarded is, of course, an open question but there is no apparent mechanism
which would motivate a court to award the correct amount of $12.
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Discussant's Response to
"On the Economics of Product
Differentiation in Auditing"
Howard R. Osharow
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. First let me express my appreciation
to the Symposium organizers for inviting me to start the discussion of such a
difficult topic as product differentiation in auditing. I also want to express my
appreciation to Dan and his coauthor for making this such a challenging
opportunity. It has been a long time since I have thought of differentiation in
auditing in terms of formulas like they use. While I have used some advanced
mathematical techniques such as regression analysis to determine the reasonableness of inventory levels for a chain of 400 drugstores, it has been many
years since I have had to deal with sentences like "Given P', and a loss from
Type I error, all assessed by the user, an optimum audit intensity, N*, can be
calculated by performing a Bayesian preposterior analysis."
Many of you are familiar with the television program Star Trek. I want to
tell you that after reading the paper several times I couldfinally sympathize
with Dr. McCoy of the Starship Enterprise every time he had to try to treat an
injury to Mr. Spock. Dr. McCoy was a very talented physician, but Mr. Spock
was a rather unusual character. While, other than his famous ears, he looked
human, we know his blood was green and his heart was where your liver might
be. His various other physical differences from a normal human being made him
quite a challenge to the doctor. I almost feel like I am playing Dr. McCoy to the
paper's Mr. Spock.
In spite of these deficiencies in my upbringing, I am going to try to give you
what I believe is a practitioner's view on product differentiation in auditing, with
particular emphasis on the definition of the product itself. Unfortunately, time
did not permit me to discuss the contents of the paper with Dan prior to this
meeting. If I had, some of my comments and questions might be unnecessary.
But, since our purpose here is to generate a discussion of the paper and its
applicability to the world of auditing, I guess we will still be able to meet our
objectives.
We should recognize that the academician and the practitioner tend to come
at any problem from different perspectives. To paraphrase what they say about
the English and the Americans, academics and practitioners are two professions separated by a common interest. I have personally found trying to read
and understand most academic papers to be an extremely frustrating experience, especially when the topic seems to have applicability to what I am
interested in, but the content leaves me absolutely dumbfounded. I have been
heading our firm's audit research and development efforts for the last three
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years, and have found very few academics that I can discuss audit methodology
with who speak a language that I am capable of understanding or applying to our
practice. Maybe that is a deficiency on my part, but perhaps it is just
symptomatic of the different backgrounds and perspectives of the academician
and the practitioner. I do wish there was a more coordinated effort between the
academic and practice sides of our common interests that could make much of
the research more valuable to the practitioner.
Let me start the discussion of the paper by presenting what I call the
Auditor's Dilemma of Interests. The auditor, as we are all painfully aware,
really has at least two parties interested in the nature of his services. One of
these parties is the client, or client management, that engages the auditor to
report onfinancial statements or render other services as may be required.
The other is the public that looks to the auditor as a "guardian of the public
interest.'' Our discussion earlier this morning on the legal liability of accountants touched heavily on this matter.
One of my concerns about the paper is that I believe it tends to deal
unrealistically with the public's attitude toward the auditor and the auditor's
responsibilities and thus glosses over a major problem of our time. That
problem is that the public does not assess ex ante and ex post probabilities in
determining whether, when there has been a business failure, they should try
to sue the auditor. Let us be realistic about it. When a business fails, investors
have very few sources to look to for recovery of their funds. A legal system
such as we have in the United States tends to make it easy for an investor to
look for someone associated with the company who has funds to become a
target of litigation to recover the lost investment. I do not want to discuss the
U.S. legal system, but I believe it is unrealistic to say that, in the real world,
only mismatches between the public's expectation of an auditor and the
auditor's actual performance on the engagement will result in "hits" as they
are called in the paper. I believe that, in spite of what the profession would like,
the public does perceive the auditor as an insurer of its investment and
someone who has the responsibility to signal when that investment might be
turning sour.
I believe this has serious implications to the differentiation model when you
balance it against the clients who engage the auditor. These clients have
interests, too. The paper implies that the client (meaning top management of
the client) will always take the position on issues that will most favorably reflect
management's wishes as to the outcome of the issue. It almost, but not
directly, implies that management will always select a course of action that is
opposite the interest of the public when it comes to reporting bad news. While I
am sure that such cases do exist, I do not believe it is always the case.
Management is not stupid and it does not like to have the auditors waving red
flags in front of the bull. Neither management nor the auditor would like to see
an auditor's disclosure become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Therefore, it is up to
the auditor and the client together to agree that the public interest has been
served without destroying the whole economic system because of incomplete
and imperfect information.
Thus the auditor's dilemma . . . how does he serve the interests of the
client and the public at the same time while serving the other interest which
thus far has not been mentioned, that is, the self-interest of the auditor in
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practice? I believe this is where the issue of differentiation comes into play. It
also means it is time that I focused on a definition of the product that the auditor
produces.
I believe that the product differs depending upon your point of view. For the
public, the product is the auditor's report, and I agree with most of the material
in the paper that tends to indicate that the public's only means of assessing the
quality of that report is by the reputation, or at least the public's perception of
the reputation, of the auditor involved, versus the reputation of auditors as a
whole. Of course, the public is working with imperfect information, because
even two audit reports signed by the samefirm do not necessarily carry the
same amount of real quality with them. Auditingfirms consist of people, and
people do not always react the same way in the face of similar information. So
while the general marketing of afirm's name in the public eye is important, I
believe it is only important from that standpoint, that is, a marketing
standpoint.
The real key to differentiation is to understand that the product the auditor
delivers to the client and client management is not the auditor's report. It is the
whole relationship of the auditor with the client. It is the auditor understanding
what the client expects of him and what is important to that client, and then
delivering against those measured objectives.
Differentiation takes on another aspect also. It's a different perspective that
the potential client or client has on an auditingfirm depending upon whether
they are an incumbentfirm or whether the company is involved in investigating
the engagement of new or different auditors. It is much easier for afirm to
differentiate itself in the mind of its client when it has been the firm's auditor for
a few years. The incumbent auditingfirm knows the client, its strengths and
weaknesses, and has hopefully identified any "hot points." The rest of the
auditingfirms represent a vague world to the client. I think that we have found
that the only real way to begin to tickle a potential client's fancy for selecting
you as their auditors is to have developed a personal relationship, through
outside activities or otherwise, with top management of the potential client.
This is why accountingfirms devote so much time, effort and expense to the
outside activities of their partners. An accountingfirm cannot differentiate itself
through its audit process nor through anything else that another firm can
duplicate. What those other firms cannot duplicate are its individual people and
the impressions those people leave in the minds of the clients they serve and
the potential clients they contact.
Unfortunately, there is not sufficient time today to provide a detailed
discussion of client values, but let me conclude this section of my discussion
with a comment: the auditor that does not respond to the client's values, and
indeed respond to the client's highest value, will be unsuccessful in attempting
to differentiate himself through any of the tools that he uses on the audit. I
would propose that the client does not know nor does the client care about the
audit process. He does not care if the auditor uses a microcomputer, has a
pyramid of six to one or ten to one, or uses yellow or green paper. What he
does care about is that he has a good working relationship with an audit partner
who really understands his company. That understanding can be demonstrated
by being responsive to the company's needs, understanding the company's
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operations, organization, terminology and management style, and delivering
the audit in an efficient manner.
Let me make one more point about responding to client values and
differentiation. Good performance in a client value area by the practitioner is
usually not sufficient to satisfactorily transfer the differentiation impression to
the client's mind. The auditor's exemplary performance in meeting the client's
values must be adequately communicated so the client is fully aware of the
auditor's accomplishments and his efforts to satisfy the client's needs.
Remember that attempts at differentiation amongst auditingfirms is irrelevant if
buyers of thefirms' services cannot distinguish the differentiating factors. The
auditingfirm must transfer the differentiation knowledge to the client and be
sure the client acknowledges and is aware of the factors involved. Again, this is
much easier for the incumbentfirm to do than for a potential auditingfirm. In a
proposal situation, the client must look to criteria that are indicative of future
performance, such as reputation, industry experience and apparent business
sense. This is the best alternative available since the client has no actual
experience working with the firms being evaluated, except for the limited
exposure obtained during the proposal process and any prior personal relationship with the firm's personnel.
In the short time I have, it is not possible to discuss all aspects of the paper,
but let me talk about some points that are of the most concern to me. On page
100, the authors conclude that "the higher thefixed cost commitment, the less
flexible the firm will be in producing a variety of characteristic vectors." It
implies that afirm is lessflexible in meeting the real needs of its client and its
public if it has more structure to its audit process than anotherfirm. I do not
believe this is necessarily true. I believe it depends on the nature of the
structure imposed into the process. If those things that are required to be done
on every audit, regardless of the shape or size of the company, can somehow
be put into a structure so they can be dealt with more efficiently, I believe this
gives the structured firm the advantage over one with less structure. Structure
does not always have to be viewed in a negative sense. In fact, if thefirm can
put positive structure into the process, it could actually spend more time doing
a better job responding to the client's real values and not have to spend
significant amounts of time dealing with constant elements. If the auditor can
spend less time on the audit process, of which his client and the public care
very little, more time is available for responding to that client's real values
which will differentiate the auditor in the client's eyes.
Let me come to the item in the paper that has given me the most trouble. A
conclusion in the paper states: "A ranking of audit firms on a credibility
dimension has no pejorative implications." Now, to tell you the truth, the first
thing I had to do with that conclusion was look up the meaning of "pejorative"
in the dictionary. And Webster's tells me that means "having negative connotations." What that conclusion says to me is that, if an auditor has a name which is
associated with a low credibility level as far as the public is concerned, that does
not have any significant implications to that auditor. I may have interpreted the
meaning of that conclusion wrong, but if I have not, Ifind it very difficult to
understand. I cannot understand how you can have a negative reputation in the
business community as to the quality of the intrinsic value of your report versus
someone else's report and it not have implications for your practice or your
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relationship with your client. During our discussion period, perhaps we can
explore whether I have interpreted the conclusion properly and what the
implications are for actions that an accounting firm might take in establishing its
reputation.
Finally, let me summarize my comments by putting differentiation in what I
think is its proper context in the entire auditing process. The auditing firm
which does the best job of balancing the three factors that must be considered
when providing service to clients—management of risk, efficient conduct and
reporting of the audit, and delivering values that are held in the highest regard
by that client—is the auditing firm that, in the long run, will be able to
differentiate itself from its competition. This differentiation involves hiring the
right people and training those people in both the art of auditing and effective
communication.
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4
Unresolved Issues in
Classical Audit Sample Evaluations
Donald R. Nichols
Texas Christian University

Rajendra P. Srivastava
The University of Kansas

Bart H. Ward
The University of Oklahoma
Classical variables techniques can be usefully employed in certain audit
situations. They may be useful, for example, when auditing high error rate
populations or accounts with numerous negative balances or when the auditor is
concerned about both over arid under-statement errors. Classical variables
techniques may also be useful when the auditor is concerned with assessing the
reasonableness of proposed adjustments in light of statistical test results. This
paper reviews several issues associated with the evaluation of classical
statistical hypothesis testing results in auditing. Though presented in terms
relevant to classical statistical testing, some of the issues reviewed may be
germane to other statistical or non-statistical approaches to audit sampling as
well.
Some of these issues have been isolated and examined in greater detail by
other studies. This paper mainly deals with the comparison and reconciliation of
certain alternative evaluation strategies which can be employed when achieved
allowances for sampling risk differ from planned levels. This situation can occur
when the apparent achieved efficiency of a sample estimator is different from
the level on which the auditor based the audit sampling plan.

Comparative Evaluation Strategies
Several strategies are available for use in evaluating the results of a classical
variables hypothesis test. Conclusions drawn from the evaluation of sample
results may vary depending upon which strategy is employed. Three of these
strategies are explained and compared in this paper.
No one of the three strategies is uniformly dominant or necessarily superior
to the others in all situations. However, they can lead to different conclusions.
Therefore, it is important to understand how they differ. In this respect, the
selection of an appropriate evaluation strategy is similar to the dilemma
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encountered in selecting an appropriate error bound in probability-proportionalto-size sampling applications (see Felix, Leslie & Neter, 1982).
We shall identify the three strategies as: the acceptance risk control
strategy, the rejection risk control strategy, and the balancing strategy. Figure 1
depicts and compares the decision sequences associated with the first two
strategies. The decision sequence for the balancing strategy is presented
separately in Figure 2. Where possible the symbols and terminology used will
conform to the AICPA audit sampling literature (e.g. Roberts, 1978; SAS 39;
and Accounting and Audit Guide—Audit Sampling, 1983).
Both approaches described in Figure 1 are relatively well-known strategies
for evaluating the results of classical statistical samples. Evaluation strategies
based on both approaches appear in the AICPA's publication Audit Sampling as
well as auditing literature andfirm procedure manuals.
The acceptance risk control strategy for evaluation of the results of classical
variable hypothesis tests appears in the AICPA publication, Statistical Auditing
[Roberts, 1978]. This approach is also referred to, but not described in detail,
by the AICPA's guide on audit sampling which supports Statement on Auditing
Standards #39 (SAS 39) [Auditing Standards Board, 1981]. Sample evaluation
approaches based on this strategy can be found in the auditing literature, e.g.
Guy and Carmichael [1986].
The rejection risk control strategy is described in detail in the AICPA
publication Audit Sampling and the audit and accounting guide prepared by the
Statistical Sampling Subcommittee to support SAS 39. Sample evaluation
approaches based on this approach can be found in the accounting literature,
e.g. Arens and Loebbecke [1981] and Bailey [1981].1
The balancing strategy which is depicted in Figure 2 was explored by
Thompson [1982] and is rooted in the work on the utility of various schemes for
reporting or summarizing hypothesis testing results done by Leamer [1978].
Using this balancing strategy, the auditor would employ an epistemic loss
minimizing criterion. It could be used as an alternative to the two better known
traditional strategies.
In order to set the stage for the sample evaluation strategies portrayed in
Figures 1 and 2, it may be useful to briefly consider the sample planning
process. In most descriptions of audit sampling, in the planning stage, sample
sizes are determined which will control the risk of incorrect acceptance (TD)
and the risk of incorrect rejection (a) to levels that are acceptable to the auditor
given ex ante (before sampling) information about the population and planned
statistical estimator. In this regard, the estimated standard error is important.
The ex ante (planned) allowance for sampling risk associated with the
amount A can be compiled based on an estimate of the standard deviation of the
population under examination or the related population of auxiliary values
(differences or ratios between audited and book values, etc.) and on auditor
decisions about appropriate levels for the risks of incorrect acceptance and
incorrect rejection and about the amount of tolerable error for the account or
balance, TE. Discussions of this process and factors affecting it can be found in
the audit sampling literature, especially Guy and Carmichael [1986], Arens and
Loebbecke [1981], Roberts [1978], SAS 39 and the associated AICPA audit
guide. The auditor will plan a sample such that if B ε X ± A, the reported
amount will be accepted as fairly presented, whereas if B is not in the interval X
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± A, the reported amount will not be accepted as fairly presented. In each
instance, B is the book value of the account or balance and X is the audit
sampling estimator of the correct value. The sampling plan will be established
such that the risk of incorrect acceptance and the risk of incorrect rejection of
the decision interval, X ± A, in relation to TE will be at levels planned by and
acceptable to the auditor.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, if the ex post (after sampling) information
agrees with the ex ante estimates (A' = A), then the auditor faces no special
evaluation problem, and the three evaluation schemes are the same. That is,
the decision rule is to accept the book value if B ε X ± A'. Since this is
equivalent to B ε X ± A, the associated risks of incorrect acceptance and
rejection should be the same as the planned levels. A' is the monetary amount
which equates the risk of incorrect rejection associated with this decision rule
with the planned level for α.
Usually, however, after the sample has been selected and audited, the ex
Post assessment of the standard error will be different from the ex ante
assessment, i.e., A' ≠ A. When this is the case, no decision strategy
discussed in the auditing literature reviewed here will retain the risk of
incorrect acceptance and the risk of incorrect rejection at the planned levels.
For any given sample result, there is a trade-off between the two risks. In fact,
there are infinitely many α and TD risk level pairs that could be established for
the sample evaluation. In this circumstance, the issue to resolve is how to
devise an evaluation strategy which will contain risk levels which are preferable
or acceptable to the auditor. The three strategies discussed here handle the
balancing of these risks in different ways. By understanding the approach and
the results of these strategies, the auditor may select one (or devise another
strategy) that is consistent with his or her preferences.
The essential differences among all the strategies reviewed in Figures 1
and 2 can be traced to different philosophies about risk control. In our
discussion we shall highlight the manner in which each strategy deals with this
dilemma and attempt to explain what the various options imply about the
relative utility of incorrect rejection and incorrect acceptance.

Acceptance Risk Control
The acceptance risk control strategy, as detailed by Roberts [1978], will be
reviewedfirst. Like each of the other strategic options discussed, the principal
purpose is to provide a framework for rational evaluation of a classical statistical
sample. The objective is to accept or reject the amount being tested, given the
ex ante specification of the risk of incorrect acceptance, TD, and risk of
incorrect rejection, α, and the achieved sampling test results. 2
If the estimated standard deviation used in planning and the sampling
estimator of standard deviation are identical, then the potential for variability in
sampling results can be properly controlled by relying on the critical limits
associated with the ex ante allowance for sampling risk. In such instances,
A' = A, and an appropriate decision rule is to accept the amount being tested B,
if BεX ± A'. Otherwise it is appropriate to reject the amount being tested. In
this situation, the planned risks of incorrect rejection and incorrect acceptance
are also the levels achieved.
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In most instances ex post estimates of the standard error of the estimator
will varyfrom planned levels, i.e., A' ≠A. In pursuing the "acceptance risk
control" option as shown in Figure 1, the auditor confronted with a difference
between ex ante and ex post estimates of variability will establish an ex post
allowance for sampling risk by relying on an initial decision rule which calls for
acceptance of the amount under examination if that amount exists in the region
X ± A". In this case, A" is the monetary amount which necessarily equates the
risk of incorrect acceptance associated with the new decision rule (TD') with
the planned level for TD. In other words, the risk of incorrect acceptance
associated with the decision interval X ± A" is equivalent to the level originally
planned by the auditor. The acceptance risk control approach does not explicitly
control the risk of incorrect rejection. At this point, the risk of incorrect
rejection may be higher or lower than the planned level, α. In other words, TD
is fixed at the planned level and α varies, either higher or lower than the
planned level.
The strategy as described so far can only lead to an acceptance decision
where BεX ± A". The preeminence of TD is justified because at this point the
initial decision rule allows only for acceptance of the reported amount. If
acceptance is not possible, then rejection based on statistical evaluation alone
cannot take place without considering the level of control over the risk of
incorrect rejection.
In fact, if the auditor is unable to accept based on the test involving A", then
this strategy as described by Roberts (1978) calls for reassessment of both
risks. The reassessed values of these risks are reflected in Figure 1 as TD R
and αR.
Presumably, the failure to accept based on the analysis of evidence to this
point would not lead to an increase in the acceptable level of either risk when
this reassessment takes place; however, decreases in either may occur. A
reduction of the risk of incorrect acceptance might be appropriate if, in the
auditor's judgment, the sample evidence casts doubt on the appropriateness of
the level of reliance on internal control used when initially assessing TD.
Similar reassessments of that risk might be made because of changes in the
perception of inherent risk, or the risk associated with other audit test results
as compared to those used in the initial assessment of TD. The appropriate
level for a revised risk of incorrect rejection might be lower than initially
planned because a significantly larger than expected number of errors have
been observed. The likelihood of encountering circumstances requiring adjustments may indicate that a reduction in the risk of incorrect rejection is
warranted.
After reassessment of the two risks, this strategy, as described by
Roberts, calls for a test of conclusiveness. The objective of such a test is to
determine whether the sample evidence is sufficient to control both risks to
their reassessed levels.3 If the sample evidence is conclusive, an audit
conclusion to reject the amount under examination is justified. Otherwise, the
auditor will conclude that the sample evidence alone is insufficient for a final
decision and some fallback option must be pursued. Generally these options
may include: 1) expansion of the sample, where feasible; 2) performance of
additional substantive procedures to provide additional evidence useful in
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fulfilling the audit objectives for which the statistical sample is germane; or 3)
requesting that the client adjust or reconstruct the amount being examined.

Rejection Risk Control Strategy
In contrast to the audit planning and evaluation strategy described above,
statistical testing in many contexts other than auditing are based on direct
control of the risk of incorrect rejection with the risk of incorrect acceptance
not explicitly considered. As a result much nonauditing-statistical sampling
literature is based on direct control of theriskof incorrect rejection. Therefore,
many computer programs that may be useful for sample evaluation provide
output based on control of the risk of incorrect rejection. The AICPA audit and
accounting guide, Audit Sampling, considers sample determination and evaluation in this situation. In addition, sample evaluation strategies conceptually
based on direct control of the risk of incorrect rejection and indirect control of
the risk of incorrect acceptance can be found in the auditing literature [e.g.
Arens and Loebbecke, 1981 and Bailey, 1981].
The sample size calculation described in Audit Sampling (pp. 93-94)
permits control of the risks of incorrect acceptance and incorrect rejection to
desired levels by varying the ratio of the desired allowance (A) to the tolerable
error based on the table of ratios in Appendix C of the guide (p. 115). If the
sample statistics are reported in the context of incorrect acceptance (i.e., A')
or if the evaluation process is to focus on A', the audit guide discusses an
evaluation strategy that may be used (pp. 94-99). This strategy is pictured in
Figure 1 and is termed the "rejection risk control option.'' Thefirst step in this
process is to ensure that the ex post level of control of sampling risks can be at
least equal to the planned level of control by determining that the condition A'
< A exists. If not, the sample is regarded as insufficient and fallback options
must be considered. If A' < A, a direct test can be employed. If BεX ± A',
the reported value can be accepted. In contrast to the acceptance risk control
options, the rejection risk control option strategy initially tests with therisk of
incorrect rejection set to the original planned level. In this case, the risk of
incorrect acceptance is allowed to vary, and it will be at a lower level than
planned (except in the rare case where A' = A, when it will be at the planned
level). If B ε X ± A' is not true, additional steps are suggested by the audit
guide. They are described below. These steps ensure that the reported amount
will not be rejected simply because sample estimators are more efficient than
planned.
If A' < A but B does not exist in the region X ± A', the auditor may still be
able to accept without computing an allowance for sampling risk related to the
risk of incorrect acceptance. To do so, two conditions must be met. One
condition requires that α < 2TD. This condition ensures that an allowance for
sampling risk based on α will also be associated with a risk of incorrect
acceptance that is no more than TD. To ensure that such is the case, the
reliability coefficient used in computing the (far) end of the range X ± A' in
relation to book value must be greater than the reliability coefficient which
would be used in determining A" and the associated allowance for sampling risk
as related to TD. Because the reliability coefficient for αrisk is associated with
two-tail testing, that coefficient will be greater than the reliability coefficient for
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TD only if the condition α < 2TD exists. Satisfying this condition effectively
eliminates the possibility that B - (X - A') could be less than TE or that
(X + A') - B could be less than TE even though B does not exist in X ± A".
Without the first condition the situation which follows could arise, when
α > 2TD:
X-A'
<

X + A'
X

>
<

A"
•

ft ft
Book Value
- Tolerable Error

Book Value

This would indicate acceptance even though the risk of the incorrect acceptance is greater than TD.
The second condition requires that X ± A' exist in the region B ± TE. In
other words, it requires that the difference between the book value and the end
of the range X ± A' farther from the book value be less than the amount TE.
When this condition is met, the risk of incorrectly rejecting the notion that the
proper value of the account or balance in question is not materially different
from the book value is less than (or equal to) the level α initially established for
control of the risk of incorrect rejection.
If either of these two conditions fails to be met, computation of an allowance
for sampling risk based on TD should be undertaken. Sample evaluation is then
conducted in accordance with the acceptance risk control option steps
previously discussed.

The Two Strategies Contrasted
As discussed, the acceptance risk control option will permit an initial
acceptance test regardless of the relationship between A' and A. If A' < A
then the sample size is sufficient to control the risks of incorrect acceptance
and incorrect rejection to the planned levels. On the other hand, if A' > A,
then the sample is not sufficient to control both risks to the planned level, and
the initial decision process holds the risk of incorrect acceptance to the planned
level by using the decision interval X ± A". The auditor will not permanently
reject the reported amount based on this decision process; however, if
rejection were allowed, the risk of incorrect rejection would be greater than
planned where A' > A.
The sufficiency test within the rejection risk control strategy prevents such
an occurrence. This is accomplished by declaring the sample to be inclusive and
then pursuing fall-back options in any instance for which A' > A. In all other
instances A' < A.
Without the sufficiency test, classical statistical hypothesis evaluation using
the acceptance risk control option is more likely to lead to acceptance than
would the rejection risk control or sufficiency test options. Two conditions are
necessarily associated with those sampling outcomes that lead to acceptance
under the one strategy but not in the other. First, the ex post estimate of
variability must exceed the level used in sample size determination. Second,
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the allowance for sample risk associated with ex post control of the risk of
incorrect acceptance at the planned level must be small enough to warrant
rejection of the alternative hypothesis (i.e., B ε X ± A").
It is possible to employ the acceptance risk control strategy with a
sufficiency test by including the sufficiency test option with the acceptance risk
control option as shown in Figure 1. In this case, the condition A' < A would
always exist under both approaches, and rejection could be held to levels equal
to or less than originally planned under either strategy. However, the two
strategies differ as to which risk to hold at the original level.
The acceptance risk control option with its decision rule based on the
interval B ε X ± A" holds the risk of incorrect acceptance to the originally
planned level. If we assume the sufficiency test, then the risk of incorrect
rejection will be allowed to vary and will be smaller than originally planned.
By contrast the rejection risk control option with its decision rule based on
the interval B e X ± A' holds theriskof incorrect rejection at the planned level,
and the risk of incorrect acceptance is allowed to vary and will be smaller than
originally planned.
Thus both strategies will hold one risk at the planned level and allow the
other risk to vary to a level lower than originally planned. The rationale for
holding either risk at the planned level and allowing only the other risk to vary
has not been adequately discussed in the literature. The rationale for either
approach may appear to be questionable if we assume that the auditor
considered, even in an intuitive way, the possible losses that might be
associated with incorrect rejection or acceptance.
Both risks α and TD can be reduced by increasing sample size, but for any
size sample α and TD have a wide range of trade-offs. These factors must be
considered, at least intuitively, in deciding on planned levels of α, TD and
sample size. Presumably the auditor balances the expected loss from each risk
in some way when attempting to minimize the total expected loss from testing.
The fact that the level of αand TD are often not the same may imply that the
associated losses are also not equal. If so, it is not clear that either ex post
strategy of holding one risk at the planned level will be optimal from an
expected loss perspective.
By now it is clear that the choice of an appropriate evaluation strategy is less
than obvious. A more formal examination of the implicit preferences employed
when judging the sufficiency and competence of evidence using alternative
strategies follows. An additional strategy is then developed. This additional
strategy—the balancing strategy—seems logically defensible in relation to the
formal analysis of the differences in extant strategies.
One means of more formal examination is to consider the expected value of
the alternatives suggested by the alternative options. For simplicity we assume
risk neutrality. In turn, we shall examine each of the two primary decision
rules.
Within the context of the necessary conditions for different sample
evaluation outcomes, the probability of incorrect acceptance is, of course, TD,
if the acceptance risk control option is employed. If there is no error in the
amount being tested then the probability of (correct) acceptance is the
complement of the risk of incorrect rejection associated with A". We designate
this probability as 1 - α". The numeric value of α" may be determined after
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computing the associated reliability coefficient. The appropriate two-tailed
reliability coefficient can be computed by determining the number of standard
errors of the estimator contained in A" (A" ÷ S X ).
Under the assumption that the auditor will act rationally to minimize
maximum expected loss, acceptance using the primary rule from the acceptance risk control option implies that α"l1> TDl 2 , where
is the loss
associated with incorrect rejection and l2 is the loss associated with incorrect
acceptance. Under this assumption a"l 1 is the maximum expected loss
associated with a decision to reject the book value and TDl 2 is the maximum
expected loss associated with a decision to accept. The relation, a"l 1 > TDl 2 ,
holds true without regard for the specific value of a" since the value of a" does
not influence the decision rule calling for acceptance when B ε X ± A". The
rule is based on TD alone. In the extreme, this implies that even as the risk of
incorrect rejection disappears (α" — 0), or simply becomes very much smaller
than TD, the consequences of incorrect rejection heavily outweigh the
consequences of incorrect acceptance at the planned level. Such a conclusion
requires that l1> > l2, which is counter-intuitive. It demands that the negative
consequences of incorrect rejection far exceed the negative consequences of
incorrect acceptance. This seems a particularly undesirable artifact of any audit
strategy since, in the extreme, it may favor accepting client results when the
probability of their being correct is significantly smaller than the probability that
they are without material error.
On the other hand, this decision rule seems to have greater intuitive appeal
when α"- 1 or whenever α" > > TD. In such circumstances the primary
decision rule from the acceptance risk control option implies that αl1< TDl 2
and hence that l1 < < l2. This result seems intuitively more appealing.
As a prima facia matter, this observation seems to favor the more liberal
acceptance strategy associated with the acceptance risk control option. On
those occasions when the other option employs this decision rule as a
secondary criterion it is subject to the same criticism concerning the consequences of α"—0 or α" becoming much smaller than TD because of
unanticipated efficiency of the sampling process. On the other hand, because
this option employs the adequacy criterion (A' < A) as a necessary condition for
acceptance, it prevents the rule from operating and hence from indicating
acceptance in those very circumstances where the rule seems intuitively most
appealing. This occurs because α" is less than the reliability coefficient for α.
This can occur only when the allowance for sampling risk based on ex post
control of TD at the planned level forces the range of estimators which leads to
acceptance to be contained in a quite small region about the book value. Such
limits on the range of acceptable estimators will approach the book value from
above and below only as the variability of sampling results increases from
planned levels. Of course this is the very condition which will cause the
adequacy criterion test to nullify use of the decision rule by screening out the
sample result as unacceptable.
Acceptance using the primary rule of the rejection risk control option
requires exploration of the adequacy criterion. The adequacy criterion rule
suspends judgment when A' > A. Suspension is called for regardless of the
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relationship between the projected audit value and the acceptance region about
the book defined by controlling the risk of incorrect acceptance at the level TD.
Obviously, this suggests that the expected loss associated with (a, TD') for
all TD' greater than TD exceeds some maximum acceptable level (where TD is
the ex post probability of incorrect acceptance associated with the region X ±
A', which controls for α at the planned level). In addition the sufficiency test
suggests that the maximum acceptable expected loss associated with reliance
on sample evidence should be αl1 + TDl 2. If this condition cannot be achieved
based on results of a sample, then incurring the costs associated with fallback
option(s) becomes necessary. Any such fallback should be planned to produce
sufficient additional competent evidential matter. Theoretically, planned fallback
should reduce the risk of incorrect acceptance to the level TD while
maintaining α at the planned level.
Conversely, the acceptance risk control option, without the sufficiency test
as a primary screen, may permit acceptance without regard to the implicit level
of the risk of incorrect rejection associated with its primary test which is based
on TD alone. As pointed out above, this may implicitly allow α" to become quite
large when the variability of sample results exceeds planned levels. Therefore
it might be inferred that α"l 1 + TDl 2 is small enough to negate the cost benefit
of fallback procedures even when α"—-1. This seems an undesirable result. It
suggests that either available fallback options are 1) extremely costly, 2)
inefficient, or 3) ineffective at reducing risk of incorrect rejection (e.g. α"l1 <
αl1 + cost of employing feasible fallback option(s)); or that the loss associated
with incorrect rejection is trivial (l1 0).
If the latter were true, there would be no reason to have controlled
incorrect rejection risk in the first place during sample size planning. If
something from the former set of conclusions is true then no cost effective
practical means for further reducing risk is available after sampling nor were
such procedures considered subsequently available prior to sampling. Had they
been considered subsequently available then the risk of incorrect rejection
would have been worth controlling explicitly in formulation of the primary
decision rule.
These results seem to favor use of the acceptance strategy associated with
the rejection risk control option rather than the more liberal acceptance
strategy of the acceptance risk control option. Of course, thisfinding is in direct
conflict with the prior prima facia results which favored the logic of the
acceptance risk control option. This paradox suggests that another strategy for
sample evaluation be contemplated.

The Balancing Strategy
As depicted in Figure 2, the balancing strategy begins with and employs the
same straightforward decision rules as the other strategies when A' = A.
When A' ≠ A, the adequacy criterion rule (as employed by the rejection risk
control and sufficiency test options) is invoked as a primary screen. When
results indicate that the variability of sample observation exceeds the planned
level (A' > A), the sample is deemed inconclusive and appropriate fall-back
options are considered. This is also consistent with the other adequacy
criterion options.
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The balancing strategy takes its unique character from its next stage
decision rule. When invoked, the rule calls for acceptance of the amount being
tested if the book value falls in the region X ± Ab, where Ab is the monetary
amount which balances the ex post risks of incorrect rejection, αb, and incorrect
acceptance TDb, such that α/TD = α b /TD b = l 2/l 1. This condition is
equivalent to αbl1 = TD b l 2 . When the expected losses of incorrect rejection
and incorrect acceptance balance one another in this fashion, the critical limits
based on control of αb and TDb respectively will be equivalent. In each case
these limits are X ± Ab. The determination of Ab requires simultaneous
solution of the following equations:
N(Zαb/2)/FN(ZTDb)=

2F

C

1

TE/S

X = Zα b/2 + Z TD b = C 2
where C1 = α/TD = l2/l1 and C 2 = the number of standard deviations of the
sampling distribution in the region bounded by the null and alternative
hypotheses. FN(•) is the cumulative standard normal density function for the
specified standard deviate. Z /2 is the number of standard deviates which
αb
provide for control of the risk of incorrect rejection at level αb and ZTDb is the
number of standard deviates which provide for control of the risk of incorrect
acceptance at level TDb.
There is no closed formed analytical solution to these two equations
because the F N (•)'s are integrals of a normal probability function. However, as
a practical matter, numerical approximate functions (e.g., see Abramowitz and
Stegun, 1964, p. 299) can readily be employed to produce FN(•) values. Other
numerical algorithms may be used in conjunction with these approximations
to
compute Z αb/2. Once a solution for Zαb/2 computed then Ab = Zαb2/2 S x.
is available and the decision rule can be employed based on whether BεX ±
Ab.
By employing both the sufficiency test rule and balancing rule, the balancing
strategy avoids the pitfalls associated with prior strategies. The sufficiency
test, as a primary rule, assures that consideration of fall-back procedures will
not be ignored and that the consequences of incorrect rejection will not be
treated as trivial. In this sense, it is equivalent to the rejection risk control
option and sufficiency test option which dominate the acceptance risk control
option with respect to primary rule selection.
If A' < A, the balancing rule, when allowed to operate, will reduce both
risks below planned levels. Therefore, A" > Ab > A'. Acceptance will occur
less frequently with the balancing strategy than either of the other strategies.
The balancing strategy has a higher potential for failing to accept than the
acceptance risk control option because it employs the sufficiency screen and
because the critical acceptance region for secondary testing is smaller, X ± Ab,
than the region of acceptance, X ± A", associated with the acceptance risk
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control option. It is also more conservative than the other sufficiency test
options with which it shares the primary rule because they also rely for
secondary testing on the larger region X ± A".
The more efficient the sample in relation to planned efficiency the closer Ab
will be to the midpoint between the alternative hypotheses. (When α = 2TD,
Ab = A without regard to sample size because the reliability coefficients for
both risks will be equal, before and after sample results are available.) For α <
2TD, Ab and hence the acceptance region X ± Ab will become smaller as
sampling efficiency improves. For α > 2TD the acceptance region X ± Ab
becomes larger as sampling efficiency increases.
By converging on the midpoints between hypotheses as critical limits, the
rule assures that as αb approaches 0 so too will TDb (and vice versa), thus
permitting the expected loss from either error to be reduced from αl1 + TDl 2
to αbl1 + TD b l 2 with αb < α and TDb < TD, while maintaining control of both
risks.
The balancing strategy concludes with the same decision rules as the other
strategies, except that the balancing strategy rebalances Ab, in accordance with
the ratio of α R /TD R when considering the adequacy of adjustments in relation
to statistical results.

Other Issues
The previous sections have been concerned with a single issue—the merits
of alternative strategies that are available to the auditor when the ex post
efficiency of the statistical estimator appears to be different from the planned
level of efficiency. More specifically, what is the nature and result of the tradeoffs between the risks of incorrect acceptance and incorrect rejection that are
implied by several commonly available alternatives? In addition, we considered
a possible strategy for determining levels of these risks by incorporating the
losses that might be associated with these risks.
We also briefly consider some other unresolved issues in classical auditing
sampling in the following sections. These issues have only recently been
recognized by researchers in the audit sampling literature, and may prove to be
fertile ground for future research.

Assessing the Risk of Incorrect Acceptance
A good deal of work has been produced suggesting that the assessment of
TD is a tricky task and that current models of determining that risk level for
sample evaluation purposes are overly simplistic. Both Leslie [1984] and
Kinney [1984] and implicitly the CICA study, Extent of Audit Testing [1980],
point out that the current SAS 47 approach for developing TD may be viewed
as intending TD to be a conditional risk. Under this view, the SAS 47 approach
invokes TD as a conditional posterior risk. This is the risk, given that material
error exists, that the auditor will incorrectly accept. This may be significantly
less than the Bayesian type posterior risk of incorrect acceptance which would
consider the conditional probability for incorrect acceptance in relation to the
marginal probability of acceptance, where the marginal is the probability of
sample results leading to acceptance without regard to whether that decision to
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accept is correct. Among other problems associated with risk assessment are
the need to contend with the impact of artificial specification of simple rather
than complex hypotheses [Dacey & Ward, 1986] and the potential benefit of
considering extension of Bayesian type models to include posterior consideration of correct and incorrect acceptance in relation to the results of all evidential
procedures rather than only detailed sampling procedures. In addition, as
highlighted by Cushing and Loebbecke [1983], nonsampling risks may not be as
limited in their potential impact as current practices would suggest.

Ex Post Sampling Risk
Beck and Solomon [1985] have observed that the achieved sampling risks
may be dependent upon the decision rule used and the estimator selected when
highly skewed populations force defacto violation of the normality assumptions
associated with the sampling distribution. This observation suggests that the
auditor faces different ex post risks exposures and hence different audit
consequences when the statistical assumptions are violated. Under such
conditions, it becomes important for the auditor to choose an appropriate
estimator and an appropriate decision rule for evaluating the sample results so
that he can minimize his risks exposure. The Beck and Solomon study provides
suggestions for meeting this objective by pairing decision rules with statistical
estimators based upon an ex post analysis of the sample evidence (e.g., error
pattern).
The (two) decision rules that Beck and Solomon refer to are based on the
two alternative hypothesis testing approaches. Under one approach the auditor
tests null hypothesis that the account book value is fairly presented (the
decision rule based on this approach has been referred to as Elliott and Roger
(E & R) decision rule). In essence, this is a test of the type associated with the
rejection risk control option described above. Under the second approach the
null hypothesis being tested is that the account book value is misstated by an
amount greater than tolerable error. This approach was used in Statement on
Auditing Procedure (SAP) 54. This is a test of the type associated with the
primary decision rule from the acceptance risk control option as discussed
above. It should be mentioned here that the E & R and SAP 54 decision rules
are equivalent for planning purposes as demonstrated by Roberts [1974] when
normality of the sampling distribution is assumed.
Beck and Solomon then illustrate how the achieved sampling risks are
changed when the decision rule used is changed. Assume that the accounting
population is highly skewed (as is often the case usually, see Stringer, 1963) to
the right and the estimator used is the ordinary mean per unit (MPU) estimator.
Since the accounting population is highly skewed, the MPU estimates are likely
to exhibit skewness, and in the presence of skewness the estimator of the
population mean and the estimator of the standard error are found to be highly
positively correlated (see Neter and Loebbecke, 1975). Suppose now that the
client's asset account book value is fairly stated, but the auditor's sample
estimate of the account mean (total) value is drawn from the lower region of the
sampling distribution and thus is less than the actual mean (total) value of the
account. Since the estimator of the mean is positively correlated with the
estimator of the standard error, a smaller than average mean estimate would be
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accompanied by a smaller than average standard error estimate. In this
situation, the two-sided confidence intervals computed under the E & R
decision rule would be centered below the actual mean and also would be too
narrow. Consequently, the risk of efficiency error would be higher than what
was planned. However, when the SAP 54 decision rule is used, because of
small estimates of the mean and standard error, a large estimate of monetary
error would result and with a smaller achieved precision measure the risk of
efficiency errors would become smaller than the risk determined using E & R
decision rule. A similar argument can be presented for the risk of effectiveness
which also is lower under the SAP 54 decision rule than under the E & R
decision rule when the mean estimate is such that a larger than average
estimate of standard error is projected from sample results.

Asymmetric Materiality Thresholds
There is empirical evidence suggesting that decisions about materiality may
not be symmetric. In some circumstances auditors may be less tolerant of
overstatement than understatement and wish to establish audit testing hypotheses accordingly (Ward, 1976). Recently, Srivastava and Ward [1986] have
developed a methodology that incorporates such an asymmetry for variable
sampling. Their preliminary results show that the auditor can achieve a
significant reduction in the sample size when the asymmetric materiality
thresholds are used in the planning stage. It is interesting to note that the
sample size reduction is achieved without sacrificing the two-tail test for
control of the risk of incorrect rejection.

Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to identify and discuss some unresolved
issues in classical audit sample evaluations. The selection of which issues to
consider was not random and, in fact, was very biased. The bulk of the paper
was devoted to a discussion of the implications of common evaluation strategies
that are presented in the audit sampling literature for situations where the
achieved efficiency of the estimator appears to be different from the planned
efficiency. When this occurs, both the acceptance risk control and the rejection
risk control strategies create a decision interval such that one risk (TD or α) is
held to the originally planned level and the other risk is allowed to vary from the
planned level. Little discussion is presented in the literature concerning the
rationale for selection of one or the other risk to hold at the planned level, or
why it is so logical to allow the other to vary from the planned level. In fact, this
type of trade-off process may seem contradictory if there is at least a rough,
intuitive balancing of expected losses from the two risks when the acceptable
risk levels are initially planned. From this viewpoint, a strategy was presented
which attempts to balance the expected losses for the two risks based on ex
post information. This process would appear to have some conceptual merit and
to warrant further investigation. In addition, brief comments on several other
recently discussed issues were presented. Although these issues have just
been identified and thus are perhaps further from solution, they merit mention
and probably future discussion and investigation.
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End Notes
1. Much of the discussion of evaluation of samples in Bailey is based on the same premise as
the audit guide option approach; however, he recognizes the alternative approach similar to the
acceptance risk control strategy in footnotes.
2. Guidance for establishing the two risk levels, TD and a, is available elsewhere. See, for
example, Arens & Loebbecke [1981, p. 136] and SAS 39. A significant amount of prior effort has
been expended to assist the auditor in understanding how to establish an appropriate level for TD.
Some issues and problems raised by these studies are reviewed in a separate section of this paper.
3. The statistical evidence may be considered conclusive if the number of standard errors of
the estimator contained in the tolerable error amount, TE, for the account being tested exceeds
the sum of the number of standard errors of the estimators required to control αR and TD R at the
reassessed levels.
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Discussant's Response to
"Unresolved Issues in Classical
Audit Sample Evaluations"
Abraham D. Akresh
Laventhol & Horwath
I am happy to be here at Kansas to discuss the paper by Nichols, Srivastava
and Ward. Ourfirm uses an assertion based audit approach; we use classical
variables sampling when we expect tofind many errors or when we perform
accounting applications. In general, I have little question that the authors
understand the mathematics of classical variables sampling and the various
approaches. While their mathematics are generally right, I am not sure they
have considered all of the practical aspects. I will discuss some of the practical
problems that are based on the many telephone calls received in our National
Accounting and Auditing Department from our practice offices.

Discussion Points
1. The paper places equal emphasis on the risks of incorrect rejection and
acceptance when evaluating sample results. For accounting applications,
these risks might be equally important. For auditing applications,
however, auditors are much more concerned about the risk of incorrect
acceptance. Incorrect acceptance leads to audit failures. Incorrect
rejection leads to audit inefficiencies. In today's environment, with
insurance difficult to obtain, incorrect acceptance and audit failures are
"unacceptable." Incorrect rejection is a cost of doing business that is
directly or indirectly passed on to clients. In the short run, we may even
realize revenue when there is incorrect rejection.
Audit efficiency can be controlled by means other than sample size;
for example, proper planning and supervision, analysis of error risks and
determination of materiality levels, selection of nonsampling procedures
when justified, and use of modern technology to reduce clerical time.
Thus, auditors do not rely solely on risk of incorrect rejection levels to
control audit efficiency.
We recognize that the rejection method is conservative and may
yield higher than necessary sample sizes. We also recognize that
teaching people the more efficient method will be expensive, more so
than the sampling cost to be saved.
As a result, auditors determine the risk of incorrect acceptance for
sampling applications, then select a somewhat higher risk of incorrect
rejection. This selection is somewhat arbitrary and is based primarily on
the difficulty of extending procedures if unacceptable results are
obtained. For example, an auditor might select a 10 percent risk of
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incorrect rejection (and a larger sample) for difficult to extend procedures (accounts receivable confirmations or inventory test counts).
For easy to extend procedures (inventory price tests, additions to
productive assets), the auditor might select a 20 to 30 percent risk of
incorrect rejection (and a smaller sample). Thus, the emphasis is on not
making a costly mistake (the need to extend difficult tests, incorrectly
accepting a population that is misstated materially), rather than keeping
sample size to the minimum.
We recognize that the risk of incorrect rejection has to be higher
than the risk of incorrect acceptance! More practical guidance is needed
on selecting an appropriate risk of incorrect rejection.
2. In most cases, auditors will use ratio and difference estimation rather
than the direct projection method of classical variables sampling. Ratio
and difference estimation requires a minimum number of differences,
either overall if the combined ratio method is used, or by strata if the
separate ratio or difference method is used. As a result, the auditor
needs to choose a sample size large enough to provide enough
differences.
Further, most applications of classical variables sampling require a
minimum sample size to obtain an accurate measure of the standard
deviation of the variable of interest. Thus, for example, we require a
minimum of 30 per strata if two or more strata are used and 75 if one
strata is used. This means that if the test is easy to extend, it does not
pay to worry about incorrect rejection. Instead, one approach that is
often used is to select a minimum sample size, say 75 items if
unstratified, or 30 items per strata, plus perhaps some larger, 100
percent tested items. The test is done and the auditor calculates the
point estimate and the distance to the limit the auditor is interested in at
the appropriate risk of incorrect acceptance. If the auditor can accept, he
does not have to worry about rejection. If the auditor cannot accept, he
decides whether to investigate the errors or to expand the test. If he
expands the test, he might consider risk of incorrect rejection or he
might just arbitrarily expand the test afixed number, say, an additional
50 items. While this is far from scientific, for many auditors it is much
simpler than trying to understand the mathematics of acceptance and
rejection.
3. The paper implies that the auditor places reliance on internal control and
other substantive tests when determining risks of incorrect acceptance
and rejection. Because classical variables sampling ordinarily is used in
high error rate situations, the auditor ordinarily does not rely on
controls. The auditor considers inherent error risk in determining the
population to sample, how to select the sample and what supporting
documents to examine.
This high error expectation also means a Bayesian approach might
be difficult to apply because the auditor will have difficulty expressing
prior expectations.
4. In evaluating sample results, the paper suggests that the auditor control
either the risk of incorrect acceptance or rejection at the planned level,
or balance the risks and compute achieved precision accordingly. In
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6.

7.

8.

practice, the auditor ordinarily is concerned with a one-sided evaluation
based on the planned risk of incorrect acceptance.
In our assertion based audit approach, our auditors consider the
inherent risk of error and the inherent direction of risk. For example,
auditors might conclude that overstatement of inventory is much more
risky to them than understatement and is much more likely given the
client's controls and the nature of the business. In that case, they would
be interested primarily in measuring the maximum overstatement (the
existence error). They would use analytical review to consider understatement (completeness). Accordingly, they would want to know that
the distance to the lower limit (the maximum existence overstatement)
is less than materiality or tolerable error at the appropriate one-sided
risk level. In that case, the auditor could accept and the risk would
measure the risk of incorrect acceptance. If the auditor could not accept,
he would have to consider expanding the test and at that point might
measure risk of incorrect rejection.
Two-sided evaluations generally are limited to accounting situations
and situations in which the auditor is concerned about both overstatement and understatement errors (because he has little feel for the
inherent risk). Auditors are not concerned about controlling the relationship between the risks of incorrect acceptance and rejection.
The authors talk about a balancing approach, using estimates of the cost
of acceptance and rejection. It is extremely difficult to calculate these
costs, especially cost of incorrect acceptance. Since we know that
acceptance risk is much more costly, the balancing approach seems
unnecessary.
Auditors in practice need more guidance on how classical variables
sampling can be used simply, without statistical formulas or complicated
computer programs.
As this paper has amply demonstrated, classical variables sampling
can become complicated unless the approach is easy for the auditor to
understand. Thus, for example, many firms have adopted a rule of
thumb setting precision equal to one-half of materiality. This causes risk
of incorrect rejection to be twice the risk of incorrect acceptance and
provides a simple way of calculating sample sizes. Although it is
inefficient, the costs of training auditors to understand a more complex
approach far outweigh the savings resulting from auditing fewer items.
While I am hopeful that the academic world can better train auditors to
understand classical variables sampling, until that happens, we will have
to use simplified rules to reduce both our training costs and the risk of
auditor error.
In the same way, the authors of the Audit Sampling Guide were faced
with the need to simplify and to deal with various computer programs.
Although there may be a more efficient approach (from the sampling risk
viewpoint), I believe the Audit Guide approach is understandable to
most auditors.
Classical variables sampling can be complex. Auditors often avoid using
it even where they know it might yield a lower sample size (or a tighter
precision) than alternative methods, such as dollar unit sampling. We
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need a relatively simple method of classical variables sampling that
auditors can learn as quickly as dollar unit sampling and apply without
risk of making a major error in the situations where it should be
applied—high error rate situations where a reasonably tight precision is
needed and adjustment is possible.
To summarize, the authors' understanding of the math is fine, but it is
essential to consider the practical impact in the audit environment.
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5
The Impact of Technological Events and Trends
on Audit Evidence in the Year 2000: Phase I*
Gary L. Holstrum
Theodore J. Mock
Robert N. West
University of Southern California

Introduction
This research project is an exploratory study that attempts to identify and
analyze:
(1) the most significant changes in information technology that will affect
future audit evidence,
(2) the impact of such changes upon auditing, and
(3) the nature of audit evidence in the year 2000.
The success of items two and three is contingent upon results obtained in
the first phase of the study, which is reported in this paper. Phase I is designed
to identify not only the relevant future events and trends but also the likelihood
that these events may occur at various points in time in the future. To
accomplish this goal, the researchers have performed an extensive review of
the technological literature, interviewed experts in auditing and various
technical areas, and solicited expert opinions via a questionnaire. A Delphi
study will also be conducted to elicit and analyze experts' predictions of
important future information technology events and trends.
Using these data, phase II of the research will identify and analyze the
effects of predicted technological events and trends on audit evidence and the
audit process. Scenarios will be developed to extract potential new strategies
for dealing with future audit evidence, audit technology, and auditor roles.
This paper is divided into six sections as follows:
1. Statement Of Problem And Need For Research
2. Review Of The Information Technology Literature
3. Research Issues And Proposed Methodology
4. Preliminary Findings Concerning Information Technology
5. Preliminary Findings Concerning Audit Evidence
6. A Tentative Scenario Of Future Audit Evidence
* The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation is providing funding and other assistance
for the research described in this paper.
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Statement of the Problem and Need for the Research
The basic problem addressed in this project is that changes affecting the
nature and availability of audit evidence are occurring so rapidly that auditors
have difficulty making practical plans to gradually adapt their auditing techniques and processes to deal effectively with future forms of audit evidence.
Consequently, the auditing profession needs research that (1) identifies the
most significant future events and trends expected to affect future audit
evidence; (2) indicates when such events and trends are expected to occur; and
(3) analyzes their impact on audit evidence, audit technology, and the role of
auditors. For example, in planning future auditing techniques, auditors would
likely give more attention to a particular new form of information processing if a
consensus of experts indicates that it will be technologically and economically
feasible by the year 2000 than if a consensus indicates that it will not be feasible
or if no consensus exists.
The audit environment is greatly affected by technological change. The
means by which information is captured, entered, retrieved, modified, and
distributed has changed dramatically over the past 30 years. The state-of-theart of computer auditing is clearly superior to that which existed at the
beginning of this decade but probably not adequate for the highly sophisticated
innovations in information technology that are likely to occur in the next 10 to
15 years.
The nature of auditing will undoubtedly continue to undergo substantial
changes as the level of technology improves. Experts are forecasting continued
improvement in the power andflexibility of computers and communication
devices, while costs are expected to decrease over the next 15 years. A
proliferation in the number of computers and terminals is expected over the
next decade.
Numerous social, economic, and political factors are likely to be important
to the future of audit evidence and auditing; consequently, they will be
considered in the study. However, we have chosen to place less emphasis upon
specific predictions of these factors because they seem to be inherently more
difficult to predict reliably and somewhat less important to the future of audit
evidence than changes in information technology.
Given the need for reliable predictions of future information technology and
of other factors that will likely affect future audit evidence, our research is
designed to address the following two basic research questions:
1. What will be the status of information processing technology in the
year 2000?
2. How is the information processing environment in the year 2000
expected to impact the nature and adequacy of audit evidence?
The basic research approach for the first question includes: (1) a review of
the literature concerning future information technology, (2) interviews with
information technologists and auditors, (3) an open-ended questionnaire survey
of information technologists and auditors, and (4) a Delphi study of information
technologists to predict the likelihood of future technological events and
trends.
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The basic research approach for the second question includes: (1) discussions with a relatively small panel of auditors concerning the audit impact of
predicted information technology changes, (2) preparation of narrative descriptions of likely audit impacts, and (3) a survey of a larger panel of auditors to test
and validate the descriptions and scenarios.

Review of the Literature on Future Information Technology
The first research step was a review of the literature concerning future
information technology. The objective of this literature review was limited to
identifying potential future information technology events and trends that may
occur. At this stage of the research, it would be premature to make assertions
about when these events or trends are likely to occur or even whether they are
likely to occur. Potentially important events and trends that are identified at this
stage will be included in the Delphi survey of information technology experts.
Research inferences about the degree of consensus among experts will be
based upon the Delphi study results.
The three major components of the literature review are: (1) computer
hardware, (2) computer software, and (3) data communications and office
automation. A brief overview of that literature is presented below.

Computer Hardware
Computer hardware improvements continue to outpace software improvements. Computer processing has become much faster due to advances in
integrated circuit technology. Computers are becoming smaller, more powerful, and less expensive which has led to a tremendous surge in end-user
computing. AT&T (International Data Corp., 1985) estimates that available
computer power is doubling each year. Just three years ago, Lewis M.
Branscomb, a Vice President and chief scientist at IBM, estimated that
computer power was increasing at a rate of 40 percent per year (Branscomb,
1982).
Proliferation of Computers—Where is this increased computer usage
coming from? Of the three broad categories of computers—mainframes,
minicomputers, and microcomputers—the growth has largely come from the
microcomputer segment. In 1975, the market for microcomputers was
virtually non-existent. The U.S. market for personal computers used in
business or professional purposes has grown to $11 billion, counting multi-user
supermicros. The dollar volume of microcomputer sales is now nearly equal to
the market (in dollar sales) for mainframes. By 1989, the market will be more
like $39 billion. The number of personal computers used for business or
professional purposes in the U.S., either stand-alone or multi-user, will
increase to 59 million in 1989 (IDC, 1986). The number of personal computers
used for business or professional purposes was 7.5 million in 1984. The key
trends causing the shift to personal computers are shift to hard disk storage,
faster micros, multi-user systems, and higher resolution graphics.
The number of terminals is also expected to increase dramatically throughout the 1980s and 1990s. International Data Corp. offered several projections
in the April 15, 1985 issue of Fortune magazine.
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1. In 1970, there were less than 200,000 remote terminals. In 1980,
there were two million remote terminals, a ten-fold increase. By
1990, 100 million remote terminals will be in use.
2. There were 20 million digital keyboard devices in the U.S. workplace
in 1984. By 1989, 80 million are expected to be in use.
3. Expected sales of Voice/Data terminals in 1987 are 250,000 units, a
ten-fold increase over the actual number of units sold in 1983.
All of these projections point to a proliferation of computers and a business
environment saturated with computers in the year 2000.
Parallel Processing—Machines like Japan's Teradata systems, part of their
fifth generation project, have a high level of parallelism; that is, several
microprocessors read different sections of the database at the same time.
Present computers can read hundreds of transactions per second, but by 1990
some of the large banks will need a computer that can read thousands of
transactions per second. With a computer that can read several records at a
time, this desired tenfold increase in processing speed may be attainable.

Computer Software
In an interview in Computer Decisions (Kull, 1984), James Martin, a noted
writer, lecturer, and consultant on information technology, discussed a wide
range of topics including programming, fourth andfifth generation languages,
Database Management Systems (DBMSs), operating systems, spreadsheet
packages, and expert systems. Since the issues raised by Martin are indicative
of those raised in the literature on the future of computer software, they are
discussed briefly below.
Automation of Systems Analysis and Programming—Martin believes the
jobs of programmer and systems analyst will be automated. We are evidently
heading in the direction of a "syntax-less" programming language. He favors
replacing languages altogether with diagrams because no syntax is required.
Fourth generation languages are much more English-like, but Martin does not
feel that there are any top-rate languages yet. It is difficult to replace existing
languages such as COBOL because companies have so much invested in them.
End-User Programming—Massive growth in end-user programming is
predicted in the next ten years. For example, current end-users of spreadsheet
software on a PC can use sophisticated financial-analysis tools to perform
faster, more accurate, and more complex calculations than were performed
previously by fulltime analysts on mainframe computer programs. Martin
believes that spreadsheet graphics will move from two dimensions to three
dimensions (with cubical structures) and that, eventually, four and more
dimensions will be available.
The expected growth in end-user programming and decentralized computer processing raises auditability concerns. In his book, EDP Auditing,
Weber states:
With the rapid growth in the use of minicomputers and microcomputers,
the unavailability of generalized audit software that runs on these
machines may be a problem confronted increasingly by the auditor.
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Further, at least in some cases, it is unlikely generalized audit software
vendors will make major attempts to increase the availability of their
packages on new hardware/software configurations. Increased availability means increased maintenance costs, decreased efficiency, and a
greater risk of the integrity of the software being compromised. (1982,
p. 433)
New Database Structures—Continued
rapid growth in database construction
by professional programmers and end-users is predicted by several experts.
Many experts believe that relational systems are far superior to CODASYL/
hierarchical based systems, but there is a vastfinancial investment in the older
systems. For example, Martin states: "By 1990, only a small percentage of
major database systems will be relational" (Kull, 1984).
Operating Systems—A clear need exists for increased standardization of
operating systems. The lack of program portability is inconvenient and
expensive. Martin stated that in ten years we may standardize on an entirely
different operating system, one without a UNIX pedigree. UNIX is weak in the
human factors area and in machine performance. Furthermore, UNIX is
research oriented and is ten years old.
Expert Systems—Many experts are predicting widespread applications of
expert systems. Several companies such as Teknowledge, Intellicorp, and
Xerox have developed "shells" for building expert systems that are sometimes described as expert system generators. Building expert systems,
however, is very time consuming and requires a heavy investment of capital
and human expertise. Illustrating the scarcity of human expertise necessary to
build expert systems, Martin states: "By 1990, there probably won't be more
than 5,000 professionals in the U.S. who can build an expert system, compared
with the one million programmers we have presently" (Kull, 1984).
On the other hand, Technology Forecasts (Anonymous, 1984) states that
artificial intelligence applications are seen propelling the AI market from its
current annual level of $250 million to at least $11 billion by 1990. Expert
Systems is one aspect of AI. Expert Systems will probably be the area of AI
which has the greatest impact upon the business arena. Sales of expert
systems reached $216 million in 1985. Industry analysts project a $3.5 billion
market by 1990 (IDC, 1986).
In a personal interview, a Vice President from Information Builders
(creators of Focus) stated that artificial intelligence in ten years will be where
PCs are today. The development of AI knowledge-based systems will make
software truly "user-friendly."
Anne Lampert, staffwriter for Computer Decisions (January, 1985) comments that expert systems arefinally out of academe and into the business
world. She commented on the expert systems presently in use and concluded
her article by stating: "The expert system does not supplant human involvement in the problem-solving process. The system merely makes the problemsolving more efficient and accurate."
The auditing and accounting profession is making a substantial investment
in expert systems evident by the attendance of 220 academics and practitioners
at the 1986 USC Audit Judgment Symposium which focused on expert
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systems. Expert systems have the potential to change both the way we
account for economic and social events and the way we audit information
systems and reports.

Types of Information Input
The sophistication of computer input is also expected to improve throughout the next 15 years. Papageorgiou (1983) predicted by the mid 1980s
computers would be able to optically scan hand-printed information. David
Terrie, manager of International Data Corp.'s office automation services, says:
"The machine will adjust to the user instead of the user to the machine."
Terrie also believes that computers will be accepting unstructured voice input
before the turn of the century (Pilla, 1982). Other respected individuals in this
field are not as certain of this prediction as Mr. Terrie. In that same article,
AT&T stated that voice recognition will not have a major impact upon nonroutine decision making before the year 2000. Brian Blackmarr, a principal with
the management consulting firm of Lifson, Hermann and Blackmarr in Dallas,
Texas, believes it would take a major breakthrough to make it work well.
The Naisbitt Group assisted the Colorado CPAs on an auditing futures
project. They concluded: "By 1990, a document will not only include text, but
also data, image, and voice" (Colorado Society of Certified Public Accountants,
1984). Forecasters may not agree on the year, but they do agree that these
changes are coming. Computers with voice recognition capabilities could
substantially impact the nature of auditing. Detailed audit testing and flowcharting are almost completely document oriented. The profession needs to prepare
for the changing nature of audit evidence in a paperless society.

Data Communications and Office

Automation

Improvements in the data communications industry will also have a
substantial effect upon the audit environment. Technological innovations such
as communication satellites and fiber optics have increased data transmission
speeds dramatically. Papageorgiou states that with this improved speed and
reliability the electronic desk is expected to become standard equipment. An
electronic desk is defined differently by various technologists. Papageorgiou
believes that it is comprised of a large display screen, a keyboard, a pointing
device, a local processor, a localfile, a storage unit, a local printer, and a link to
the rest of the system. Computerized Private Branch Exchange (PBX)
technology allows electronic mail, voice, and word processing to communicate
with one another.
In addition, video teleconferencing, telecommuting, and picturephone are
all expected to make revivals now that the technology has improved. Electronic
mail is already being used, but it will become far more pervasive. Electronic
communication between organizations will also expand significantly according to
Omar Sawy of University of Southern California's Center for Futures Research. Some companies have installed terminals connected to their mainframe
computer at customer plants to facilitate inventory ordering (McFarlan, 1984).
The main function of the mainframe will be to handle anything that people
want to share, according to several experts. The micro-to-mainframe links will
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have to get better. We need standards for data representation so a user can
easily download information from the mainframe. Eventually users will not
know whether they are using data on the PC or the mainframe, especially if
they have a Local Area Network (LAN).
International Resource Development, Inc. estimates the office automation
market to be $36 billion by 1990. Much of this money will go toward
networking (Pilla, 1982). In addition, multifunction terminals will come of age.
A multifunction terminal can do jobs such as word processing, electronic mail,
electronic filing and data processing from one workstation. Gerald Maskovsky,
Vice President of MIS for Home Insurance Co., believes that the biggest
challenge ahead of us is not technological, rather it lies in changing the
operational and organizational patterns of organizations. "Everything is designed around a physical piece of paper and now that paper will disappear and
drastically change the system" (Pilla, 1982).
LANs which allow individual users to pursue tasks independently from
separate PCs while calling on shared resources, such as hard disks, high speed
printers, and shared data bases, are expected to increase substantially in the
next several years. According to Future Computing, a market research firm
specializing in the personal computer marketplace, shipments of personal
computer LANs will increase to 166,000 in 1988 from 10,000 in 1983
(Guttman, 1985, p. 43).
The PC has helped to decentralize the information processing within a
company. Tim Sammons, director of a computer consulting firm, says that:
"Control and centralization of information processing are compelling reasons to
get a LAN. I think we'll see some companies go back to a centralized
operational structure. Others will centralize locally so a given manager will be
able to review the work done by his or her staff" (Luhn, 1985, p. 79).
Many experts predict that the networks and PCs that we know today will
soon be obsolete. For example, Sammons predicts:
The future lies in very high-speed networks that integrate voice and
data and blur the distinctions between the telephone and the computer.
The whole notion of stand-alone vanishes. That's why I think broadband, fiber-optic-based networks are the future. You'll have a machine
that delivers your morning newspaper, the Sears catalog, shopping
services, and more (Luhn, 1985, p. 80).
Videotex, the generic label applied to home information retrieval systems,
is growing significantly. Management Horizons Inc. predicts that 20 percent of
all U.S. retail sales will be done via videotex by 1990. More than eight million
U.S. homes are predicted to use videotex by 1990 (Anonymous, Business
Week, 1981). Transaction processing in financial services appears to be the
trigger application (of videotex) that the public would be willing to pay for.
However, Edward J. Atorino, a securities analyst for Smith Barney, describes
some of the current limitations: "Videotex is providing a service which has too
many alternatives that are cheaper and easier. It requires the consumer to
perform, to go through too much effort, to get the services" (Granelli, 1986).
Various communication channel options are available. Big users like Seattlebased Boeing Co. are building their own corporate phone networks instead of
leasing from the telephone company. Demand is soaring for transmission lines
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that carry huge quantities of digital voice and data over one line, such as the socalled T-1 transmission lines. Companies also can continue to ship smaller
quantities over separate lines, or send information between buildings with
microwaves and their own transmitting and receiving dishes (Simpson, 1986).
Fiber optics is growing at about 25 percent a year, and that growth is
expected to accelerate (Bartons, 1985). Fiber's favorable characteristics
include a digital nature, small size, light weight and low heat, wide capacity,and
immunity to electromagnetic interference and eavesdroppers. The telephone
companies, especially the long-distance carriers, buy roughly 80 percent of
what is produced. Fiber optics has approximately 20 times the bandwidth
(capacity) of coaxial cable. However, a worry to thefiber-optic industry is the
lack of standards for components.

Limitations of the Existing Literature
Despite the fact that a wide variety of sources have been examined, there
are some weaknesses in the literature. The most notable weakness is the
limited time-span of the forecasts. Nearly all of the experts confine themselves
to afive-to-ten year time horizon. Only the most recently published articles
dared to venture into the 1990s. John C. Papageorgiou, the author of the article
"Decision Making in the Year 2000," states at the outset of his article that
"[forecasting is almost impossible nowadays" (Papageorgiou, 1983, p. 77).
This statement is particularly appropriate for the forecasting of technology.
However, forecasters can offer projections that can give guidance to the
auditing profession for the 1990s and beyond.
The preliminary review of the published literature shows that auditors need
more current forecasts. Science magazine devoted an entire issue to all aspects
of the computer world in February of 1982. The issue was extremely insightful,
but the articles were written over four years ago and there have been many
major changes in computer and communication technology since that time.
Given the lag between collecting data and publishing a report, most forecasts
are several years old. In addition, none of the reviewed studies specifically
addressed the implications for business and auditing.

Research Issues And Proposed Methodology
Research Question No. 1 is: What will be the status of information
processing technology in the year 2000? Thefirst three of the four research
steps for Question No. 1 which are listed below have already been performed.
1. A review of the technological literature to identify the probable
status of information processing technology in the year 2000.
2. Interviews with a sample of EDP audit specialists and directors of
internal audit.
3. A survey of a sample of information technologists, internal auditors,
and external auditors using an open-ended questionnaire to validate
thefindings of the literature review and to identify other potential
changes.
4. A Delphi study of technologists to ascertain the likelihood of future
technological events and trends.
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To address the first research question, a number of methodologies for
"futures research" were considered. Fowles (1978) gives a detailed discussion of ten related approaches in the Handbook of Futures Research. Sackman
and Citrenbaum (1972) list and rank order 26 "futures-creating" methods. The
methods that were given the most serious consideration for this study were:
Delphi technique, cross impact analysis, scenarios, simulation gaming, simulation modeling, technology assessment, technology forecasting, and brainstorming.
The most appropriate methods to identify possible future technological
events and trends seem to be review of appropriate literature and interviews
with experts, particularly those in research environments where future
implementations of technology are already on the drawing boards. The most
appropriate methods to assess the likelihoods of future events and trends seem
to be Delphi and Cross-impact analysis. The literature in the area of futures
forecasting leans strongly toward using the Delphi method. The Delphi method
has been used successfully in several past forecasts of information technology.
The Delphi method is a highly cost-beneficial technique for obtaining the
opinions of leading experts in a givenfield. However, the Delphi approach has
been criticized because it does not take into account interdependencies of
events/trends. Cross-impact analysis does incorporate interdependencies.
However, a recent Delphi study by Eschenbach and Geistauts (1985) did
incorporate interactions through a scenario approach in thefinal round of the
Delphi.
The Delphi Method was suggested as an appropriate research tool for
forecasting technological changes affecting auditing in a recent article by
Garsombke and Cerrulo (1984, p. 6), as follows:
Since there is little reason to believe the rate of technological innovations will decrease, the auditor is faced with the problem previously
described (i.e., how should auditing adapt to changing technology). We
believe the auditor's best response to the challenge is to try to predict
future changes, rather than simply react to changes as they occur. . . .
The primary goal of any research project designed to address the
problem outlined above should be to predict the future direction of
change in certain relevant computer technologies, to the extent the
change may affect auditors. We suggest using a technological forecasting tool, such as the Delphi Method, which enables one to determine
the consensus of views of the future held by experts. Our expectation is
that knowing experts' views, auditors will be able to better prepare for
changes that are foreseen.
Research Question No. 2 is: How is the information processing environment in the year 2000 expected to impact the nature and adequacy of audit
evidence? The research steps to be performed for Question No. 2 include:
5. Preliminary discussions with a selected small number of auditors to
identify the likely effects.
6. Documentation of the proposed likely effects in a narrative or
questionnaire format.
7. Validation of the documented effects by surveying a larger number of
practicing auditors and obtaining their responses.
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8. Analysis of the responses.

Preliminary Findings Concerning Information Technology
Nature of the Open-Ended Questionnaire Survey
As recommended in the literature on the Delphi technique, we sent openended questionnaires to small groups of experts prior to the preparation of the
actual Delphi questionnaire. This procedure was designed to help ensure that
the questionnaire would be as complete as possible. We used two sets of openended questionnaires because we believed that it was important to obtain
information from both technologists and auditors. We performed a more
extensive open-ended preliminary survey with auditors because there was
very little literature available that referred to the future of auditing. Some of the
comments made by auditors did, in fact, influence the questions included in our
Delphi instrument for technologists. A copy of the questions included in our
Delphi questionnaire is included in Appendix A at the end of the paper.
Open-ended questionnaires were developed at this phase of the project to
obtain an unbiased list of responses from our expert respondents. One of the
primary concerns of questionnaire surveys is that the wording of the questions
may bias the respondent. Using an open-ended questionnaire format at the
initial "event identification phase" is favored by most futures researchers.
The questionnaire and methodology for this milestone phase of the study
were reviewed by consultants from the USC Center for Futures Research,
who made several important suggestions. For example, due to their suggestions, the questionnaire was divided into two sections. The first part of the
questionnaire asked respondents to identify thefive most important changes/
events/trends (within their area of expertise) that they believed would occur by
the year 2000. The questionnaire for the auditing and accounting groups was
modified slightly. It asked respondents to indicate those changes that would
have the most impact upon the nature of audit evidence.
The second section of the questionnaire asked the experts to indicate two
"less likely, but still possible," events. Prior experience of futures researchers
has indicated that the responses from most experts are similar (identifying the
more obvious events) unless respondents are asked to consider "the unexpected" or potential surprises. In many cases, these unexpected events or
plausible surprises do in fact occur over a long time horizon such as 15 years.
Type of Technical Experts Surveyed—We surveyed 30 technologists using
mailed questionnaires and in-person interviews. Our sample included experts
in the areas of artificial intelligence/expert systems, applications software,
database systems, data communications, computer hardware, and office automation, including information technology researchers at Bell Labs. In addition,
we interviewed experts who made presentations on various emerging information technologies at a computer conference in Los Angeles.
We interviewed two experts in organizational structure and behavior. This
area is important to the present study because future organizational structures
are expected to have a significant impact on future information flows and audit
evidence.
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The preliminaryfindings relating to changes in information technology are
divided into the following sections:
a) Office Automation and Transaction Automation
b) Data Communications
c) Computer Hardware
d) Computer Software.

Office

Automation and Transaction Automation

Electronic (Paperless) Transactions and Records—The computerization of
the business office paperwork and accounting records could be the most
significant concern of the auditors whom we surveyed in our open-ended
questionnaire. Some of them expressed difficulty in auditing electronic funds
transfers at present. The potential lack of an audit trail from a paperless
business office could have the greatest impact on auditing of any of the changes
being predicted. Already, some companies are ordering inventory from
computer to computer with no purchase order involved. Electronic checking
and home banking have been explored in a number of areas. Most of the
auditors we surveyed responded that a paperless or near-paperless business
office would occur by the year 2000. Many believed that the change would
occur first in the large (Fortune 500) companies.
Voice Recognition Input—Voice input of data before the year 2000 is
predicted by some of the technological experts. It is being used in some cases
by inventory counters at present. Questions are included in the survey
concerning the expected usage level and reliability level of various input
mediums including voice, keyboard, and optical scanning devices.

Data Communications
Data Sharing—Data sharing appears to be a primary goal in business today.
Local area networks and multiuser systems seem to be dominating the hi-tech
spotlight at present. Most experts agree that there is a tradeoff between data
sharing and data security. A truly secure network has not been designed to
date. Loss of data integrity is one issue that is exacerbated in the networking/
multiuser environment. The physical design of the network can impact the
security of the information system. There are presently three common types of
LAN designs—star, token ring, and bus. A technical discussion will not be
addressed at this time, but the star is considered to be the most secure design
followed by the token ring, and then the bus. IBM has adopted the token ring
design so it is expected that this design will dominate in the future. A question
concerning LAN design is included in our Delphi instrument.
Communication Channel Options—Another very important communications issue is the selection of a communication channel. Using the channel
already in existence, the telephone system, is certainly one option. Telephone
wire (technically, twisted-pair wire) is slower and slightly less reliable than
other wire/cable options. Coaxial cable is faster and more secure than twistedpair; however,fiber optic cable is much faster and even more reliable yet. A
major disadvantage of fiber optic cable (concerning networks) is that the wire
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cannot be spliced to add a new node. T-1 lines are massive (1.5 megahertz)
communications channels that are extremely popular with large companies.
Wireless communication can be achieved via either microwave or satellite.
Microwave is usually considered a local communication option. Inclement
weather and static discharge can affect the reliability of the signal. Weather
does not usually affect satellite communication. Questions concerning local and
long-distance communication channels are included in the questionnaire.
Data Security—The security of data travelling over communication channels
is a major concern. Data encryption is one possible solution. A question
concerning encryption of confidential data is included in the instrument.
Communication Among Computers—Another important issue is the level of
communication among computers. Will microcomputers, minicomputers, and
mainframes be able to communicate with one another? Will computers made by
different manufacturers be able to communicate with one another? Many
companies have a variety of computers within the departments of their
company. Although some departments may desire to share certain data, often
they cannot. Data sharing may improve efficiency and effectiveness, but it
could result in an exposure to data security risks.

Computer Hardware
Proliferation of Computers—Our preliminary findings indicate that there will
be a proliferation of computers, especially microcomputers. The computers will
be faster, more powerful, smaller in size, and less expensive. In other words,
the trend of the early 1980s is expected to continue. These findings do not
raise many new audit concerns; however, they do intensify our existing
concerns. The problems of unauthorized data access, program access, and
hardware access are certainly not going to go away and certainly could get
worse. Separation of duties, one of the cornerstones of effective internal
control, is becoming less and less attainable. Hardware failure and lack of
adequate hardware backup will become increasing concerns as we become
more dependent upon computers. Vastly improved processing speeds are
likely to resultfrom parallel processing and other innovations.
Backup Storage—A number of questions arise concerning the types of
primary and backup storage mechanisms for accounting data and the location of
the backup data (stored off-site/on-site). Some experts have predicted that
microcomputer storage will be measured in terms of gigabytes (billions of
bytes) in the very near future. Storage and backup of data on microcomputers
with this much information will be critical. Microcomputer users are generally
not as conscientious in backing up data, which could be a major data security
risk. The trend is clearly toward a decentralized computing environment. One
concern is that in this type of environment there might be a lack of standard
operating procedures at some locations (e.g., backing up data daily).
Data Access—Preventing unauthorized access to data is a critical internal
control issue. Password systems have evidenced vulnerability to unauthorized
employees and outside hackers in recent years. Technology for biological
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"passwords" such as fingerprints and voiceprints has already been developed.
A question concerning the nature of access control mechanisms in the future is
included in the Delphi instrument.

Computer Software
Resistance to Change—In spite of the predicted proliferation of new
programs, change is not easily achieved in the software arena. Such resistance
has been encountered with COBOL programming language and hierarchical
database management system software. Supposedly "better" languages and
database designs have been introduced. However, due to the level of
investment in terms of money and trained manpower, it is difficult to replace
"adequate" software. We are beginning to witness similar occurrences at the
microcomputer level. DOS is the most widely accepted operating system
software (for business purposes). Perhaps UNIX has some better features, but
to invest the additional manpower and money, the improvements will have to be
substantial. In application, software, DBASE III is certainly vastly superior to
DBASE II, yet many individuals continue to use DBASE II. Will any new
spreadsheet software be able to replace Lotus 1-2-3 (on a large scale)?
The benefits of new software must be substantial for a company to reinvest
the money and training needed to make a change. Artificial intelligence based or
natural language based software offers those potential benefits. Questions
regarding the likelihood of these occurrences are included in our questionnaire.
Natural Language Programming and Expert Systems—Natural language
programming and expert systems could have substantial audit implications if
they become feasible on a large scale. Program review by the EDP auditor
would become more simplified, but unauthorized tampering with programs
written in natural language (or close to natural language) could become a
greater problem.

Preliminary Findings Concerning Audit Evidence
The Open-Ended Questionnaire and Expert Auditors Surveyed
Prior to formally surveying expert technologists, an open-ended questionnaire was sent to various experts in accounting. This questionnaire was used to
obtain a list of the concerns of the professional accountant as input for the
eventual survey of technologists.
The (non-random) sample of accounting professionals surveyed included
ten directors of internal audit of Fortune 500 companies, 20 partners of large
CPA firms, and ten controllers of Fortune 500 companies. The questionnaire
simply asked the respondent to list thefive trends/changes/events that would
have the greatest impact upon auditing which he/she expected would occur
within the next 15 years.

Overview of Predicted Trends
The comments obtained centered on approximately ten different categories. The following is a list of those categories:
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NUMBER OF
COMMENTS

DESCRIPTION

(N = 20)
1. Trend toward a paperless society with a reduced audit
trail.
2. Increased governmental intervention in auditing.
3. There will be an increased number of business failures
and audit failures. Auditors will be more responsible for
predicting these failures. Increased litigation concerns
for external auditing firms.
4. Thefinancial reporting package will place a greater
emphasis on forecasts over historical reports.
5. Increased prominence of internal control reporting.
6. Changes infinancial reporting and information required
(e.g., disaggregated data replacingfinancial statements,
current value based reporting).
7. Expert Systems used in auditing.
8. Increased competitive pressures among external auditing
firms.
9. Increased trend toward a world economy.
10. Trend toward a "Decision Support System" environment.

19
10

7
6
6
6
5
3
3
3

The three categories receiving the most responses—(1) paperless society,
(2) governmental intervention, and (3) business/audit failures—are not unrelated. As the computerized accounting environment becomes more complex,
auditing becomes more difficult. As auditing complexity increases, the likelihood of audit failures increases. And if audit failures occur, government
intervention becomes more likely.
There are also several legal, regulatory/governmental, macroeconomic,
and reporting issues that are of much concern. However, the primary focus of
comments was with the impact of changing technology upon audit evidence and
internal accounting controls. Therefore, the thrust of our research will be
directed toward that area.

Potential Future Effects

on Types of Audit Evidence

The following section informally discusses some suggested possible effects
of potential information technology changes on future audit evidence. Information technology changes will likely have a significant effect on all seven basic
types of audit evidence: physical examination, observation, confirmation,
vouching or documentation, inquiries of client, tests of mechanical accuracy,
and analytical tests.
Physical Examination—The most common types of physical examination
are inventory observation and examination of securities. One possible change in
this area is that inventory taking could be done "on-line" with voice input or
laptop computers. Actually, this may help to improve auditing because a
physical inventory listing could be available at the time of observation.
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Physical examination of marketable securities could undergo significant
change if the physical piece of paper, the certificate, is eliminated. Obviously,
other audit procedures will have to be performed to establish validity and
perhaps value as well.
Confirmation—Two of the respondents in our open-ended audit questionnaire stated that the reliability of confirmations would decrease in the future.
Outside confirmations are one of the strongest forms of audit evidence at
present. It would conceivably take significantly more audit effort to establish
the validity of the asset or liability presently being confirmed. Further, despite
additional audit effort, it is unlikely that the evidence gathered internally would
be nearly as persuasive as the external confirmation.
Vouching/Documentation—It seems obvious that auditing in a world without
cancelled checks (or even checks), invoices, purchase orders, time cards, etc.
would be much different than it is today. Several partnersfrom large accounting
firms surveyed in our open-ended questionnaire argue that continuous controls
monitoring, auditing at the time of occurrence of the transaction, will become
essential. With a reduced audit trail, strong internal controls become more
essential. A greater understanding of the computer, accounting controls, and
management control systems will be required of the auditor.
Inquiries of the Client— Client inquiries are considered a relatively weak
form of evidence that must be substantiated if possible. Substantiation can be
difficult even now. In a more electronic environment, the situation may even
worsen.
Mechanical Accuracy—In one respect, the mathematical accuracy of virtually all tab runs, spreadsheets, invoices, etc. should improve. However,
client prepared electronic spreadsheets, for example, might be an area of
concern. Electronic spreadsheets "look" correct, but the assumptions underlying the spreadsheets must be audited. At present, this is a very difficult
procedure and audit judgment problems concerning spreadsheets are just
emerging. Perhaps the software will improve in that regard.
Analytical Tests—It seems possible that we will be placing more reliance
upon analytical review procedures as "hard" evidence becomes less available.
More creative uses of analytical procedures may have to be developed to meet
the need for audit evidence.
Observation—Observation is generally considered one of the weakest forms
of audit evidence. However, observation of computer environment and general
computer and office procedures may give added information of the strength of a
client's internal controls.
Summary of Preliminary Findings about Audit Evidence—Three of the
currently strongest forms of evidence—physical examination, confirmation, and
vouching—could possibly all deteriorate in reliability and persuasiveness. It is
unknown at this time whether other forms of evidence, or other types of audit
procedures, can compensate for these potential losses.
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This potential deterioration of evidence is occurring at a time when the
complexity of business transactions (especially financial) and accounting rules is
increasing. At the same time, Congress and other regulatory bodies are
applying increased pressure for improved auditing.

A Tentative Scenario of Future Audit Evidence
The following tentative scenario of future information processing and audit
evidence is offered merely as an attempt to provide a stimulus for discussion at
the Symposium. In thefinal research report, such a scenario will be based upon
more extensive empirical evidence from the Delphi study information technology experts and the survey of audit experts. In this tentative scenario we
distinguish "highly likely events and trends" from "important contingencies,"
which are not highly likely but which would be important if they occur.

Highly Likely Events and Trends
Based upon the research to date, some of the highly likely events and
trends that are expected to have an important impact on the future of audit
evidence and auditing are:
1. Vastly increased computer power, reduced cost, and miniaturized
size.
2. Commonplace usage of small, highly portable, powerful computers
that telecommunicate without a hard physical connection or coupling
to a network.
3. Commonplace usage of voice data entry and image processing and
ultra high-speed printers.
4. Vastly increased practical use of expert systems for a wide variety of
audit tasks.
5. Commonplace usage of imbedded audit monitors to flag items of
audit interest on a continuous basis.
6. Vastly increased computer and information processing sophistication
by management and employees.

Important Contingencies
Events and trends that are not highly likely to occur but that would have a
significant impact on future auditing if they occurred are regarded as important
contingencies. Some of the important contingencies that are suggested in the
research to date are:
1. Uncertainties about the specific type(s) of (a) computer hardware, (b)
software, or (c) networks that will prevail.
2. The degree of assurance that can be delivered by future systems
with respect to (a) information security, (b) guaranteed privacy, or
(c) backup reliability. Technological advances will greatly enhance
both the sophistication of security measures and the tools available
for overcoming those security measures.
3. The prevalence of expert systems and the specific arena or role of
individual human judgment in auditing. Individual human judgment is
likely to be used interactively with expert systems.
4. The extent of legal liability of auditors—both external and internal.
The presently exploding liability costs may continue to rise or may
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be controlled by various legislative, legal, social, or economic
remedies.
5. The level of governmental regulation or intervention into the
auditing and/or business environment. This could be affected by any
major failures related to business enterprises, audits, or databases.
6. The degree of public acceptance of (or disillusionment toward)
pressures for higher and higher levels of computer and technological
sophistication.
7. The prevalence of the "electronic cottage" or working at home and
telecommuting.

Conclusion
In summary, this paper reports on Phase I of a research project that
attempts to identify and analyze the most significant information technology
changes and other factors that are likely to have a major impact on audit
evidence, the audit process, and the role of auditing in the next 10 to 15 years.
The literature review, interviews, and open-ended questionnaires used in this
phase of the research tentatively identified numerous events and trends that, if
they occur, will have a significant impact on the future of audit evidence. In the
remaining phase of the research, a Delphi survey will be used to measure and
analyze more rigorously the predictions of a panel of information technology
experts. The audit implications of these predictions will then be further tested
through use of another panel of auditing experts.
In concluding this paper, we are requesting that Kansas Auditing Symposium participants—in addition to critiquing the paper in any way they deem
appropriate—also provide feedback concerning (1) specific factors likely to
affect future audit evidence that may have been omitted from our discussion
and (2) the most likely scenario of audit evidence and the audit process in the
year 2000.

Appendix A
Questions Included in the Delphi Survey
Estimation of Trends
Data Communications
1. What percentage of microcomputers and terminals will be able to communicate with any mainframe or minicomputer made by the same manufacturer
(in the following years)?
2. What percentage of microcomputers and terminals will be able to communicate with any mainframe or minicomputer?
3. What percentage of microcomputers used for BUSINESS purposes will be
used. . . ?
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4.

5.

6.

7.

a) As stand-alone devices
b) As part of a Local Area Network or a Wide Area Network
What percentage of local data communication will be transmitted over the
following channels? (Use whatever your definition of LOCAL is.)
a) Twisted-pair wire
b) Coaxial cable
c) Fiber optic cable
d) Microwave
e) "T-1" type lines
f) Other
What percentage of long-distance (i.e., NON-LOCAL) data communication
will be transmitted over the following channels?
a) Twisted-pair wire
b) Coaxial cable
c) Fiber optic cable
d) Microwave
e) "T-1" type lines
f) Satellite
g) Other
What percentage of local area networks will utilize the following architectures?
a) Star design
b) Token Ring design
c) Bus design
d) Other
Certain data are considered confidential. What percentage of the data
which you consider confidential will be encrypted when transmitted over
communication channels?

Office

Automation and Transaction Automation

8. What percentage of payments will be conducted electronically by the
following entities?
a) Large (Fortune 500) corporations
b) Medium-size companies
c) Small businesses
d) Individuals (consumers)
9. What percentage of invoicing and billing will be done electronically by the
following entities?
a) Large (Fortune 500) corporations
b) Medium-size companies
c) Small businesses
11. What percentage of business-related transaction data will be input using
the following mechanisms?
a) Keyboard
b) Voice
c) Communication channels
d) External data sources (e.g.,from another company's computer)
e) Optical scanning device
f) Other
142

12. What percentage of business office employees in America will telecommute? (The employee does not have to work allfive days of the week at
home. His/her schedule might call for working at home every other day, for
example.)
13. What percentage of business and accounting data will be backed up on the
following devices?
a) Magnetic Tape
b) Floppy Disk
c) Hard Disk
d) Laser Disk
e) Tape Streamer
f) Other
14. What percentage of companies will store back-up data at off-site premises?
15. What percentage of back-up business data will be stored on "Read Only"
devices?

Hardware, Software, Other
16. What percentage of databases do you expect to utilize the following
designs?
a) Hierarchical
b) Relational
c) Network
d) Other
17. What percentage of user identification/authentication schemes for gaining
access to hardware orfiles will use the following?
a) Personal characteristics (e.g.,fingerprint, voiceprint)
b) Possessed objects (e.g., card, key)
c) Remembered information (passwords)
d) Dialog (typed or spoken)
e) Other
18. What percentage of business application software for the mainframe will be
programmed using the following categories of languages?
a) Higher level languages (e.g., COBOL, FORTRAN, etc.)
b) Fourth generation languages
c) Fifth generation languages (i.e., natural language based)
d) Other
19. What level of reliability will voice input of data achieve?
20. What percentage of each category of computers listed below will have
parallel processing capabilities?
a) Mainframes
b) Minicomputers
c) Microcomputers
WHAT IS/ARE THE PRIMARY SOURCE(S) OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE FOR
RESPONDING TO THE QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION OF THE SURVEY? (Please rank them if your knowledge comesfrom more than one source.)
First-hand; personal involvement in the area related to these trends.
Professional literature.
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Oral communication; information from knowledgeable persons whose
opinions you respect.
Popular literature.
RATE YOUR LEVEL OF EXPERTISE ON THESE TRENDS (0 TO 10)
(0 = No Expertise; 10 = Very highly qualified)

Estimation of Events
1.

2.

3.
4.

Specify probability of occurrence for the following (0-100%)
SOFTWARE: Sophisticated software is developed capable of creating
computer programs that solve complex analytic problems specified by a
user who has only minimal computer literacy. The software system
identifies the inputs needed, elicits these inputsfrom the user and writes
the program.
AI: Breakthroughs in the so-calledfifth generation computers result in the
development of a complete artificial intelligence capability. These units
speak several languages, and respond to oral questions in a wide variety of
subject areas.
HARDWARE: Microcomputer storage capacity is measured in gigabytes
(billions of bytes).
OFFICE AUTOMATION: Office automation reaches a level in which
elimination of all paper-work from repetitive tasks is feasible for the
following items:
a) Payroll time-cards
b) Accounts payable vouchers
c) Expense reports
d) Purchase requisitions
e) Purchase orders
f) Invoices
g) Job Sheets (for production)

Appendix B
Sample Page from Delphi Questionnaire
Estimation of Trends
Data Communications
1. What percentage of microcomputers and terminals will be able to communicate with any mainframe or minicomputer made by the same manufacturer (in
the following years)?
BY:

1990

1995
%
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2000
%

NQ
%

2. What percentage of microcomputers and terminals will be able to communicate with any mainframe or minicomputer?
BY:

1990

1995
%

2000
%

NQ
%

3. What percentage of microcomputers used for BUSINESS purposes will be
used. . . . ?
BY:

1990

1995

2000

NQ

As stand-alone devices

%

%

%

As part of a Local Area
Network, or a Wide
Area Network

%

%

%

4. What percentage of local data communication will be transmitted over the
following channels? (Use whatever your definition of LOCAL is.)
BY:
Twisted-pair wire
Coaxial cable
Fiber optic cable
Microwave
"T-1" type lines
Other

1990

1995
%
%
%
%
%
%

2000
%
%
%
%
%
%

NQ
%
%
%
%
%
%
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Discussant's Response to
"The Impact of Technological Events and Trends
on Audit Evidence in the Year 2000: Phase I"
Stephen M. Paroby
Ernst & Whinney
My compliments go to authors Holstrum, Mock, and West for a wellwritten and well-thought-out paper and a project that will have a significant
impact on all of us. Mark Twain once said, "It's all right to make predictions,
but not about the future." Technological forecasting tends to be optimistic in
the short run and pessimistic in the long run. Had this paper been written in
1970, I truly wonder if it would have predicted today's environment. However,
the authors have taken a compilation of speculations that are often difficult to
quantify or fully support and put them in a perspective that will certainly jar
today's auditor.
Computerized systems benefit all of us in several ways. Computers process
transactions with much greater consistency than is possible in a manual
system. In addition, the speed andflexibility of computer processing provide
wide-ranging capabilities for a timely, reliable reporting of high volumes of
information. These capabilities give management greater opportunity to make
informed business decisions and allow management to react quickly to and
capitalize on business developments.
As the number of on-line systems and paperless transactions continue to
increase, new products will continue to emerge to provide auditors with more
sophisticated computer-assisted audit techniques. Advancing technology such
as micro-to-mainframe communications, down-loading of information from
centralized or decentralized sites, expert systems, and artificial intelligence
probably will not change basic audit techniques of review and verification. What
this technology will change significantly is the way auditors evaluate and test
systems. The traditional approach of examining "hard" copies is neither
adequate nor feasible. Computerized techniques have been developed to deal
with this task. Various software programs and utilities can provide exception
reports and other audit-related information. Embedded audit modules can
select and verify all or a sample of transactions and generalized audit software
performs calculations faster and much more accurately than we could manually.
However, the consistency, speed, andflexibility of the computer can pose
additional control concerns for us as auditors. These concerns include:
1. The effect of errors may be compounded. For example, the
computer may prepare sales invoices by taking the quantity input
and extending it by price on the sales price master file. If the
program is not functioning properly (e.g., selecting incorrect prices,
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2.
3.
4.

5.

performing extensions improperly), all sales invoices may be incorrect.
The reduction of manual involvement resultingfrom the presence of
the computer in the process could lead to inadequate segregation of
duties.
Audit trails may be reduced or eliminated, or may exist for only short
periods of time in computer-readable form.
Changes to data and programs may be made by individuals lacking a
sufficient understanding of the overall system of internal control and
standard operating policies. Also, such changes may be made
without adequate testing by a quality assurance group or without the
consent of management.
More individuals may have access to data, a critical corporate
resource. These individuals may be authorized or unauthorized.
Authorized access could still lead to either errors or irregularities,
and unauthorized access usually leads to computer fraud.
As recently reported by the FBI, computerfraud ranges from
three to five billion dollars annually. The average return to the
perpetrator in reported crimes has been calculated at $615,000,
quite a difference from the $23,000 average for manual embezzlements. As evidenced by these figures, computers can greatly
facilitate the misappropriation of assets and the manipulation of
information under certain circumstances.

Therefore we should keep in mind that while a computer's involvement in
the accounting system or in a production process often has a positive impact,
this does not necessarily mean the data it generates are correct, nor that
adequate controls are in place. In most cases, control procedures will exist.
However, we need to identify and test them before relying on them, just as we
would in a manual system.
Also, all auditors will have to increase their understanding of computerized
systems. In order to plan and execute an audit effectively, auditors will have to
determine the impact of the computer on the data they are examining. In
addition, they will have to gain an understanding of the controls over the
processing of the data. Specifically, this will include controls over the development and maintenance of programs and controls over access to data files and
programs.
Having painted the picture of what the future that is here today holds, let
me focus on some of the significant changes in information technology and the
paper presented by the authors. Essentially, the authors take current technology and project it forward, anticipating no new significant technological
break-throughs. Clearly, in an area evolving as rapidly as computer technology,
such an approach could be risky. For example, had this paper been written ten
years ago, the authors may have failed to predict the revolutionary impact of
microcomputer technology.
I agree with the authors that the micro-to-mainframe links and local area
networks will become much more common. In addition, these links and
networks will present control challenges. The more difficult task will be to
predict how these technological trends will affect auditing. A clear distinction
should also be made between big, unusual transactions and little, normal ones.
Although the authors state that three of the currently strongest forms of
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evidence—physical examination, confirmation, and vouching—could possibly all
deteriorate in reliability and persuasiveness, it is unclear now whether other
forms of evidence—or other types of audit procedures—will be able to
compensate for these potential losses.
Computer-based information is intrinsically more reliable than printed
information. Perhaps the most important effect of new computer technology
will not be in a reduction in the quality of audit evidence, but a greater emphasis
on computer controls to assure its accuracy and the avoidance of unwarranted
reliance on computer-generated data.
Audit failures usually result from not understanding a particular transaction
or class of transactions and the related processing and control systems rather
than because the inventory listing does not foot. New information technology is
not likely to alter this situation but in fact may compound it.
When you relate the changes in information technology that will affect future
audit evidence and the impact of those changes on auditing, certain issues come
to mind. Some of the specific issues that should be addressed include:
1. How to make computer technology and computer tools accessible to
general auditors. In broad terms, audit evidence is what auditors
examine. If auditors cannot understand computer technology, computerizedfiles will not be considered audit evidence.
2. It seems likely that analytical review will become the centerpiece of
most audits within ten years. An important aspect of increased
computer technology is that clients can now accumulate and analyze
a much larger amount of information than previously possible. That
information makes possible much more detailed and persuasive
analytical reviews. Also, through the use of artificial intelligence,
more information will be gathered, synthesized, and put into useful
form faster than ever before.
3. Audit coverage will increase dramatically. For example, when we
test inventory extensions manually, we typically select a small
sample of inventory items to recompute. If we use software tools to
check the same computation, we generally test all inventory items.
As we move toward more computerized auditing, the percentage of
transactions we examine will increase. If we had to do it manually,
audit fees would be astronomical.
4. The authors cite Weber and suggest that generalized audit software
may be unavailable to run on microcomputers and minicomputers for
many years to come. At Ernst & Whinney we are now using a
multimachine generalized audit software package that runs on a
microcomputer, as well as microcomputer software that gives us the
ability to extract data from essentially any minicomputer or mainframe. That technology is here today.
Given the rapid change in technology in just the last few years, it will be
almost impossible to project what the computerized auditing environment will
be in the year 2000. Aside from the obvious concerns and those already
mentioned (e.g., data security, lack of audit trails), some additional pervasive
considerations are (1) what financial statements will look like 10 to 20 years
from now and howfinancial information will be distributed and (2) how audits
will be performed then.
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Regarding presentation of financial information, several questions come to
mind. For example, will shareholders and other financial statement users have
continuous access (via their own computer terminals or other devices) to a
company's financial information? Will audits be done entirely by computers
from the auditor's office, in which case "field work" would virtually disappear
except for some inquiries and observations?
Another major question is how the sophisticated technology of the future
will affect the structure of CPAfirms and the staffing of audit engagements. A
related issue is the impact on accounting and business schools. Accounting
students will need to have a much more detailed background in information
systems before joining a CPA firm, and the firms themselves will need to
provide increased training to supplement normal development programs. We
have recently released an interactive computer-based training course, EDP
Concepts for Auditors, designed to raise the level of computer literacy for all
auditors.
How will smaller CPA firms adapt? The impact of technological change
generally is not felt as quickly by the smallerfirms, since their clients tend to be
the last ones to adopt sophisticated technology. However, in 10 to 20 years
even small businesses likely will place substantial reliance on the computer.
Accordingly, the smallerfirms will need to invest in the necessary hardware
and software to keep pace with their clients and the rest of the profession. This
increased sophistication definitely will place more emphasis on the system of
internal controls. Companies will need to turn increasingly to EDP managers to
make sure that adequate control systems are installed and then to their auditors
for assurance that the controls are functioning.
Better communication between external and internal auditors would seem
to be a necessity for coping with the changes in technology. The authors refer
to "continuous control auditing." Not only would this cause us to place more
reliance on internal audit, but it would seem to change dramatically the nature
and timing of our tests. The authors state that "Changes affecting the nature
and availability of audit evidence are occurring so rapidly that auditors have
difficulty making practical plans to gradually adopt their auditing techniques and
processes to deal effectively with future forms of audit evidences." Frankly,
what we are doing now in terms of researching and testing new hardware and
software and training personnel seems to be the appropriate course of action.
Although long-range planning is important, we can realistically look only to the
short term because of the rapid advancement of technology.
With tomorrow's technology here today, management's and audit committees' concerns about the computer are intensifying. Management and audit
committees are increasingly asking their auditors to provide answers to such
questions as: What information is being processed on our computer; why; for
whom; by whom? What would happen if our computer system went down for a
day, a week, or a month? What would happen if our key data processing
personnel left tomorrow? Can someone with a telephone and a home computer
access our confidential files? Within our organization, can only people with the
need to know gain access to confidential data? Are there proper segregation-ofduty policies? To answer these and other questions effectively, it is imperative
for all auditors to be more computer literate.
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As an auditor, how do you respond when you ask the data processing
manager how things are going and he replies:
I had just arrived in town to bring the on-site on-line. No sooner had I
brought it up than it went down. Rising to the occasion, I went
downstairs and gathered my tool kit: Time Domain Reflectometer, logic
probe, comm lube, and spare low-order bits.
Going to the SOURCE, I TC'd the packet with some spare protocols
until the EtherLink locked up TS0 and broke the SYSGEN. I slipped a
Turbo Accelerator into the PC and revved it up until it executed an
infinite loop in under three seconds.
Coming in the back door under VMS, I broke the UNIX shell and
released the ASCII characters in the error traps. Applying CSMA/CD
brought the recovery rate safely below the BIOS buffer overflow. DOS
recovered, and the crisis was over. . . .
Many of the skills previously reserved for a few high priests in the data
processing center are now required of all of us.
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Is the Second Standard of Fieldwork Necessary
Thomas P. Bintinger
Touche Ross & Co.

Introduction
Today's generally accepted auditing standards were primarilyframed in
1947 by the Committee on Auditing Procedure (Committee) of the American
Institute of Accountants, the predecessor bodies of the current Auditing
Standards Board and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
The standards were formally adopted by the profession at its annual meeting in
September 1948.* These standards have remained in place since that time with
numerous statements interpreting them adopted by the Auditing Standards
Board or its predecessors. These familiar standards are organized into two
general classes: (1) personal or general standards and (2) procedural standards. The procedural standards have two categories: the conduct of the
fieldwork and reporting. The objective of this paper is to focus on the
procedural standards, in particular, the second standard of fieldwork:
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal
control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the
resultant extent
of the test to which auditing procedures are to be
restricted. 1
This second standard of field work pertaining to the evaluation of internal
control is interposed between thefirst which covers planning and supervision
of the work and the third which requires evidential matter to be obtained as a
reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements being
examined. Its mandate has been subject to considerable interpretations in
formal statements which include:
Special Report by the Committee
November 1948
on Auditing Procedure
Internal Control—Elements of a Coordinated
System and its Importance to Management
and the Independent Public Accountant
Statement on Auditing Procedure 29
October 1958
Scope of the Independent Auditor's
Review of Internal Control
* The fourth reporting standard was subsequently added and approved by the membership of the
AIA (AICPA) in 1949.
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Statement on Auditing Procedure 33
Auditing Standards and Procedures:
Chapter 5—Evaluation of Internal Control
Statement on Auditing Procedure 54
The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of
Internal Control
Statement on Auditing Standard 43
Omnibus Statement on Auditing Standards:
Section 2—The Auditor's Study and Evaluation
of Internal Control

December 1963
November 1972
August 1982

The profession has issued restatements and codifications in 1954 and 1972
in addition to the SAP 33 codification. These were derived from the pronouncements, including the above, reflecting the development of the auditors' actions.
The significance of the system of internal control has transcended auditor's
and management's interest when Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 which requires "devis(ing) and maintain(ing) a system of
internal accounting controls"2 for objectives that the auditing profession
articulated in Statement on Auditing Procedure 54. Again, in the Report,
Conclusion and Recommendations 3 of the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities, the subject of internal control and its evaluation was extensively
commented upon.
In addition, the standard has been the subject of considerable discussion as
to whether its requirements are contained in the first and third standards of
fieldwork, and thus its listing as an independent standard is confusing to those
in practice. This paper will examine the evolution of the second standard as
interpreted in the auditing statements and consider whether the intent of the
original authors has been changed in the context of providing more precise
guidance. Articles and papers exist on the subject, but the discussion
developed herein is primarily based upon the officially issued statements of the
profession itself.

Tentative Statement of Auditing Standards—Special Report—
October 1947
In the introduction to the Tentative Statement of Auditing Standards
(Tentative Statement), the Committee said:
Auditing standards may be set to be differentiated from auditing
procedures in that the latter relate to acts to be performed whereas the
former deal with measures of quality of the performance of those acts
and the objectives to be obtained in the employment of the procedures
undertaken. Auditing standards as thus distinct from auditing procedures concern themselves not only with the auditor's professional
qualities but also with his judgment exercised
in the conduct of his
examination and in his reporting thereon.4
This distinction has been maintained in the various reissuances of the
standards, and may be the reason that the profession has a reluctance to modify
or change the original standards. While not entirely comparable, it is interesting
to observe in the Attestation Standards, recently issued by the Auditing
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Standards Board and the Accounting and Review Services Committee, that the
fieldwork standards have been reduced to two by absorbing the internal control
concept into an element of the evidence standard.5
In the Tentative Statement, the introductory remarks applying to all
procedural standards include a discussion on materiality and relative risk. In
particular, the comment upon relative risk on internal check and control is
significant as it states that, "The effect of internal check and control on the
scope of an examination is the outstanding example of the influence on auditing
procedures of a greater or lesser degree of risk of error. The primary purpose
of internal check and control is to minimize the risks of errors and irregularities. . . . " 6 The Committee appeared to use this stated purpose as the
underlying reason for the second standard. The Committee referred to the
Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 1 issued in 1939 which states that, "It is
the duty of the independent auditor to review the system of internal check and
accounting control so as to determine the extent to which he considers that he
is entitled to rely upon it." 7
The Committee also stated that, "The review of internal control is one of
the most important steps in proper planning of the audit. . . . " 8 The Committee recognized that the study and evaluation is to help plan the approach to
evidential matter; yet it did not seefit to include it under the planning standard.
I believe it is particularly significant to note the words chosen by the
Committee to describe the process envisioned by the second standard: words
such as outstanding, primary, duty, one of the most important. These words all
indicate a standard that the Committee believed to be extremely significant.
The Committee also identified the documentation requirements that should
be employed in the procedures to evidence the second standard of fieldwork:
"A systematic and clear record should be made of the facts developed by the
review."9 This documentation requirement imposed by the discussion on the
standard itself again seems to emphasize the importance as to which the
Committee attached to the review.

Internal Control—Special Report—November 1948
A year later, the Committee issued its special report entitled Internal
Control—Elements of a Coordinated System and Its Importance to Management
and the Independent Public Accountant (hereafter referred to as the Report). I
believe it is worth noting that the Tentative Statement and the Report were
issued not as releases under the Statements on Auditing Procedure but as
special reports. While the former was directed to the auditing profession, the
latter was directed to the public accountant and management due to "the
complementary nature of their respective responsibilities and of their interdependence upon each other in discharging those responsibilities."10
The Report indicates that the public accountant's review of the system of
internal control serves two purposes:
First, it enables him to formulate an opinion as to the reliance he may
place on the system to the end that, by adjusting his audit procedures
accordingly, he may express an opinion as to the fairness of management'sfinancial statements; and, secondly, where the review indicates
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apparent weaknesses, recommendations for possible corrective measures may be conveyed to management.11
This section continues with its advice which indicates that:
This secondary aspect of his review frequently enables the public
accountant to render broader services than those generally associated
with his capacity as an independent reporter to stockholders upon
management's conduct of stewardship responsibilities. His aid to
management in attaining more
efficient operation can and should be an
equally important function. 12
This duality of purpose, while not stated precisely in the second standard,
was, I believe, framed in the Report in the broader context of the profession
and its clients for whom services were rendered.
In the introduction to the Report, a statement is made, "In earlier periods
the independent accountantfrequently had to examine practically all transactions and make dozens of journal entries before reasonably accurate financial
statements could be prepared." 13 This statement was made to establish how
internal control had served to impact the audit in producing financial statements, and also assist management in fulfilling its responsibilities. Howard
Stettler, in his auditing textbook, observed that Robert H. Montgomery, in his
work, felt it necessary to prepare an American treatise on auditing as he had
observed in professional practices in the United States, a growing departure
from the principles and procedures expounded by Dicksee.14 Dicksee's Auditing was largely directed to the balance sheet and a determination of the amount
of surplus legally available to serve as the basis for the payment of dividends.
Montgomery had observed that more was expected of the auditor, and a
broader extension of the services of practitioners over the entire field of
business activity had resulted. These comments emphasized the broader
relationship that the engagement of an auditor by an enterprise had become.
The Tentative Statement and the Report represent the culmination of a thought
process on the profession's responsibilities to its clients and to society.
In The Accounting Profession—Where Is It Headed?, edited by John L.
Carey, the role of the auditor is expressed in this context:
The auditor, whether internal or external, plays a strategic role in the
discharge of the accounting function. By tests and observation, he
ascertains the manner in which the economic data are being measured,
recorded, summarized and communicated, and whether all this is in
conformity with the established plan. He passes judgment upon records, reports, and the performance of people, all to the end that the
output of economic data be sustained at a high level of quality. Without
auditing, degeneration of the accounting process sets in.
The auditor also performs another important task—he looks beyond the
presently established plan for carrying out the accounting function to
determine whether some different or modified plan is called for by
changed conditions. Organizations, methods, people, and economic
environments are constantly changing; the equivalent changes occur in
the actual or potential contribution of the accounting function and in the
methods of discharging it. Without auditing, any accounting process is15
exposed to the risks of losing effectiveness because of obsolescence.
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Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 33—December 1963
The Tentative Statement and the Report remained in place as authoritative
auditing pronouncements until the codification in Statements on Auditing
Procedure No. 33 (SAP 33) which combined the standards, the Report and the
previous Statements on Auditing Procedure into a single document. Therefore,
the official position of the profession was contained in these documents for a
15-year-period until 1963.
Chapter 5 of SAP 33, "Evaluation of Internal Control," became the
interpretive section for the second standard of fieldwork. The difficulty of the
profession's dual role of attest for third party and services to the engaging
client caused a significant rewording of the auditor's responsibility for internal
control.
This codification now stated, "[a]sa by-product of this study and evaluation
(of internal control), the independent auditor is frequently able to offer
constructive suggestions to his client on ways in which internal control may be
improved." 16 This wording arose in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 29
which was issued in 1958. The concept outlined in the Report of equality of
purpose was now stated as a by-product.
This evolution may have been influenced by a movement that was occurring
within the profession: the concept of specialization, and in particular, the
concept of management services. In the aforementioned The Accounting
Profession—Where Is It Headed?, Carey includes an article by Robert M.
Trueblood, "The Management Service Function in Public Accounting" which
appeared in the July 1961 Journal of Accountancy. Mr. Trueblood makes the
statement:
Independent auditing results in the expression of an expert opinion on
financial representations made by management. The CPA bases his
opinion, in large part, on a comprehensive understanding and evaluation
of management's system of internal control—the systems and procedures used to generate thefinancial information under evaluation.
This expert knowledge of financial information systems and controls is
requisite for the CPA's performance of a professional audit. The same
expertness that is applied to sound audit performance may also be
logically applied by the CPA to management consulting activities.
Over the years, the performance of both the audit and management
consulting, or management service, function has been an accepted
practice of CPAs. Largely because of the clear connection between the
knowledge required to perform a professional audit and the knowledge
useful in management consulting activities, the staff performing both
activities wasfrequently the same. Today, however, developments are
taking place that tend to force 17
a more explicit delineation of audit and
management services activity.
This statement indicating the thrust of the forces of the profession, I
believe, has caused the second standard of fieldwork's requirements to move
into the area of specialization, and thus, narrow the role of the CPA in his
position as auditor of financial statements. This delineation of activity obviously
has been much more pronounced as firms grew in size. While the wording of
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the second standard remained the same, its interpretation had significantly
changed.

Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 54—November 1972
The Committee on Auditing Procedure felt it necessary to "Amplify and
clarify the application of (the second standard) in the light of subsequent
developments in business and in the profession." 18 Accordingly, it issued
Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 54, "The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control" (SAP 54). This statement reflects the continuing
difficulty faced by the profession with respect to specialization and the
furnishing of advisory services and audit services directed to the examination of
financial statements. Paragraph 2 of SAP 54 clearly states this issue:
The increasing trend for certified public accountants to provide management advisory or consulting services involving the study, evaluation,
and improvement of management information systems increases the
need to clearly distinguish between these special services and those
audit services required for compliance with the auditing standard for
study and evaluation of internal control incident to an examination of
financial statements.19
Apparently, the profession's need to compartmentalize activities with a client
was a significant driving force to restate the requirements of the second
standard. The certified public accountant was engaged as auditor of financial
statements or as consultant on systems, and the two functions could not be
delivered at the same time. The reasons for this delineation may be subject to
considerable speculation. These may include the difficulty of complying with the
increasing requirements for financial statement disclosures and information; the
difficulty of increasing litigation; or controlling fees. The purpose of this paper
is not to reflect on these causes, but they might be the subject of additional
research.
SAP 54 stated, "The purpose of the auditor's study and evaluation of
internal control... is to establish a basis for reliance . . . in determining the
nature, extent and timing of audit tests to be applied in his examination of
financial statements." 20 It went on to indicate:
The study and evaluation made for this purpose frequently provide a
basis for constructive suggestions to clients concerning improvements
in internal control. . . . Although constructive suggestions to clients for
improvements in internal control incident to an audit engagement are
desirable, the scope of any additional study made to develop such21
suggestions is not covered by generally accepted auditing standards.
Thus the concept of the second standard embracing two primary purposes
as articulated in the Report and then redefined in SAP 33 as a by-product was
further reduced in SAP 54 as incidental and suggesting that a special
engagement should result for the study.
SAP 54 also undertook a discussion of how the evaluation mandated by the
second standard interfaced with other standards. The other standard which
was specifically considered was the third standard of fieldwork covering
evidential matter. It is interesting to observe that in the Tentative Statement,
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the framers of the second standard noted planning as significant, and as time
has passed, it has been interpreted that the study and evaluation of internal
control is significantly associated with the evidence standard. Thus, SAP 54
continued the narrowing of effort to thefirst purpose of the review suggested
by the Report and disregarded the second.

Statement on Auditing Standards 43—August 1982
In August 1982, the Auditing Standards Board issued SAS No. 43,
Omnibus Statement on Auditing Standards with a section entitled "The
Auditors Study and Evaluation of Internal Control." In SAS No. 43, the Board
clarifies its position on "the minimum study and evaluation of the system of
internal accounting control contemplated by the second standard of field work''
and "[t]he minimum documentation required." 22 In brief, if the auditor does
not plan to rely on the system, he need not document his understanding of the
system but only record his reasons for not reviewing. Thus, the most basic
sequence is a minimum understanding which need not be documented, but
requiring documentation as to the reasons why he did not extend his review
past the minimum level which was not documented. The thrust of SAS 43
represents, again, a significant reduction from the original adoption of the
standard which indicated that a systematic and clear record be made. In
addition, it appears to significantly diminish the second standard's application in
the audit process.

Conclusion
The second standard of fieldwork appears to have embodied a broader
concept of engagement of an auditor. This is evidenced in the Report where it
stated:
Determining the effectiveness of the organization plan, division of
responsibilities, and such special control procedures as budgetary
controls, reports, analyses, and cost systems are among the areas
which the public accountant should cover in his review. It is not
anticipated that the independent auditor will be able to review all the
control procedures within the course of any one audit. The review may
very well be so arranged as to entail complete coverage over a period of
several years. However, the review of those controls which relate
directly to 23
the accounting records should, if practicable, be conducted
each year.
The evolution of the interpretations of the second standard was to focus solely
upon the purpose of financial statement examination and substantially diminish
the purpose of communicating with management. While the profession in SAS
No. 20, Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control, did require communication of material weaknesses in internal
accounting control24 and evidence a continuing responsibility, it continues to
move in the direction of a secondary role of communication at best.
In the Studies in Accounting Research No. 6, a Statement of Basic Auditing
Concepts published by the American Accounting Association, the statement is
made:
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An information system is a necessary subject matter attribute because it
is needed to record assertions. Such a system provides a record of the
actions or events which is essential to the preparer of accounting
information and to the auditor for verification. The reliability of this
record is enhanced if it is generated within a system of adequate internal
controls. Without25such controls, the verifiability standard could be
tenuous, indeed.
In a later section, it is noted that "[t]he system of internal control (is) of
paramount importance to the auditor." 26 This is another articulation of the
significance of internal control to the audit process as well as the management
process.
In the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities Report, a conclusion is
reached that the, "Traditional association of independent auditors with annual
financial statements is an obsolete, limited concept." 27 This statement is made
in the context of expanding the responsibility of the audit function. The
Commission would "require the auditor to expand his study and evaluation of
the controls over the accounting system to form a conclusion on the functioning
of the internal control system." 28 Looking back to the Report, such an
admonition appears to be a call to return to basics. The formulation of the
auditing standards as originally stated seems to me to embody this requirement
and only the subsequent interpretations have undertaken to restrict its
application. While these restrictions may have arisen from events such as the
evolution of specialization in the profession and the impact of litigation as
alluded to previously, it still appears that this narrowing diminishes the
significance of the audit process and its relevancy to not only third parties, but
also the client who has engaged us.
The Statement on Auditing Standards No. 30 states that:
The study and evaluation of the system of internal accounting control in
an audit is generally more limited than that made in connection with an
engagement to express an opinion on the system of internal accounting
control. Nevertheless, an accountant's opinion on a system of internal
accounting control does not increase the reliability of financial statements that have been audited.29
Thefinancial statement report stands on its own at any given point in time.
However, as the time frame moves forward, the significance of internal control
is increased and management has the right to receive the considered opinion of
its auditors. The question of reporting to users other than management has
received considerable guidance, but it is independent of the responsibility of
reporting to management.
While the second standard of fieldwork gives guidance on the conduct of the
"current" audit of the financial statements, it also is giving guidance in
reporting to management so that "future" audits would be able to be
conducted. Thus, the second standard of fieldwork is necessary to the
articulation of our profession's judgment of this significance, and it should be
reemphasized in our professional statements and engagements.
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Discussant's Response to
"Is the Second Standard of Fieldwork
Necessary"
Andrew D. Bailey, Jr.
The Ohio State University

Introduction
Mr. Bintinger's paper is very interesting reading. The historical perspective it brings to the topic is a useful one and one often forgotten by many of us
who have a tendency to treat extant practice as if it has always been and ever
will be. I found the evolution suggested by this scenario intriguing. We seem to
have come nearly full circle in Mr. Bintinger's mind, beginning with a limited
view of the control system where audits were very much balance sheet
oriented, progressing to a broad business and management orientation to client
service and now to a narrower focus which Mr. Bintinger believes
..
diminishes the significance of the audit process and its relevancy to not only
third parties, but also the client who has engaged us." Mr. Bintinger's position
is that
[w]hile the second standard of fieldwork gives guidance in the conduct
of the 'current' audit of thefinancial statements, it also is giving
guidance to management so that 'future' audits would be able to be
conducted. Thus the second standard of fieldwork is necessary to the
articulation of our profession's judgment of this significance, and it
should be reemphasized in our professional statements and engagements.

The Policy Approach and Precedence
The approach taken in Mr. Bintinger's paper can be characterized as
historical or constitutional/precedence oriented [Danos, et al. 1986]. By this I
mean that the argumentflows by the development of the historical role of the
framers of the "constitutional" elements of the auditing standards related to
the study and evaluation of internal controls. This is quite clear in the statement
of objectives put forth by the author:
This paper will examine the evolution of the second standard as
interpreted in the auditing statements, and consider whether the intent
of the original authors has been changed in the context of providing
more precise guidance. . . . [T]he discussion developed herein is
primariy based upon the officially issued documents of the profession
itself.
If my interpretation of Mr. Bintinger's basis of argument is correct, Mr.
Bintinger's attitude towards the newly promulgated Statement on Standards
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for Attestation Engagements [AICPA, 1986] is of interest. While noting the
continuity of the standard setters focus on internal controls as a fundamental
aspect of the audit, Mr. Bintinger introduces comments on the newly adopted
Attestation Standards indicating that "[w]hile not entirely comparable, it is
interesting to observe in the Attestation Standards recently issued by the
Auditing Standards Board and the Accounting and Review Services Committee
that thefieldwork standards have been reduced to two by absorbing the internal
control concept to an element of the evidence standard." Mr. Bintinger is quite
correct in noting the lack of total comparability. This point is made in the
standard itself where it is stated that:
The second standard of fieldwork in GAAS is not included in the
attestation standards for a number of reasons. That standard calls for 'a
proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control as a basis for
reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant extent of the
tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted.' The most
important reason for not including this standard is that the second
standard of fieldwork of the attestation standards encompasses the
study and evaluation of internal controls because, when performed, it is
an element of accumulating sufficient evidence. A second reason is that
the concept of internal control may not be relevant for certain
assertions (for example, aspects of information about computer software) on which a practitioner may be engaged to report [AICPA, 1986,
pp. 24-25].
The anomaly in Mr. Bintinger's observation is that he ignores its position in
his historical argument. The issuers view "[t]he attestation standards [as] a
natural extension of the ten generally accepted auditing standards," and
indicate clearly that "[t]he attestation standards do not supersede any of the
existing standards . . . " [AICPA, 1986, p. 3]. As a natural extension of the
historical and/or constitutional/precedence process the attestation standards
should have the same weight as prior legislative action or amendment
processes. In that sense they reflect the nature of the constituent desires or
beliefs either as to the framers' original intent or their likely "intent" under
the new environmental conditions. To oppose this line is to suggest that Mr.
Bintinger intended not to call upon the historical process to support his
conclusion, but to call for a strict constitutional interpretation of a past position
as he sees it. Recall his comment as to ". . . whether the intent of the original
authors has been changed . . . in the context of providing more precise
guidance." This will leave Mr. Bintinger in the awkward position of having to
decide upon which past period to focus on, those with which he agrees or those
with which he does not agree. This is always the danger of a call for strict
constitutional interpretations where interpretations vary over time as they
seem to in this case. If he wants to use historic precedent to support his opinion,
he must, or for the sake of consistency should, accept the continuing evolution of
that precedent.

The Normative Service Approach
While generally taking what appears to be a strict constitutionalist approach, including citations suggesting theframers' original intent " . . . [using]
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words such as outstanding, primary, duty, one of the most important" in
describing the second standard of fieldwork, Mr. Bintinger also offers a more
normative service oriented argument as well. He clearly sees the profession's
responsibility to the client as running beyond the audit to a support and service
activity. He also perceives that during the audit activity one of the primary
means of meeting this client service function is through a broader interpretation
of field standard two than he perceives as currently in place or likely to be in
place given the trends evidenced by the newly promulgated Attestation
Standards.
The difficulty with this position is not in asserting a broader role, but in usin
the audit as a means of implementing that role. As Mr. Bintinger points out,
public accountingfirms have specialized by creating large and diverse consulting practices including substantial practices in tax consultation. The profession
clearly desires a broader business role than represented by auditing. The
question is not in the breadth of the role, but in the means of implementation.
By proposing that the second standard of fieldwork be retained to enhance that
role, Mr. Bintinger proposes to use audits as a feed to the other specialized
areas of consulting. Unless he can propose a criteria by which it is necessary to
adhere tofield standard two in order to perform a viablefinancial audit or attest
engagement, his proposal stands as a feeder line to consulting. Mr. Bintinger
did not provide such a justification in the body of his paper although his
conclusion does suggest that future auditability is conditional on the implementation of the secondfield standard.

Auditor Incentives
The feeder orientation noted above is implicit but not developed by Mr.
Bintinger except in several references to auditor incentives such as those that
follow. Midway through the paper Mr. Bintinger notes that:
[t]he reasons for this [separation of consulting on internal control from
the auditing function] delineation may be subject to considerable
speculation. These may include the difficulty of complying with the
increasing requirements for financial statement disclosures and information; the difficulty of increasing litigation; or controlling fees. The
purpose of this paper is not to reflect on these causes, but they might
be the subject of additional research.
Again in the conclusion he notes that:
. . . these restrictions may have arisen from events such as the
evolution of specialization in the profession and the impact of litigation as
alluded to previously, it still appears that this narrowing diminishes the
significance of the audit process and its relevancy to not only third
parties, but also the client who has engaged us.
I quite agree with Mr. Bintinger that the various forces that led to the
current evolution of attitudes toward internal control study and evaluation may
be the topic of future research. It is unfortunate that he did not focus on these
issues to a greater extent in that it may be among these ideas that a normative
justification for field standard two could be developed. The economics of
auditing and risk sharing may provide grounds for the second standard.
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It seems that Mr. Bintinger's motives are the laudatory ones of service to
clients and third parties. However, a less charitable interpretation might be that
his motives are for the stature and profitability of the profession to which he
belongs, i.e., his special interest group. After all, his argument for retention of
thefield standard is that the
. . narrowing diminishes the significance of the
audit process and its relevancy . . . " and thus by extension the stature and
likely future profitability of the profession and professionals. The only way to
counter this motivation observation, one rampant in the Dingle Commission
Hearings, is to offer arguments that support the conceptual need for the study
and evaluation of internal controls beyond the level implied or suggested by the
elimination of field standard two. Mr. Bintinger has offered no such arguments
in the body of his paper, although as noted earlier, his conclusion alludes to the
conditional nature of future auditability and the implementation of the second
standard of fieldwork. He clearly believes that this service is desirable to
clients and third party users.
If the service is desirable, presumably clients will pay for it when it is
offered as a distinct activity. Also, presumably, if the public accounting
profession is uniquely capable of offering the service at a higher value added
than other consulting organizations, then public accountants will get the work
and the stature and profitability of the profession will be maintained and
enhanced. Whetherfield standard two is maintained as a separate standard or
merged into the evidencefield standard will have little or no impact if this is the
case.

A Quality Control Argument
I was surprised that Mr. Bintinger did not offer up the quality control
argument as an additional reason for maintaining field standard two. This
argument would require some development of the position that a study and
evaluation is essential to the audit. However, he could basically rely on existing
pronouncements on this matter as none of them, including the new Attestation
Standards, explicitly argue the contrary. Given that the need for some level of
study and evaluation is established, it can be argued that without the explicit
standard some auditors will be tempted to ignore the study and evaluation of
internal controls even to the minimum required level. On this basis, guidance of
an explicit nature is necessary to maintain a minimal quality level throughout
the profession. This basic regulatory argument has been used successfully in
many arenas, including the auditing arena.

A Normative Argument
This argument proceeds from the position that any audit must consider
internal accounting controls, not as a feed to other service oriented matters but
as a necessary condition for efficient and effective audits. I believe this to be
the case in any complex organization where the computer is an integral part of
the system and have elaborated on this point elsewhere [Bailey, et.al., 1984].
Mr. Bintinger does not develop this argument in the paper but does include it in
his conclusion. Perhaps he has also developed this point elsewhere.
However, the fact that internal controls need consideration does not mean
that the external auditor requires a specific field standard such as that under
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discussion. A collapsing of this standard into the general evidential standard will
in no way alter the need to consider internal controls. The consideration may be
tailored to the needs of the particular audit and could involve only a very limited
auditor effort in small companies or where an independent and effective internal
audit function exists and can be relied upon. Much more extensive special
consideration by the external auditor may be required under other circumstances. I do believe that, whatever the extent of consideration, the external
auditor's role should proceed no further than necessary for audit purposes
unless specifically contracted.

Conclusion
I believe that auditor involvement in the design of systems is essential to
system auditability. The design for auditability function can be done by external
consultants who might be a part of a public accounting firm, however, the
economics of the situation alone is likely to be sufficient to cause this activity to
become a part of the internal audit function in largerfirms. Further, the testing
of systems for compliance and reliability is necessary if these systems are to be
relied upon in establishing the nature, extent and timing of substantive audit
tests. Reliance on such systems becomes a more important part of the audit as
systems become larger and more complex, e.g., in large organizations with
highly integrated computer processing systems. Again, I believe that the
economics of auditing will cause much of the testing on such systems to be
done by internal auditors.
Despite the increasing role of the internal auditor, the external auditor's
role will also expand in these areas and in the use of computers to support audit
activity. External auditors will continue to develop design and testing criteria as
well as searching for effective means of reliance on the work of internal
auditors. I cannot foresee how this relationship will develop in such areas as
risk sharing and litigation, but I believe that these matters will receive
substantial attention in the near future.
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Interim Report on the Development of an Expert
System for the Auditor's Loan Loss Evaluation
Kirk P. Kelly
Gary S. Ribar
John J. Willingham
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

Introduction
The Audit Research Group at Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. has been
interested in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Expert Systems for a number of
years. Under the auspices of the Research Opportunities in Auditing program,
we have funded a number of academic research projects on the application of AI
to the audit task. With the growing interest in thefield and the advances in
technology, it was decided to undertake a project oriented toward the
development of an application model. The initial thrust was to build a prototype
model for test and evaluation with the implicit intent that the model would
eventually be developed into a useful audit tool for field work. This paper
reports on that project in terms of the rationale for the project, the current
status of the project, and the future directions for this project.

Rationale for Expert Systems
The rapid advances in computer technology and ensuing applications
require that those engaged in the accounting and auditing profession be
involved in exploring new application opportunities. Artificial intelligence and
expert systems are clearly in the forefront of these technologies; however the
conventional wisdom of expert system developers suggests that considered
applications ought to be limited to environments that exhibit certain characteristics. For example, it is suggested that there should be clearly definable
experts in the problem task, that there should be appropriate measures of
correct vs incorrect judgments, and problems should be small yet have a high
payoff.
The auditing environment has some unique characteristics that tend to
make it a less likely candidate for successful deployment of expert systems.
For example, many areas of auditing do not have a feedback mechanism that
allows for determination of correct vs incorrect decisions. Auditing is more
process oriented than results oriented, wherein the quality of work is judged
not by results, but by traces of process to be found in the work papers.
Moreover, auditors learn acceptance of processes that may diverge signifi167

cantly from their own as long as they "appear reasonable.'' A side effect of this
is that we do not have a set of clearly defined "experts" whose technical skills
find "material errors" in an audit with a significantly higher frequency than
other auditors.
While these factors may mitigate against using expert systems, we do not
believe they are fatal. The issue surrounding the feedback and correctness of
judgments in the audit environment is, we believe, a knowledge representation
issue that will clarify itself through the knowledge engineering tasks. We also
believe that there is expertise, albeit spread out, and that the professed need
for a singular expert is a knowledge engineering problem that can and will be
addressed pragmatically as the art of knowledge engineering advances.
We believe that AI technology offers the following significant benefits:
1) Support of Field Work: There are any number of applications for the AI
technology that, when harnessed, can be used as tools in the support of
auditing field work, thereby freeing the auditor from many of the more
mundane tasks and making the work of the auditor significantly more interesting. At the same time, the technology can lead to a greater consistency in the
quality of field work, and hopefully reduce the time requirements for the field
work.
2) Diffusion of knowledge: The complexity of modern auditing, as dictated
by the complexity of modern business, leads to areas of audit specialization.
Expertise relates to certain industries, such as banking or oil and gas, and
across industries as in EDP auditing. Even within industries, there are pockets
of expertise, e.g., in the banking industry there are those who are expert in
auditing community banks, moderate size banks and the extremely large banks.
Additionally, many banks themselves perform in specialized industries, e.g.,
agricultural banks, oil and gas, etc. The data or information available in these
varying circumstances require varying types of expertise. It is very difficult if
not impossible for one auditor to be an expert in all these areas. By capturing
the expertise in specialized areas, however, we can provide knowledge where
the expert is not available.
3) Uniformity of documentation: Through the proper design of an expert
system, the required documentation to support a given judgment can be
automatically provided as the output of the judgment exercise and included in
the working papers of the audit. The expert system not only provides
uniformity of documentation, but also frees the auditor from another time
consuming and costly chore.
4) Staff Training Aids: Training is an extremely costly investment in a
large public accountingfirm. Technological advances are providing the potential
vehicles for both increasing the effectiveness of training while concurrently
reducing the huge costs involved.
5) Research: We should not forget the role of research in the design of
expert systems. Designing expert systems is research oriented, in that
problems chosen are seldom well enough understood to be solved algorithmically. The knowledge engineering process can and should lead us to a
greater understanding of the problems, thereby advancing our knowledge.
Based on the above reasoning, a decision was made to embark on the
development of an expert system that would at once provide insights into the
development process, provide knowledge about resource requirements, and
produce a useful audit tool.
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Selecting a Project
Since the project to be developed had multiple objectives, it was agreed
that the project should be of a very limited scope and nature, yet have the
potential for a very high payoff. Additionally, since we were not overly
committed to the expert system technology, we wanted to attempt the
development at a minimal investment. The decision was therefore made to
develop the model in a microcomputer environment using commercially
available development shells.
Hoping for the potentially high payoff, we wanted to focus on a problem that
was meaningful to our firm's audit practice and yet might be successful given
the constraints we were imposing. Since bank audits are a large part of our
audit practice, it was decided to focus on a problem in that area. We found that
there was significant support from bank audit partners in the form of
enthusiasm and willingness to invest expert bank auditors' time and cooperation. This was considered important, since we knew the development work
would require a considerable amount of time and effort from bank experts at no
small cost.
The next issue was to settle on a specific problem. We were guided by two
considerations: 1) the problem had to be small enough to accomplish within a
reasonable time, and 2) it had to be sufficiently important within the context of a
bank audit. An area of bank audits that filled both of these requirements was the
loan loss evaluation, the process of estimating the dollar amount of the reserve
for the bank's portfolio of loans. This problem is basically a classification
problem, which is a type of problem that has been successfully attacked by rule
based systems before. (Most commercially available development tools for
microcomputers are rule based.)

Project Description
Since we did not have an in-house AI capability for the development of such
a system, we contracted the project to an outside consultant. The consultant's
project proposal suggested the following stages of development:
1) Review current literature.
2) Develop a preliminary model of the loan loss evaluation process.
3) Implement the preliminary model as a computer program.
4) Extend knowledge acquisition to include the process of expert loan
evaluation.
5) Combine knowledge into a final task expertise model and complete
prototype expert system.
The proposal initially indicated that the above stages would require nine months
to complete, employing one full-time consultant with the availability of audit
experts in the loan loss evaluation task. To date we are somewhere in the
fourth stage. What follows is a description of our model and how the system
works.

Description of Model
For ease of reference, we have named the model CFILE, for credit file
analysis. The current working model is based on the conceptual model shown in
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Figure 1. The model is modularized and illustrates the various factors
considered when making the reserve judgment. The first column of factors to
the left of the reserve conclusions are 'level one subgoals' and the second
column of factors are 'level two subgoals' which affect the level one subgoals.
For example, the conclusion on the current financial condition of the borrower
is based on conclusions concerning the borrower's short term liquidity, finanical
risk, and business risk. These judgments are reached internally by the model
with the exception of the industry profitability and volatility, which temporarily
are user inputs.
The consideration underlying the control structure of CFILE is efficiency.
Efficiency is often considered one of the hallmarks of the expert. Like an
expert, the model is designed to arrive at a conclusion as soon as possible with
the minimum amount of information.
A session with CFILE begins with screens explaining the purpose of
CFILE and what it will do. Immediately following this explanation, the user is
asked for some basic information about the loan including its size, due date, and
what kind of collateral and/or guarantees exist relating to the loan.
What CFILE asks next depends on the answers to the initial questions. If,
for example, it is indicated that there are bank deposits pledged as collateral,
CFILE will ask a series of questions about those bank deposits. These include
questions about both access andfinancial strength, which are the two 'level two
subgoals' relating to collateral. CFILE will want to know whether or not the
bank has the legal right to dispose of the collateral in the event of a default. It
Figure 1
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might also ask if those bank deposits were pledged as security for another loan.
If the model concludes that there is adequate access to those deposits and their
strength is sufficient to cover the loan, the analysis would stop with a noreserve decision.
If the bank deposits were not sufficient, the model would start dealing with
the three 'level one subgoals' that are needed to perform an analysis on an
unsecured loan: current financial condition, overall loan history, and expected
net cashflow. The model would ask the usual questions about hard data such as
the current ratio of the borrower and would also ask about soft information,
such as whether or not the borrower is planning any major projects that are
going to befinanced through the use of current assets. Again, how many of
these subgoals would be pursued and to what extent would depend on the
situation. For example, if the loan were due in the next 12 months and the
borrower had a very strong current financial condition, no reserve would be
necessary and the system would conclude without asking any questions about
loan history or expected cash flow.
The system has some other interesting features. In general the questions
are asked in abbreviated form. This is useful for the experienced user who will
be familiar with the system. For example, the question about major projects
alluded to above would appear as illustrated in Figure 2. However, help screens
are available to provide more details and guidance to understand the question.
The help screen for the same question as shown previously appears in Figure
3.
Another feature of the system is the ability to do limited sensitivity analysis.
It is possible for the user to see how sensitive the conclusion is to a particular
question. For example, one might be interested in determining the impact of
the loan officer's opinion of the borrower's liquidity (see Figure 4), given an
otherwise constant set of input judgments.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the conclusion reports provided by the model.
Both conclusions came from identical information except for the response to
the question noted in Figure 4. One can see that, in this case, the answer to the
question had a fairly substantial impact. There is a difference in the evaluation
of currentfinancial condition which leads to different conclusions. In one case,
wefind an evaluation of the current financial condition of the borrower as weak
and a conclusion of a 25 to 34 percent reserve before considering collateral. In
Figure 2
PMM—CFILE Preliminary version 2.02 November 25, 1985
Select what describes:
current assets used for new commitments
MMM

no
yes

2 UNKNOWN 3 REPORT 4 EXPAND 5 MENU 6 HELP
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Figure 3

PMM—CFILE
Based on your judgment, is there a significant chance the borrower will use a
substantial amount (i.e., at least 25 percent) of current cash, accounts
receivable and marketable securities or incur a significant amount of new short
term liabilities for commitments tofinance a major new project?
A major new project could be an acquisition, stock repurchase, an expanded
advertising campaign or plant expansion program. A yes response would also
be appropriate here if the borrower is involved in a continuing problem situation
(e.g., a legal dispute) such that it is possible (FASB #5) that a new significant
liability will emerge for the borrower.
enter no

if any new commitments will not use significant current assets or
generate significant new current liabilities.

enter yes if new commitments will use significant current assets or generate
significant new current liabilities.
2 RESTART

5 GO BACK 6 HELP 7 EXIT
Figure 4
PMM—CFILE

Based on your judgment, if a set of financial statements were to be generated
as of today, do the comments provided by the loan officer suggest to you that
the loan officer, based on his/her knowledge of the borrower's current financial
condition, believes the borrower is in a strong, moderate or weak short term
liquidity condition?
enter
strong

if the loan officer believes the short term liquidity condition of the
borrower is strong

moderate if the loan officer believes the short term liquidity condition of the
borrower is moderate
weak
if the loan officer believes the short term liquidity condition of the
borrower is weak
2 RESTART

5 GO BACK 6 HELP
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7 EXIT

Figure

PMM-CFILE Conclusions
Client Name:
Audit Period:

ABC BankCorp
12-31-85

Borrower:

XYZ Company

Analysis prepared by Joe Auditor on 12-1-85
Extent of available information is adequate.
Based on the available information, the following factors are indicated:
Industry prospects: expected profitability = moderate.
expected profit volatility = high.
Intermediate conclusions (scaled from very weak to very strong):
Currentfinancial condition is weak.
Future cashflow potential is weak.
Borrower's past loan performance is moderate.
The amount of the loan is $150,000.
The loan is covered by bank deposits having an accessible value of $100,000.
Of this, $90,000 is considered available to cover the loan.
No guarantee is available for this loan.
A reserve of 25 to 34 percent of the loan would appear appropriate, if it were
unsecured. After considering the collateral available, no reserve would appear
to be required.
I agree with the conclusion suggested by the system and the underlying
reasoning.
preparer.
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Figure

PMM—CFILE Conclusions
Client Name:
Audit Period:

ABC BankCorp
12-31-85

Borrower:

XYZ Company

Analysis prepared by Joe Auditor on 12-1-85
Extent of available information is adequate.
Based on the available information, the following factors are indicated:
Industry prospects: expected profitability = moderate.
expected profit volatility = high.
Intermediate conclusions (scaledfrom very weak to very strong):
Current financial condition is moderate.
Future cashflow potential is weak.
Borrower's past loan performance is moderate.
The amount of the loan is $150,000.
The loan is covered by bank deposits having an accessible value of $100,000.
Of this, $90,000 is considered available to cover the loan.
No guarantee is available for this loan.
No reserve appears to be required.
I agree with the conclusion suggested by the system and the underlying
reasoning.
preparer.
the other we find a moderate evaluation leading to a no-reserve conclusion even
before the collateral is considered.
This facility is useful to both user and developer. It gives the user, who is
uncertain about the appropriate response, the ability to see the impact of
alternatives without repeating a lot of data entry. It gives the developer a tool
for testing the reasonableness of the rules in the system.
Perhaps the most important feature in this system is the user's ability to
find out why a question is being asked. Through function key, one can look at
the rule that has caused a specific question to be asked, and in turn ask about
that rule. Figure 7 illustrates the screen that would appear asking about the loan
officer's view of the borrower's liquidity. In this way it is always possible for the
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Figure

PMM—CFILE Preliminary version 2.02 November 25, 1985
The highlightedfields indicate the antecedent
and conclusion being pursued.
The rule currently being pursued is:
RULE 3850
IF
MMM quick ratio is (are) weak
AND current ratio is (are) moderate
AND current ratio trend is (are) decreasing
AND loan officer liquidity judgment is (are) strong
THEN
stliquid is (are) very strong CF 0
AND stliquid is (are) strong CF 0
AND stliquid is (are) moderate CF 100
AND stliquid is (are) weak CF 0
AND stliquid is (are) very weak CF 0
2 ALL RULE 3 OR CLASS 4 FORWARD
5 GO BACK 6 HELP 7 EXIT
user to understand the line of reasoning that the system is using. This not only
allows the user to understand the basis for the conclusion the system reached
but facilitates review and avoids the blanket acceptance or rejection that is
common with algorithmic systems. The model becomes a transparent box
which is essential to the audit review process and it places the user in a position
to be able to make constructive criticism, which may aid in further system
development.

Limitations of Current Model
The current model has limited capabilities that have resulted from design
decisions intended to keep the project manageable. CFILE applies only to loans
due on demand or within one year and are either unsecured or secured by bank
deposits or marketable securities. The model requires two years of audited
financial information or three years of unauditedfinancial information from the
borrower and is limited in its ability to perform and integrate cashflow analysis
into its decision process. The model is further limited by its inability to deal
with situations involving bankruptcy and liquidation analysis.
These limitations resultedfrom design decisions made early in the project
and compose a major portion of the work yet to be performed. Again, our intent
was to build a working prototype model that we hoped would be easily
expanded to cover situations through the addition of modules to the knowledge
base. It is envisioned that the prototype will then be of assistance in future
knowledge engineering work.
With the prototype model working, it was decided that we should test the
system against the modeled 'expert' to determine how well we captured the
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experts' decision model. Afield test of CFILE was carried out in late February
and early March of 1986.

Field Test of CFILE
For a number of reasons dealing with logistics, time constraints and
purpose, thefield test was not set up as an experimental design but rather as a
pilot test to determine if we were on the right path with our model. It provided
the opportunity to deal with actual loanfiles in bank audit environments and to
compare how different auditors performed the tasks in process as well as
judgment.
The testing was carried out at four of our client banks. Two of the banks are
large regional banks and the other two are smaller community banks. A total of
16 cases were chosen eitherfrom client's listings of unsecured loans or with
the assistance of the local audit team. First priority was given to loans which
had a reserve allocated to them either by the audit team or by the bank's
internal loan review department.
Each case was reviewed by three subjects, two at the partner level and one
at the senior accountant level. The partners chosen werefrom our bank audit
practice. One of the partners was the 'expert' employed in the development of
the model. The other partner had only a cursory understanding of the model.
The senior accountant had neither bank audit experience nor knowledge of the
model to be tested. Our intent here was to see how much the model might
assist the novice in thefield and the senior accountant level is the appropriate
level for performing this task during an actual audit.
Cases were reviewedfirst without the use of the model and then with the
use of the model by each of the three people. Unfortunately, one of our partner
subjects, the 'expert', was unable to participate at the first bank setting due to
illness and therefore only evaluated ten of the 16 cases.
The results of the test are summarized in Figure 8. By way of explanation,
CFILE uses nine reserve classifications expressed in percentage: no reserve,
1 to 10, 11 to 15, 16 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 59, 60 to 74, and 75 to 100
percent. All analyses of the data were made using these ranges. If the reserve
suggested by the subject fell into the same range or on the border, the
comparison was marked OK. If the reserves fell in different ranges, the
number of ranges by which they are different is noted. Starred entries indicate
that one party suggested a reserve and the others did not. In addition the cases
were analyzed for a comparison of the reserve vs. no reserve decision.
Comparisons were made between individual judgments with and without
the use of the model. This comparison allowed us to consider how closely the
unaided partner's judgments agreed on the same loan and how closely the nonexpert's judgment agreed with the partners. Additional comparisons were
made between the partner's judgments without the model and between the
senior's judgments with and without the model in order to determine if the
system was moving the non-expert judgment closer to the partner judgment.
The loans were also analyzed according to whether no reserve or some
reserve was required without respect to the reserve amount in order to test
how the model did on the reserve vs. no reserve decision.
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CFILETEST RESULTS

Figure 8
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Summary of Results
The following table summarizes the results of the individuals' judgments
compared to the model's judgments when the model is used by that individual.
All Cases
Res vs. No Res
Reserve Cases
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
Expert partner 90%
10%
90%
10%
100%
0%
Second partner 69%
31%
81%
19%
33%
67%
Senior
62%
38%
88%
12%
20%
80%
In terms of the test's first objective, i.e., determining whether the system
is consistent with the judgments of the designated expert, the results are very
positive. On ten loans, the model's judgment is consistent with the expert
partner's judgment nine times. Reserve vs. no reserve decisions were
consistent in 90 percent or nine out of ten loans. In three cases where the
expert and the model both suggested a reserve, the reserve amounts are in
agreement. On the one disagreement, the model suggested a reserve of 11-15
percent while the partner suggested no reserve. We interpret these results as
very positive and we intend to expand the scope of the model to produce a
significant audit tool.
The second partner's percentages do not look quite so good in terms of
agreement with the model. The second partner evaluated 16 loans and agreed
with the model 11 times while disagreeing on five of those loans. These results
become much more positive, however, when viewed in relation to other data.
First of all, the percentages improve when looking at the agreement between a
reserve vs no-reserve judgment. Here the model disagreed on only three
loans. If we then scrutinize the degree of disagreements we note the model
was never more than two classifications away from the second partner.
In attempting to explain the disagreement we note that the two partners'
judgments, independent of the model, agree in nine of ten or 90 percent of the
cases, (with only one classification separating them on the one disagreement).
Since the use of the model is the only variable, and we know that the model is
constant when given the same inputs, we hypothesize that the problem is not in
the model itself, but in the user/model interface. We explain this as follows.
The expert partner, who was instrumental in the design of the model, fully
understands the questions and the impact of the responses on the model since
he essentially wrote the questions. The other users of the system only had the
cryptic wording of the questions and the help screens to indicate what the
questions intended to ask. To support this hypothesis, we looked at the
model's consistency of performance across users. We have 42 runs of the
model which consisted of running ten cases three times, once by each subject
and six cases two times by the subjects which we designate as partner-2 and
senior. This provides us with 36 two-way comparisons. Of these 36, 20 runs
involving ten of the 16 cases had complete three-way agreement. All of these
agreed on zero reserve. In the additional 16 comparisons, involving only six of
the cases, the consistency of the model was significantly different, agreeing
with itself only five times or 31 percent of the time when a reserve is indicated.
Based on this it appears that the model performs well on the easy cases that
require no reserve, but struggles when the case becomes more difficult and
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where more user judgment comes into play. While one reason for the
degradation may be the user interface, we also suspect that the depth of the
knowledge base may be inappropriate, thereby requiring too much user
judgment in interpreting what the model is asking for. If the model were
sufficiently robust to deal with facts rather than user judgments about, for
example, the strength of the current ratio, we would expect that a good deal of
the inconsistency would disappear. Yet another cause may be the attempt to be
too specific about the amount of the reserve. In attempting to specify the
ranges, it is possible that we have overrefined by attempting to be more
specific than the experts themselves. While this may be a cause, we tend to
discount it somewhat since there was no definable pattern to the disagreements
between the model and the users. The model was not consistently higher or
lower nor off by one or two classifications. The differences appeared to be
more random, leading us to believe that the shallowness of the model's
knowledge coupled with the user/model interface are the major problems.
We could apply the same analysis to the figures associated with the senior
subject performing the task; however, in this case, we are not primarily
interested in whether the model agreed with the senior. Since one of the
objectives of the model is to improve the inexperienced decision maker's ability
to emulate the partner decision, the more important data deal with how the
senior's judgment independent of the model compared to the partners'
judgment independent of the model, and then how the model altered the
senior's judgment in relation to the partners'.
The data indicate that the senior's unaided judgments agreed with the
partners' unaided judgments in only 69 percent of the cases. This, of course, is
expected based on experience and knowledge of the senior. Ideally, when using
the model, the senior's judgments should be closer to the partners' decisions.
The data show that the model did alter the senior's decision in four of the
cases; however, the model moved toward the partners' decision on only two
loans and moved further away from the partners' decisions on the other two
loans. While these results are inconclusive, we again hypothesize that the
interface or communication problem cited above is the major culprit. In any
event, negative conclusions should not be drawn on the basis of this test.
Further testing with improved user interface will provide more insight in this
matter.

Summary of Field Test Results
Based on the results obtained from the field test, we conclude that the
model performs very well within the stated limitations of the design and when
used by the expert who was involved in the design of the model. We must also
conclude that the model performs less well in the hands of others.
This problem can be thought of as an interface or communication problem
that may be very simple to rectify, or may require a considerable amount of
effort. The solution lies in determining how to structure the questions in such a
manner that, given a specific loan, user responses to the model's questions will
be consistent. To obtain the solution, existing questions may need to be
restructured and/or users may need more training in the use of the model. A
179

third and more time consuming solution is to enhance the model's knowledge
base to a depth that allows the model to work from more basic information.

Additional Insights from Field Testing
Through observation and recording verbalized protocols of certain cases,
we were able to gather additional knowledge that a) lends more support to our
hypotheses above and b) provides a focus for the immediate development work
that is required. Since the analysis of the protocols is not yet complete, we will
informally discuss these in the following paragraphs.
We are pleasantly surprised infinding that our bank partner's unaided
judgments agreed in nine of ten loans and disagreed by only one reserve
classification on the tenth. We are fortunate that this one case is included in the
six cases for which we have protocols, and these protocols provide a plausible
explanation for the partner's disagreement.
The second partner made reference in the protocol to having just recently
read an article in a leading business journal concerning the borrower's history
of problems, actions taken, and forecast for their survival. (In a later discussion
we found he had read the article on the airplane in route to the lending bank's
city.) The expert partner made no such reference to any additional outside
information. The article provided an optimistic outlook for the company's ability
to turn its problems around and survive in its market. While both partners
recommended a rather high reserve (75 and 50 percent), the second partner
was lower, perhaps indicating the impact of the article on the amount of his
reserve judgment. This would indicate the need for the model to account for
more soft data in greater detail than currently available. This is further
supported in other parts of the various transcripts.
While we have not yet completed our analysis of the protocols, they appear
to provide clear evidence of a significant weighting differential based on two
primary characteristics of data: the recency of the data in relation to the date of
evaluation, and the independence of the source of the information. While this is
not terribly surprising, it is surprising in that the degree of change in the
weighting appears to be significant. While we have not yet drawn any
conclusion, it appears at this point that the model will have to account for these
information characteristics.
Another fact that is becoming increasingly evident is the need for the model
to deal with cash flow. It was originally thought that cashflow projections would
not be a significant factor until we expanded the scope of the model to longer
time horizons. Our protocols clearly indicate otherwise. In fact, as soon as a
loan is considered to be a candidate for a reserve, the cashflow model comes
into play. Furthermore, as the loans become increasingly suspect, there is a
point when the partners change to a liquidation model, attempting to determine
how much the bank may salvage from a liquidation and/or bankruptcy
proceeding. These are important considerations even within our limited scope
model.

Conclusions
We are basically pleased with the results of ourfield test not only because
they indicate the model provides results consistent with the expert, but also
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because we believe that the model will provide significant assistance to the
senior in thefield. While we are aware that in the longer term the model's
knowledge base must be expanded depthwise, we also believe that many of the
user/model communication problems can be rectified through a restructuring of
questions and help screens, as well as training of the intended users.
Our intention is to pursue the development of this model in three
directions: a) to improve the interface to the point we can release the model to
the bank practice personnel for more extensivefield tests, b) to improve the
model's current scope by increasing the depth of its knowledge and provide the
ability to deal with the cash flow and liquidation requirements, and c) to begin
expanding the scope of the model to handle other types of security and time
horizons.
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Discussant's Response to
"Interim Report on the Development
of An Expert System for the
Auditor's Loan Loss Evaluation"
William F. Messier, Jr.
University of Florida
It is a pleasure for me to comment on the paper by Kelly, Ribar and
Willingham. As someone who has spent a major part of the lastfive years in
expert systems research, it is good to see this technology begin to impact audit
practice. I will make one caveat before I proceed. There are times in my
discussion where I raise questions about or criticize this work. In those
instances, please recognize that I am fully cognizant of the difficulties of doing
this type of research and, more importantly, sympathetic with those difficulties.
Before discussing the specifics of the paper, I would like to make a few
overall comments on this work. The research by Kelly, et al. is noteworthy for
three reasons. First, it demonstrates the application of expert systems
technology to an important audit problem, the assessment of loan loss
reserves. Application of this technology to auditing is important because public
accounting firms are facing a more competitive environment that will require
audits to be conducted with the same level of effectiveness but with increased
efficiency. Relatedly, the types of decisions auditors face today are more
complex (e.g., EDP auditing) and require more expertise. Expert systems are
intended to assist with such complex decisions.
Second, since this is a proprietary system, it is especially noteworthy that
Peat Marwick is willing to share the details of the system with academics and
practitioners. Until recently, many public accounting firms were unwilling to
share these types of developments with the public. I make a point of this
because I believe that it is important to our profession to disseminate research
and that it should be a two-way street.
Finally, this paper shows that public accounting firms are willing and able to
build expert systems. This realization was also brought home to me at the
recent expert systems conference at the University of Southern California
where Coopers & Lybrand demonstrated an expert system for deferred taxes
[Shpilberg and Graham, 1986]. For that project, Coopers & Lybrand hired a
full-time computer scientist to assist in developing their system. By bringing
their enormous resources to bear on the problem, they were able to construct
the system in approximately a year. Peat Marwick has been able to do a similar
sort of thing with CFILE. In spite of the generous support from Peat
Marwick's Research Opportunities in Auditing grants, most academics who are
developing expert systems have faced much longer development times. This
raises a question about whether academics any longer have a competitive
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advantage in developing these systems or whether some type of joint
collaboration is necessary. If the second alternative is the most appropriate,
then academics have to ask themselves whether this work is research or
consulting. My thoughts on this question are that as long as sound research
issues are addressed and no limitations are placed on the dissemination of those
results, the work qualifies as research.
My specific comments on the paper will center on three topics: the
rationale for expert systems, the CFILE model, and thefield testing.

Rationale for Expert Systems
Successful development of expert systems requires that certain characteristics be present in the problem domain. These include acknowledged experts,
an ability to extract their knowledge, some measure of the correctness of the
decision, and manageable problems with high payoffs. Kelly, et al. properly
point out that auditing does not have all of these characteristics. For example,
in auditing it is very difficult to state specific criteria by which to label someone
an expert. This is unlike domains such as chess or certain specialities in
medicine. Thus, there is some difficulty with identifying an expert(s) to assist in
designing a particular system. This is further compounded by the fact that
auditing is "process oriented" and two experts may solve the problem
differently. Hansen and I [Hansen and Messier, 1986a, b] have encountered
some of these problems in developing and testing EDP-XPERT.
In addition, the ability to extract the necessary knowledge from the expert
is perhaps the most difficult and time consuming part of constructing an expert
system. Given that in auditing we have difficulty identifying an expert and the
fact that two experts may solve the problem in different ways, knowledge
acquisition poses a major hurdle for constructing expert systems.
Finally, the fact that many audit judgments do not have outcome feedback
about the correctness of the decision is an important characteristic for expert
system development in auditing. Kelly, et al. argue that this is "a knowledge
representation issue that will clarify itself through knowledge engineering
tasks." I am not convinced that this is true in all instances. In the loan loss
reserve situation, the auditor will get feedback (not immediately, of course)
about the collectibility of this short term loan. This situation is probably not true
for areas such as the reliability of internal controls (manual or EDP), evaluation
of inherent risk, analytical review, or similar areas where expert systems are
currently being developed. The absence of a true criterion value by which to
evaluate the goodness of the expert system's decision poses the greatest
difficulty in validating expert systems in auditing. Note that in validating CFILE,
the system's judgments were compared against the expert or the user's
unaided judgment rather than against the true outcome of the loan.
The comments just made should not be interpreted as an indictment of the
use of expert systems in auditing. They are intended to point out that
construction of an expert system is not an easy task. Individuals andfirms who
decide to build such systems must recognize that this process is long and costly
in terms of both time and money1. However, I agree with Kelly, et al. that
expert systems technology does offer some significant benefits for public
accounting firms.
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In that vein, I would like to discuss the benefits that Kelly, et al. believe will
result from the application of expert systems. They suggest five potential
benefits: support of field work, diffusion of knowledge, uniformity of documentation, staff training aids, and research. I will limit my comments to diffusion of
knowledge and research.
Expertise in any discipline is usually a scarce commodity. The complexity of
auditing today requires individuals within firms to develop expertise in specific
areas. Kelly, et al. mention this in the area of banking. Most of my expert
systems research has involved the work of computer audit specialists. I am
sure we could identify a long list of audit areas where experts exist, and I am
fairly certain that future development in auditing will only increase this trend.
My point here is that perhaps the greatest potential benefit of expert systems
is the ability to provide the expert's knowledge to novices. In auditing, most of
the expert's knowledge is not textbook knowledge. Most of it is experiential
knowledge accumulated over many years. If firms are able to capture this type
of knowledge and make it available throughout the firm, there may be cost
savings and improvements in audit effectiveness and efficiency.
Kelly, et al. underplay the role of research in designing expert systems. As
they point out, the problems chosen for expert systems development are
generally not well understood and the knowledge engineering process can
contribute to our understanding. My experiences indicate that the process of
developing the knowledge base can provide a major contribution to our
understanding of the specific problem and auditor decision-making in general.
For example, a number of audit researchers have used a Bayesian formulation
for modeling auditor judgment. However, two recent studies by Biggs,
Messier and Hansen [1987] and Biggs, Mock and Watkins [1986] that were
conducted to develop a knowledge base for expert systems seem to indicate
that expert auditors do not follow a Bayesian revision process. Instead they
seem to use "reasoned assumptions" and "analogies" to arrive at decisions.
Thisfinding not only has implications for modeling auditor judgment but also the
type of model used in the inference engines of expert systems. So from a
research perspective, I think that construction of an expert system for a
complex problem will contribute immensely to our understanding.

The CFILE Model
The section of the paper which describes the CFILE model leaves a
number of important questions unanswered. For example, what expert system
shell was used to develop CFILE? On what basis was this shell chosen? What
type of evidence accumulation model is contained in the inference engine? Is
this evidence accumulation model appropriate for auditing? How many rules are
contained in the system? Additionally, there is little discussion of how the
knowledge was captured from the expert.
The answers to these questions would be helpful to our understanding of
the system. For example, the answer to the question concerning the type of
model used in the inference engine. It is not clear in the expert systems
literature [Gordon and Shortliffe, 1985; Shafer and Srivastava, 1986] which
type of model should be used to accumulate evidence in problem domains
where some degree of uncertainty exists. Information about the model would
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provide insight into the reliability of the system's reasoning process. Based on
the presence of "CF'' factors in the rule shown in Figure 7, I can speculate that
the inference engine contains some type of Bayesian process. This is exactly
the model that has come under recent criticism in the expert systems
literature. However, I am sympathetic with the authors. When expert system
developers decide to use an expert system shell, their choice of models is
severely limited.
Similarly, if we knew how many rules were present in the current prototype
we would have an idea about the number of questions the system asks the user.
This question is important because if the system contains a large number of
rules there is always some question concerning the consistency of the rule
base. The rule contained in Figure 7 is numbered 3850. I am quite certain that
the system does not contain that many rules. Obviously, there is some
numbering convention within the system. However, a close examination of the
rule contained in Figure 7 would suggest that the system does contain a large
number of rules. Rule 3850 contains four antecendent conditions and there
appears to be five possible categories (e.g., very strong, strong, etc.) for each
antecedent. This would suggest that there are 625 possible combinations of this
rule.
The system does appear to have some important capabilities. The questions posed by the system are asked in an abbreviated form for users familiar
with the system. The less experienced user is assisted by help screens which
provide more information on the question. This feature should improve usage
of the system. It should also increase consensus in the way the questions are
answered since there will be less chance that two users will misinterpret the
question and respond differently even though the circumstances are similar.
Two other features appear quite interesting. The ability to do limited
sensitivity analysis should prove very useful. Since expert systems are
intended to support rather than replace experts, the ability to do this type of
analysis should lead to improvements in decision making. I also found the final
report generated by CFILE to be very comprehensive. The report not only
contains the conclusions about the reserve but it also contains important
information on the variables that led to that conclusion. Thus, the report can be
used for audit documentation.
I am a little disappointed with the system's explanation capability. Early
research demonstrated that experts were interested not only in a system's
conclusion but how the system arrived at the conclusion. I suspect that expert
auditors will require a similar capability.2 CFILE's ability to respond to why a
question is asked is typical of most expert system shells. The response is a
limited parse (see Figure 7) of the rule that led to the question. It would be
more helpful to the user if the system could provide an explanation in a more
user-friendly manner.

Field Test of CFILE
As I mentioned earlier, the validation of expert systems in auditing will
represent one of the major challenges for implementation of such systems.
Before expert systems will be adopted for use in thefield, public accounting
firms will have to be sure of the system's reliability (i.e., ability to yield a
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correct answer a high percentage of the time). The difficulties with validating
expert systems were alluded to earlier. In many auditing areas, the outcome to
a particular problem is not immediately known with certainty or may not be
known for some time in the future (usually after the audit report has been
issued). As a result, it is not possible in many audit settings to test the
correctness of the expert system's decision. The alternative in these situations
is to compare the system's conclusions with those of the expert. Note that this
testing is similar to earlier behavioral research on consensus.
I will not take exception with the fact that the field test of CFILE did not use
a formal experimental design. Buchanan and Shortliffe [1984] have suggested
that the validation process must be undertaken throughout the life of the
system and that the evaluations should get more formal as the expert system is
developed further. The authors admit that the system is still in the early stages
of development.
My comments are first directed at some relatively simple changes that
could have been made or added to the testing. First, it would have been
interesting to compare the results from the three subjects (expert partner,
second partner, and senior) with the conclusions reached by the audit teams on
each of these clients. Second, it should have been possible to use loans from
previous years where the client had already determined the amount collectible.
In this instance, the subjects' aided judgments could have been compared to a
known criterion. Both of these extensions would have provided increased
external validity for CFILE's performance.
In terms of the results of the field testing, the system does an excellent job
of replicating the expert's judgments. CFILE agreed with the expert in nine of
the ten cases. However, performance decreased with the second partner (69
percent) and the senior accountant (62 percent). Additionally, most of the
favorable performance is found on cases where no reserve is the suggested
answer. Seven of the ten cases evaluated by the expert without CFILE result
in a no reserve answer and the second partner agreed with all of those cases.
I am not sure how valid it is to look at the reserve versus no reserve
results. It seems to me that differences in the size of the reserve is an
important criterion to measure because it relates to materiality. Certainly, the
results that examine only the cases with reserves are not very encouraging.
However, these results are quite limited since they only include three cases for
the partners.
Kelly, et al. contend that the differences in the performance of CFILE can
be attributed to two possible causes: (1) interface or communication problems
and/or (2) the depth of the knowledge base. The first cause is correctable but
may be more difficult than the authors speculate. Hansen and I have encountered this problem in some of the recent field testing of EDP-XPERT.
Sometimes the wording of the question (and its explanation) can cause the user
to misinterpret what is being asked or cause the user to make an incorrect
assumption. We might expect this type of problem in an area such as auditing
where there are no "natural laws.'' I do not know if there is an easy solution to
this problem. Adequate training with the system may be one alternative.
The second cause, depth of the knowledge base, is an even more difficult
problem. The authors acknowledge that the current prototype has a number of
limitations (e.g., cashflow and bankruptcy analysis) and that there is a need to
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refine the knowledge base to handle more basic information. However, the
results indicate that the system handles easy cases (i.e., no reserve) quite well.
The difficulty occurs when the system encounters a case where more judgment
is required (i.e., the situation where a reserve for the loan is required). It is
such loans that are of real interest to the auditor. From my perspective, it
appears that it will be necessary to do some detailed refinements to handle the
more difficult cases. As a suggestion for future testing, it would seem
appropriate to add more cases where a reserve is necessary. It is important to
test the boundaries of the system's capabilities.
It is unfortunate that we do not have more detail on the protocol data. It
would be interesting to compare the decision processes of the two partners,
both with and without the use of CFILE. Such an analysis might provide
important insights into expert auditor decision-making.
This last comment raises an important area for future research: auditor
expertise. While a lot of effort has been devoted to developing expert systems,
relatively little research has examined expertise. There are a number of
questions that we are unable to answer at this time. For example, how does an
expert become an expert? We know very little about this process. How do
expert auditors categorize their specialized knowledge? Do experts use
different types of memory structures than novices? Answers to these types of
questions will improve our understanding of expert decision-making and may
contribute to building better expert systems3.

Summary
Kelly, Riber and Willingham should be commended on this work. Construction of an expert system is a long process full of many ups and downs. I look
forward to seeing the results of the ongoing development of CFILE.

End Notes
1. It should be recognized that there will also be ongoing maintenance costs for updating the
knowledge base after the system is introduced into the field.
2. In the questionnaire used in Hansen and Messier [1986b], the question "An expert system
when fully developed should be able to explain decisions to auditors" received the second highest
agreement score: 1.59 on a - 2 (disagree) to + 2 (agree) scale, out of 13 questions.
3. There is a growing recognition in the expert systems literature [Buchanan and Shortliffe,
1984] that a better understanding of how experts solve problems may be necessary before expert
systems achieve expert level performance.
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The Work of the Special Investigations
Committee
R. K. Mautz
In describing the work of the Special Investigations Committee, I must
assume that you already have some understanding of the SEC Practice Section
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, its purpose,
structure, and self-regulatory program. If that is a false assumption, there will
be time for questions during the evening. I warn you, however, that you ask at
your own peril. My interest in this remarkable effort is such that you may learn
a great deal more than you ever wanted to know about the profession's selfregulatory program.

Initiation of the Special Investigations Committee
When the AICPA's Division for CPA Firms wasfirst created by resolution
of Council in 1977 with an SEC Practice Section and a Private Companies
Practice Section, the organization of the former Section did not include the
Special Investigations Committee. The self-regulatory program relied completely on peer review for the improvement of audit practice, supplemented, of
course, by the Section's membership requirements. Peer review was an
adaptation of the internal inspection programs utilized within many firms to
assist them in maintaining a uniformly high quality of audit work throughout
what, in some cases, was a dispersed and decentralized practice.
One of the first matters identified by the Section's Executive Committee
for consultation with its Public Oversight Board related to the action to be taken
by the Section with respect to an alleged or possible audit failure by a member
firm. What investigative activity might or should the Section undertake and
what possible disciplinary action should be imposed? To provide you with a
basis for appreciating the sensitivity of this issue, let me take a few minutes to
discuss litigationfrom the viewpoint of a CPA firm.

The Litigation Problem
With exceptions so rare as to be nearly nonexistent, no one sets out to do a
bad audit. Professional opinions differ as to the amount of audit work required
under varying sets of conditions, judgments with respect to the propriety of
accounting methods, provisions, and estimates are not always the same, and
the work is often performed, unavoidably, under pressures of time, client
concern, and plain old uncertainty. Consequently, there is almost no audit that is
189

completely secure from criticism, no matter how diligent and professional the
effort.
Combine these facts with a legal system that permits class action suits
proposing damages of staggering amounts, and assessing joint and several
liability so that the CPAfirm may be charged not only with the share of any loss
that its activities may have caused but with the entire loss, whoever was
primarily at fault, and accountants' concerns increase. Now recognize that
litigation under our present legal system is an extremely complex undertaking
with many factors besides professional performance of audit work in compliance with established standards bearing on the outcome, and you can begin
to comprehend in some small degree why CPAfirms resist every and any
action, however otherwise desirable, that they believe will weaken their ability
to defend themselves in the face of litigation.
Historically, the AICPA has taken the position that it should keep clear of
litigation involving members unless the suit was perceived as a threat to the
profession as a whole. The rationale justifying its position is that the legal
system is fully equipped to determine the validity of allegations of audit failure,
and certainly far better provided with mechanisms and means to protect the
rights of all parties to such a contest than could be any organization not
possessing equal authority and means. Hence, possible charges of ethical
misconduct against members for alleged audit failures are held in abeyance as
long as the member is involved in litigation.
One more factor requires consideration. At the time the SEC Practice
Section was faced with this problem, litigation against major CPAfirms was
increasing in number and infinancial importance to the point where such actions
were considered highly newsworthy. Thefinancial press, which had for many
years shown little interest in accounting, was then featuring stories alleging
audit failure accompanied by substantial losses to investors and others, and
some critics of the profession were crying for stern reprisals.

The POB Recommendation
In brief, these were the realities facing the new SEC Practice Section and
the Public Oversight Board when the Section addressed its question to the
Board. What should the Section do in the way of self-regulatory measures when
charges alleging audit failure werefiled either in civil litigation or by a regulatory
agency? The POB's response was prompt and to the point. The following
words are taken from the POB's annual report for 1979-80.
After extended study, the Board concluded that protection of users of
auditedfinancial statements should be the dominant consideration in any
action taken by the Section with respect to a possible audit failure. The
Board recommended that a permanent committee be established to
monitor, and to determine what action, if any, should be taken with
respect to alleged or possible audit failures involving member firms.
The principal purposes of the committee and its monitoring efforts
would be to determine whether facts relating to any audit failure indicate
that auditing standards are inadequate or that the quality controls of the
member firm need strengthening. In developing these primary purposes, the Board concluded that disciplinary proceedings directed
toward the punishment of a member firm were of less immediate
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importance, particularly in view of the fact that the firm and individuals
involved in an audit failure would be facing punitive and compensatory
actions by governmental and regulatory bodies and by private litigants.
Nonetheless, the Board recommended that the Section have the
authority to institute formal disciplinary proceedings in those circumstances where such action is deemed appropriate, notwithstanding the
pendancy of litigation or governmental action.

The SIC—Composition and Operation
The Section accepted the recommendation of the Public Oversight Board
and appointed a nine-member committee composed of active and retired
partners, all with extensive audit experience. By the rules of the Section,
member firms are required to report litigation charging deficient audit performance to the Section within 30 days of receiving notice of such litigation.
Accompanying this notice is a copy of the official complaint. Staff members
assigned to the Special Investigations Committee forward copies of the
complaint to the members of the committee and proceed to prepare a summary
of the case including the staffs recommendations for action by the Committee.
Though few in number, some cases are so without merit that no investigation is required. Rather the case is closed on staff recommendation plus a
reading of the allegations and financial statements by committee members.
For most cases, the chairman of the SIC at the next meeting assigns the
case to a one or two-person task force to work with the staff in formulating a
recommendation to the committee. Working with the staff, task force members
read the complaint, the relevant financial statements and any press notices and,
in case of an investigation by a regulatory body, any available releases. They
may also andfrequently do meet with representatives of the firm to learn how
the firm has responded to the charges, read the most recent peer review
report on the firm's quality controls, and may meet with members of the peer
review team to obtain additional information. The task force does not have the
right under normal conditions to see the working papers or interview the staff
members involved in the audit in question. In a few instances, firms have made
personnel who participated in audits that are the subject of litigation available to
a task force, but this is the exception rather than the rule. At the date of this
presentation, SIC members have no authority to "investigate" the case in
litigation. Their concern is with the subject firm's quality control system only.

The Confidentiality Requirement
Two points deserve attention here. When the SIC was first established, the
profession's concern for litigation resulted in a requirement for complete
confidentiality for SIC activities. Members of the committee are not to discuss
matters under investigation with anyone other than committee members and
members of the staff who serve the committee. No one attends committee
meetings but its members' staff and representatives of the POB. Within a
meeting, discussions are free and open. The POB staff keeps itself and the
POB members fully informed on developments as SIC inquiries proceed. Once
the SIC has completed its work on a "case," all working papers and notes are
destroyed.
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Recall that the purpose of the SIC investigation is not to try the case; that is
left to the judicial system. Its purpose is to determine, first, whether the
professional literature is lacking in instructional material to aid professionals in
responding to similar circumstances; second, to discover whether weaknesses
exist in the design of or compliance with the quality control system of the firm
involved. Neither of these purposes, at this time, is considered to require
access to the audit work papers of the case under litigation or to the personnel
involved in that audit.

Confidentiality and SEC Oversight
The Securities and Exchange Commission is charged by the Congress with
responsibility for oversight of the CPA profession. In meeting that responsibility, the SEC staff has access on a stratified random sample basis to selected
peer review working papers and to the working papers of the POB staff
resulting from its peer review oversight activities. The SEC does not have
access to SIC working papers nor to the working papers of the POB staff in the
performance of its oversight with respect to the activities of the SIC. The SEC
staff takes the position that without some access to SIC activities, it is
foreclosed from formulating any valid conclusion as to the effectiveness of that
committee. The SEC staff has refused to accept unsupported statements from
the POB that the SIC is functioning effectively and well. Time after time we
have been told that if the SIC is ever to be accepted as an effective part of the
self-regulatory program, some way must be found to provide the SEC with
more access than it now has. That would constitute a breach of confidentiality
that the memberfirms have not as yet been willing to accept. Negotiations are
still in process. It seems inevitable that a solution to this impasse be found if the
self-regulatory program is to be fully accepted.

SIC Courses of Action
In the original organization document for the Special Investigations Committee, provision was made for an initial investigation of the implications of the case
that could be followed by (a) a continuing monitoring of the case for subsequent
developments, (b) an investigation of the firm, or (c) an investigation of the
case. Monitoring was utilized when it appeared that the investigations of a
regulatory body of some kind might produce information relevant to the
committee'sfinal decision and not otherwise available to the SIC. When the
information available to the committee was such that there appeared a strong
likelihood that the firm's quality control system had not been effective, the
committee could call for a special investigation of the firm's quality controls.
This might run to a review of the firm's quality controls with respect to a given
industry, a given office or offices, or the work of specific professional
personnel. Just what an "investigation of a case" might entail was not clear.
Not long after it began operation, the committee found it necessary to
undertake a limited number of investigations of firms (which soon came to be
referred to as "special reviews"). A number of these have now occurred.
Needless to say, nofirm desired to be thefirst one investigated by the SIC and
to this day, no firm seems to welcome a special review. They do occur,
however, and I will describe their results in a moment.
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No investigation of a case took place, however, and none has to date. As the
committee acquired experience with these matters and as the philosophy of
self-regulation developed, the members of the SIC became convinced that they
could perform their function satisfactorily without ever undertaking an investigation of a case. That is, their purposes, as stated above, could be met with
special reviews directed at the firm's activities in a given industry, or at the
functioning of specific offices or personnel, without going directly to a case in
litigation. That is where the matter stands at this time.

Effect of a Special Review
What results from a special review? First, consider the obvious fact that the
self-interest of any firm is best served by bringing damage control to bear on a
problem as rapidly as possible. Contrary to the apparent expectations of some
critics, this does not consist solely of employing the best legal talent available,
although that may be necessary. If there is a weakness in a firm's quality
control, it must be repaired immediately or additional damage may occur. If that
weakness is one of personnel rather than system, repairs are still necessary.
This may involve transfers of personnel, other changes of assignment,
remedial training, improved supervision, or, in some cases, termination of
employment.
In most cases, by the time an SIC review of afirm has been mounted, the
firm has already taken measures to shore up its system of quality control.
Where this has not yet occurred, recommendations by the SIC are unequivocal
and are followed up to assure that whatever the deficiency in quality control
was, it no longer constitutes a threat to the public that relies on thefirm's audit
opinions.

Professional Acceptance of the SIC
How has the work of the Special Investigations Committee been accepted
by the members of the SEC Practice Section? At the beginning, it met with
very mixed enthusiasm. There was general recognition among the member
firms that something of the sort was needed. The attention being given to
allegedly unsatisfactory audits demanded that the profession have a mechanism
for dealing with them, and there was more than a suspicion within the
profession that strengthened audit procedures were both possible and needed.
But when your own firm is the one threatened with the need for and the cost of
a special review, then the "dedication" of the SIC bordered on "overzealousness." With time, however, and the necessity of responding in writing
to thefindings and recommendations of a special review, there has come a
reluctant but general recognition that the SIC is a necessary and useful part of
the self-regulatory program.

SIC Procedures
What happens at a meeting of that committee? After some preliminaries by
the chairman and the senior staff member present, generally designed to bring
the committee members up to date on developments within the Institute and
the Section that bear on the work of the Committee, the chairman leads into an
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organized discussion of the cases on the committee's agenda. Each member
assigned to serve as or on a task force reports on activities concerning that
case since the last meeting. That activity may have been a discussion with firm
representatives, with the leader of the team for the most recent peer review,
or, in the case of a special review, a visit to an office to supervise the review of
quality controls and audit work papers. The intent in reporting is to convey to
the rest of the committee the understanding acquired by the committee
member so that when he offers a motion either to close the case, to monitor it,
or to initiate a special review, the rest of the committee will be in agreement.
Some cases are closed rather quickly because the allegations are so general
as to have no real meaning and the review of thefinancial statements in
question shows no deficiencies related in any way to the allegations. Others
remain open for some time while a variety of inquiries take place and the
committee member assigned satisfies himself that he has learned everything
necessary to make a reasonable and supportable recommendation to the
committee.

Quality of SIC Activity
How satisfactory is the work of the committee as an essential part of the
self-regulatory program? Overall, I regard it as an essential feature of that
program. SIC work is generally of very high quality. The astuteness and
dedication of the chairman, the quality of the staff, and the support of the
section's membership are all important. Ultimately, however, the work is done
and the recommendations are made by the members of the committee. Any
committee of nine members selected from different firms and possessing
different backgrounds of experience and authority will experience some
unevenness in its work as those members undertake their assignments. The
chairman and the staff can do much to overcome shortfalls in diligence and
pursuit, but not all.
The committee has been blessed with high quality members and with some
whose concern for the profession is genuine and apparently limitless. I continue
to be impressed at what people who love and respect their profession and have
high standards can accomplish in making others aware of the necessity and the
opportunity to bring about change.

A Personal Evaluation
I attend almost all SIC meetings and occasionally participate in task force
meetings withfirm representatives. I think of SIC members as secret heroes.
Questioning fellow practitioners from other firms about the quality of their
work is seldom pleasant and can be very difficult. Refusing to accept ready
answers, penetrating to the heart of possible failures, hanging on to a line of
questioning until satisfactory answers are received are far from easy. And all
this must be done with the utmost confidentiality. There is no discussing one's
work with one's partners. SIC members received few plaudits; there is no fan
club. But those who have served a term on that committee and have performed
to the best of their ability have made an important contribution to the well being
and to the environment of the profession, and they have strengthened the selfregulatory progam immeasurably.
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